Tjerandsen -- Education Citizenship

Preface | Introduction | Chapter 1 | Chapter 2 | Chapter 3 | Chapter 4 | Chapter 5 | Chapter 6 | Chapter 7 | Chapter 8  | Chapter 9 | Bibliography | Appendices | List of Acronyms | About the Author


Chapter 9

What Was Learned

The resources available to the ESF for grant-making purposes were relatively modest, being in this respect similar to many other foundations. At the same time, the ESF's concern with citizenship was and is shared by other donors although not necessarily in a community context. This report was written, therefore, in the hope that the experience of the ESF might benefit foundations as well as other organizations, scholars and practitioners concerned with improving citizenship through education and action. This final chapter is intended to summarize what was learned from our experience and is divided into two major parts. The first deals with what the Foundation learned about making grants. The second summarizes what was learned about the development of civic competence. More specifically, the second part will be concerned with such questions as the following: In organizing the citizens of a community, to what does one appeal? To self-interest? Should all elements in a community be encouraged to join? Is staff help necessary? Is confrontation or conciliation the more appropriate tactic? What principles are useful in helping young people prepare for adult citizenship? How can leaders be trained? How can groups facilitate citizenship education? These are only some of many relevant questions. We begin, then, with what the Foundation learned about making grants. As a basis for this, some descriptive material on its mode of operation will be useful.

What Was Learned About Effective Functioning of a Foundation

After stating in his will the general purposes for which the Foundation was to allocate its funds, Mr. Schwarzhaupt stipulated that its grant activity be terminated within twenty-five years of his death.

My reason for imposing the restrictions and conditions in connection with the period of disbursement ... is because of my conviction that in the long run society is benefited by having each generation solve its own problems and provide the necessary funds for so doing, and that endowments, in order to be responsive to the ideals, wishes and needs of each respective generation, should be created by such generation.

In fact, almost all of the current assets were disbursed by 1965. Subsequently, some relatively nominal grants were made following the rather protracted liquidation of some parcels of real property.

Foundation Organization

The initial group of trustees consisted of two close business associates of the founder and two attorneys who had also been associated with him. Later, three additional trustees were added in accordance with provisions of Mr. Schwarzhaupt's will, "one to be selected by the then presiding head of the Catholic archdiocese of the city of New York, one by the then acting president of the Federal Council of the Churches of New York and one by the then acting Rabbi of Temple Emanuel of New York City."1

During the Foundation's active grant-making period, the trustees met semiannually and annually thereafter. Their remuneration was limited to travel expenses. All of the officers were also trustees except for Leonard Rieser, who served as vice-president before becoming a trustee, and except for the assistant secretary and assistant treasurers, this latter post being filled during the Foundation's active period by Marie Ganley (who had been personal secretary to Mr. Schwarzhaupt and later to his partner Leo Gerngross, who was one of the original trustees) and by Ruth McCullum. Following Miss McCullum's death, Therese Powell became assistant secretary and assistant treasurer. Except for this staff support, the only staff employed by the Foundation was the executive secretary, who served on a part-time basis. This function was performed by me, beginning shortly after the meeting of trustees in April 1953, at which time the report of the University of Chicago Committee was presented and discussed.

The Applicants

Before discussing how a pool of applicants came about, it should be understood that at no time had Mr. Schwarzhaupt, or the initial group of trustees, seriously considered the possibility that the Foundation would either undertake educational activities on its own or commission others to implement a program. In fact, in a document entitled "Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation, Inc., Tentative Plans for Factual Survey," reference was made to a consensus reached at a meeting on November 17, 1950, that it would be unwise to attempt direct activities. Instead, it was assumed that a sufficient number and variety of applicants would come forward so that the Foundation could invest its funds in a manner appropriate to the established criteria.

Although there had been no invitation from the Foundation to submit applications, there was a reference to Mr. Schwarzhaupt's interest in better citizenship when his obituary appeared in the newspapers. Later, the University of Chicago issued a news release concerning the grant to establish the Committee on Education for American Citizenship. In addition, certain applicants to the Foundation had received gifts from Mr. Schwarzhaupt during his lifetime. Some applications may have come about through word of mouth once the faculty of the university became aware of the grant's existence. No doubt, another source was the questionnaires mailed to various organizations and agencies, when the material for the directory of civic organizations was assembled. Acquaintances of acquaintances of trustees may also have learned of it, Of course, once grants were made, agencies and organizations at least tangentially involved with grantees, or alerted by grantee news releases, were moved to apply for assistance. Eventually, hundreds of applications were received. In any case, whatever the sources, by the end of 1952 the Foundation had received thirty-five applications which the committee was asked to review.

Discussion with the trustees at their meeting in November 1952 covered proposed areas for Foundation activity and suggested criteria for judging applications. Appraisals of the applications received up to that time were then prepared.

Criteria for Judging Applications

The reports of the Chicago Committee having been reviewed and discussed, the trustees decided to accept their general tenor but to de-emphasize support of research programs as a major objective. Attention then turned to the decisions which would have to be made on specific applications. At this point, certain criteria had been formulated which were to guide the executive secretary in the review of applications.

1. Did the application fall within the established guidelines concerning Foundation purposes? Was it intended to change behavior appropriate to an individual's role as a citizen? Would it help a group learn how to function more effectively in the pursuit of some public purpose? Excluded by such questions would be assistance to help a group get a traffic light or build a school-unless the project would also involve helping people to learn how to accomplish such goals.

2. Were the proposed activities consistent with the stated aims of the proposal? In some proposals, the activities themselves seemed to be their own end, unconnected with the ostensible purposes. Or the applicants failed to show how the activities might be expected to change citizen behavior.

3. Could we conclude that the applicants were competent? Did the proposal exhibit sufficient clarity of thought to indicate that they knew what they were talking about? Did the applicants appear to have the understanding, interest and skills to complete the project in a competent manner?

One difficulty with such questions, of course, was that the persons with whom one discussed the proposal were not necessarily those who would carry out the work. And in some cases there was a great discrepancy between the former and the latter in outlook and/or ability. Furthermore, we expected the applicant to have had a history of experience which could be judged and a conclusion reached as to the likelihood of the objectives being pursued effectively. We tried to find informants familiar with the applicant's record who could assist us to make such judgments. It was our expectation that the persons involved should be known to someone who could speak to their competence, integrity and judgment. Beyond this, we expected that our grantees would be honest in their handling of funds. In retrospect, it appears that our grantees were basically middle class. Almost without exception we have some confidence that funds were handled by grantees in an aboveboard manner.

We are not saying here that we expected grantees to exhibit a conventional cluster of middle-class values, such as one might find in the membership of a small town service club. Rather, we hoped that the values would, where appropriate, include a concern about justice, for example, and a willingness to try to achieve it in spite of the possible unpopularity of such efforts. That is to say, some of our grantees were controversial. The trustees recognized that the IAF and Highlander programs were controversial, and in spite of the possibility of criticism they continued to provide support.

4. Was the proposed program practicable? Would the resources available be adequate to deal with the particular situation? In several cases, inadequate attention was given to this criterion. The objective circumstances proved to be so negative, that the proposed program was in fact hopeless. (A neighborhood house in an urban redevelopment area would be a case in point. The existing circumstances would not be sufficiently amenable to change.)

5. Was the probable cost sufficiently small in relation to expected benefits to warrant support from the Foundation's modest resources?

These were the principal criteria invoked. However, in some cases they were not probed far enough, or the answers elicited from informants were wrong, or at least lacking in candor. Because at the beginning we knew less about the general field than we did later, the criteria did not prevent some diffuseness in the range of projects funded. In more cases than I like to recall, my conclusions (hence, recommendations to the trustees) were faulty. In other cases, we had doubts about the outcome but felt that it was important to take a chance-in which case we might limit the term of the grant to permit a review of progress, to determine whether further support should be given.

In addition to the above criteria, there were exclusionary rules. On September 7, 1938, the board of trustees had adopted a resolution that no grant would be made unless the application qualified for exemption under the internal revenue laws. This action was taken to protect the tax-exempt status of the Foundation and the deductibility of gifts made to it. As a further matter of policy, it was understood that no grant would be made to any organization appearing on the attorney general's list of subversive organizations.2

The Review Process

The process of reviewing applications varied according to the relevance and complexity of the project for which funding was requested. In some cases, a quick reading of the first paragraph resulted in a recommendation to reject the application; a contribution toward a building did not fall within the Foundation's allocation guidelines. In other cases, the complexity of the proposal might require much more study. The various possible steps in this review process are described below.

1. The application would be analyzed as noted above. Sometimes, additional written information would be requested from the applicant. Most applications, however, could be rejected without much ado because they clearly did not fall within the foundation's purposes.

2. If the project seemed promising, a visit would generally be made to talk with the applicant. A key area for exploration had to do with two questions. First, how clearly could the applicant describe the purposes of the project and justify their relevance to the development of civic competence? Second, could the applicant demonstrate that the purposes and the means to achieve them were mutually consistent?

It was of critical importance to determine whether the applicant understood his own project. Some applicants sought grants avidly as a way of keeping their organizations going. Others merely had a wish to do good, and the wish was taken as the equivalent of thought. The result was that the application would consist of vague generalities. These generalities might embody some worthy intention, but efforts to elicit specific statements concerning ends and means expressed in concrete terms would prove unavailing. In such cases, of course, there could be no basis for approving a grant. In one instance, the applicant was unable to discuss the important elements of the request other than in the same words and statements contained in the application. This led to a concern on my part that the applicant was not really aware of the nature nor the implications of the commitment involved.

One of the most important lessons learned by the Foundation was that we could not take for granted that the applicant understood the proposal. Sometimes the purposes as stated, even though understood, were so general in scope that they could not serve as guides for action. Furthermore, many applicants were unable to justify the proposed activities in ways which were clearly connected with the original purposes. Their grasp of their project was inadequate. Information would also be elicited from other sources in the community concerning the reputation of the applicant, the effectiveness of its program, and the relevance and importance of the work proposed.

3. In some cases, the advice of experts was sought. For example, in one instance involving work with Indians, anthropologists were asked about the reputation of the applicant's work in this field.

4. Following the visit to the applicant, an appraisal would be written for distribution to the trustees in advance of each meeting. Each appraisal would include a précis of data on the applicant, a description of the proposal, comments as to its validity, its relevance to Foundation purposes and the executive secretary's opinion as to the competence of the applicant to carry out the stated intention. The report would conclude with a recommendation as to what disposition should be made of the application.

The comments concerning the validity of the application might range over a number of points. One application (in several variants) was rejected four times, The principal thrust of the initial application involved distributing pictures of great men in order to promote patriotism. The appraisal noted the weakness of a great man theory of history; the inadequacy of including only generals and explorers in a list of great men; serious factual errors had been made, for example, stating that the amendments to the Constitution did not have the same status as the original document; American history could not adequately be treated without reference to social institutions (other than slavery), processes, issues or problems; the proposed educational methodology was utterly naive; the grantee was interested in gaining acceptance of a preferred set of conclusions, without recognizing the role of a spirit of inquiry; and the absence of any treatment of the logistics which the project would require. But as I have said, some applicants were difficult to discourage.3

In sum, the appraisal questioned the validity of the specifics of the proposal, pointed out that it did not fall into either of the specified areas for Foundation support nor did it qualify as a project in the residual area which would promise significant contributions to citizenship education at minimum cost. Appraisals ranging over such a variety of issues sometimes became lengthy, but even when there were several projects to be considered, the trustees had never failed to review the documents in order to contribute to the discussion which followed. They were prepared to discuss them in the light of their own reading, education and years of experience as persons of affairs-experience grounded in a commitment to democratic values, and a belief that every individual should have the opportunity to develop his abilities as a citizen.

In addition to the appraisals, the trustees were provided with monthly reports prepared by the executive secretary. These reports indicated what applications had been received; results of meetings held with grantees or would-be applicants, with comments on anything of likely interest to the trustees; and summaries of reports received whenever appropriate. Special attention was given to information on grantee successes and failures and their possible implications. The result was that the trustees had available to them a significant amount of information on each application as a basis for their decision. As each application was brought up, I would summarize the appraisal and any other material which had come to my attention in the interim. I was expected to contribute to the discussion which followed. It should be noted that, normally, applicants did not appear at board meetings. (I can recall only one exception.) The discussions demonstrated the trustees to be keen thinkers, persons whose experience of life had provided them with a sense of the wide range of possibilities inherent in human interaction. A favorable decision on an application was not made unless it reflected a consensus. If any trustee expressed a significant reservation concerning an application, it was rejected.

Grant Term

One of the critical questions to be resolved in connection with a grant application was the length of time for which the project should be supported. In each project there had to be a beginning, a middle and an end. Sometimes the Foundation supported a project for too long a time, as, for example, the Kenwood-Ellis Community Center. At other times, it should have provided support for a longer time. A review of the Foundation's grant history shows that three years was the most common commitment for initial grants although there were several variations. A three-year term had a certain plausibility about it. It seemed to make sense to think of the first year as a time to get started-employing staff where needed and getting the work well underway; the second year as a period in which the project would be moving steadily toward its goal through the full range of its planned activities; and the third year as the time in which the various elements of the project could be brought together and consolidated, that is, either completed or brought to a stage in which the grantee would be able to carry on without further support.

In any case, some twenty-four initial grants were made for three years, sixteen for one year, thirteen for two years and one for four years. Others, not accounted for in this list, received grants for a specific purpose not involving a definite time period. Of the twenty-four grants made for a three-year period, fifteen involved attempts to organize a community. As the reader will recall, in very few of these cases was either program or financial viability achieved. In the case of some of these failures, there may have been several reasons. In the case of Hull House, there were at least three reasons: the untimely death of the central staff figure, the overpowering political force controlled by the West Side bloc and the power of the bulldozer which eventually wiped out most of the community served by the grantee. In other cases, the grantee was simply not competent to achieve viability, regardless of the time frame which might have been agreed to.

Among the three-year projects, there were, however, some of the largest and most significant including Highlander Folk School, the IAF grants for the CSO and TWO programs, Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, South Chicago Community Center, Benton House and the National 4H Club Foundation. Others included the Migrant Ministry (MCEP), NCCC in Lackawanna and the American Indian Center. In some cases, of course, three-year grants were followed by renewal grants of up to three years (for example, IAF and Highlander).

As to those projects in which a different time frame was stipulated, in practically every case where a one-year grant was made, the applicant had requested it. In such cases, the Foundation did not urge a longer period, preferring to have the option of not refunding a program if it did not seem to warrant further support. All of the AFSC grants in support of the Interns-in-Community Service projects in Chicago and Oakland, and the community project on the Oglala reservation at Pine Ridge were made on this basis. It may be that the AFSC preferred a one year commitment because of its reliance, in many projects, on volunteer leaders who could not be counted on to be available on a multiyear basis.

The reasons for two-year grants varied. In the case of the initial AID grant for Crownpoint, the Field Foundation, which matched our grant, was unwilling to provide more than two year's support. Kenwood-Ellis Community Center requested support for two years because it wanted to start with a land use study and report as a prelude to an organizing effort, The grant to Hudson Guild was made for three years, but with a proviso that the third-year grant would depend on whether progress during the first two years was considered satisfactory. In this case, the grant was renewed for the third year on the basis of data indicating substantial organizational development. A good deal of local leadership had been identified that had learned to function more effectively than previously. It was in the third year, unfortunately, that the project collapsed over the issue of Penn Station South. This eventuality might have been foreseen but could not have been predicted with certainty unless the intentions of all the parties involved had been known. In the case of several projects (Better Housing League, the United Community Fund, Roosevelt University, Goddard College, Civic Education Center, Girl Scouts, and Encampment for Citizenship), only a two-year grant was requested. Subsequently, several of these groups were refunded for periods of up to three years.

The projects involving work with American Indians clearly should have been considered in a class by themselves. The closer the participants were to reservation life, the longer the period of time, it appeared, they would require to learn how to cope with the pressures of white society. We cannot say that we learned how long such a project should continue; our experience was too meager. The project at Crownpoint was funded for approximately seven years, and this amount of time was too short. Whether additional funding would have enabled the chapter leaders at Crownpoint to provide the kind of effective leadership their constituents needed is difficult to say. For one thing, we are not sure that the project staff would have been in a position to remain much longer. But equally important was the change in tribal politics resulting from the large inflow of funds from oil and other mineral leases. With progressives taking over control of tribal affairs from traditionalists, additional time might very well have made no difference in the outcome. Speaking to this question several years later, however, the AID director thought that an additional five years would have enabled the Crownpoint leaders to deal with their world more effectively and not be pawns in a game almost wholly controlled by others.

Termination of Support

We have discussed how projects were started. It is reasonable to ask how projects were terminated. Unfortunately, the termination of grants was not given nearly as much attention as was the giving of a grant. Nevertheless, a few points can be made. The Foundation had expressed its intention to maximize the results of its grant program by trying to arrange for reporting of results. What was done about this and what the outcomes were will be discussed below under the heading of evaluation and reporting. Nevertheless, it is relevant to mention here that the preparation of a final report does or should help to clarify what has been done and with what results in an orderly fashion. So, in a sense, the requirement that the grantee produce a report "suitable for publication" helped to "shape the termination."

One problem which must be of concern to any foundation is the difficulty experienced by grantees when the grant runs out. In a number of cases, therefore, the grant provided for funding on a decreasing scale, with the grantee having to raise the difference between the grant and the total budget from other sources-presumably sources which would provide for more continuity than is typically the case with foundation funding. The second three-year grant to the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference is an example of such a terminal grant. (Subsequently, a two-year grant was made for a special project.) In this case, we cannot say that the arrangement was successful even though the conference continued to flourish. We cannot claim it because the existence of the grantee or its program did not depend upon the ESF grant.

In a few cases, grantees were asked to secure matching funds from other sources. This requirement did not work very well, For example, one organization, which functioned on a nationwide, even international, scale simply allocated sums from its general funds to the specific ESF-funded project. The letter of the grant requirement was met, but it was not precisely what the Foundation had in mind. It was our expectation that the local program unit would raise money in its own community to support the activity and that if successful in raising such matching money, the prospects for continuity would be enhanced. In this case, efforts to locate responsibility in the local community were only meagerly successful.

One other response on our part should be mentioned as having helped to shape the ending of a project. In several cases, we extended the period within which grant funds were to be spent and a report completed. This enabled the grantee to spend the funds in a way more consistent with the local time frame, as happened in the case of the YWCA/Mississippi District. In another instance, a small supplemental grant was made to allow certain activities to be completed over a six-month span. In three other cases, unexpended funds were returned to the Foundation. When the Chelsea Community Council was dissolved, a small balance was turned over to the ESF, as was the remainder of the $14,800 granted to the IAF for organizing work among Puerto Ricans in Chelsea. In the third circumstance, the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago proposed to end the organizing efforts pursuant to its project and asked for permission to turn over $32,875 to the Association of Community Councils. It was our feeling that to do so would, in effect, establish a new project even though there had been a close relationship between the ACC and the WCMC. A decision to support the ACC should, we felt, be based on a separate evaluation of a proposal by the ACC. The funds were, therefore, returned to the ESF. An ACC application was subsequently reviewed and denied on the ground that its prospects for success did not seem sufficiently likely.

Effectiveness of the Review Process

It is a humbling experience to review the history of our grant activity, especially when one notes how much was given to projects which, in retrospect, had so little chance of success, or proved to be poorly conducted, and how cautious we were at times with grantees whose efforts turned out to be successful. It would probably have been productive to have given more support to Highlander Folk School. However, the failure of the person to complete the report which he had been commissioned by Highlander to prepare and for which he was paid might have affected our response to a request. Furthermore, there was a lack of communication concerning the potential effectiveness of certain workshops for college students, for which funds had been requested. As it turned out, the workshops held in 1960 and subsequently had direct impact on the organizing of citizenship schools, especially in Mississippi. (In addition, it should be pointed out that the Students Non-Violent Coordinating Committee was founded by a group of college students who had attended a 1960 workshop at Highlander) But we were unaware of the potential of college student involvement in such schools at the beginning.

Sometimes we gave more funding to a project than we should have. Sometimes, we were concerned about the size of the request, particularly in the amount of certain proposed elements of expenditure and, therefore, negotiated certain reductions. But this was a step taken only with caution. To overrule the applicant was to remove some of the responsibility from the applicant for the project result. In retrospect, too, it can be seen that the analysis of the practicality of a particular project was quite inadequate. The grant to the National Conference of Catholic Charities was a case in point. A more hardheaded look at the prospects might have diverted a significant amount of money to more promising experiments. The NCCC project was intended to assist groups in one or two locations to initiate development of a citizens organization on the basis of organizational methods and principles used by the Industrial Areas Foundation. For such an experiment to be successful, vigorous leadership at the top would be necessary. The risks inherent in Monsignor O'Grady's advanced age were not sufficiently appreciated, and within a relatively short period, he was unable to provide such leadership. A second requirement was a local group which understood and was committed to the experiment. It developed, however, that changes in the communities, in which the projects were expected to be initiated, made it necessary to terminate the commitments. A period of several months ensued before other participants could be found in other locations. The urgency to get started somewhere else resulted in an orientation process inadequate to the task of securing a knowledgeable commitment to the enterprise. A third factor involved the staff training element of the project. Training of project staff was to be provided by the Industrial Areas Foundation. Unfortunately, the perennial over-commitment of its personnel, which characterized IAF operation resulted in a less than adequate training experience. This is something that should have been foreseen. A fourth factor had to do with the inherent limitations of the communities finally selected. More attention should have been paid to the accelerating deterioration of the economic base of the city of Butte, for on this base depended the prospects of the citizen organization for achieving financial independence. In the case of Lackawanna, the fact that it was overwhelmingly a single-employer town and given its anti-politics history, the obstacles to a successful result were serious. A more thorough and realistic appraisal of the chances might have prevented these grants from being made, or, at least, refunding might not have been granted.

One more example of a decisive element, only dimly appreciated at the time, involved Hudson Guild and the Penn Station South project. Although it was known that a major housing project was coming, its overwhelming impact on the community was not understood. Fully as important was the fact that the Foundation did not know, until much later, that at the same meeting at which the grant was announced, the Hudson Guild board adopted a resolution supporting the construction of Penn Station South. These two actions, in effect, placed the applicant in a conflict of interest situation.

Such speculations, of course, arise more readily in retrospect than in advance. Given the wish to experiment, for example, with respect to the applicants' ability to apply IAF principles in other situations, it was necessary to take some risk with respect to future prospects for the projects involved. There was another consideration, impossible to assess in advance, which had a decisive influence on the course of several projects. Unfortunately, the element of change to which the Foundation's own program was responding, was also at work in the projects to which grant support had been given. It became increasingly apparent that the kind of quality of personnel employed by grantees to carry out the funded projects were of critical importance. The decision to make a grant included, of course, an assessment of the ability of the staff of the applicant agency or organization, but what determined success fully as much if not more was the character of staff subsequently employed to carry out the work. But even where this was known, as in the case of the grant made to University College of the University of Chicago to explore how more effective block organization could be achieved as part of community organization-a change occurred within a few months. The individual who had written the proposal and was to carry out the work left the area for personal reasons. The replacement knew little about block organization, and, indeed, his experience and expertise were in the area of group dynamics and the field of human relations. Although the addition of a second staff person may have helped to restore some of the original emphasis, the character of the project was changed. In another case, where the staff person was employed subsequent to the grant (Goddard College), an approach to working with communities was developed that differed from what the Foundation expected on the basis of the initial discussions with the applicant.

There was a further hazard, in addition to changes or decisions with respect to staff personnel, and that had to do with the change within the applicant agency itself. The most conspicuous example of this was the project conducted by the South Chicago Community Center, where the facilities and program were taken over by a different church denomination and the staff terminated. Intrying to determine the success or failure of a given project, it must not be overlooked that for many the dice were loaded against them. In several cases, a settlement house or neighborhood center was in reality faced with what became a hopeless task. Although the Kenwood-Ellis Community Center did not distinguish itself in trying to carry out its project, the implications of an almost total turnover of population in its area within a three-year period cannot be ignored. In the case of Hull House, Ed Hulbert's vision of what could be achieved if a general plan were developed was useless in the face of the existing political realities. The system supported the large Italian community in its position that there must be no change at all, on the one hand, and, on the other, it backed the determination of propertied interests, supported by city agencies, to bulldoze old neighborhoods out of existence; thus, only a bit of Hull House was left, a tiny island in a new sea of brick and mortar, to remind the passerby of what once had been.

Ongoing Relationships with Grantees

The question of how much involvement there should be between a grantor and grantee is a critical one. At what point does raising questions or offering suggestions tend to constrain the grantee, perhaps, to the point of vitiating the project? We understand that some foundations review the application, perhaps interview the applicants, make a grant and then leave the grantee to carry out the work until the project has run its course. This approach would be quite the reverse of that of the Rockefeller Foundation, which in the case of its University Development projects abroad became virtually a partner in the activity, even supplying personnel. During the institution-building phase, which might last from five to ten years, there would be a critical mass of outsiders introduced into the situation. The Rockefeller Foundation staff would be active and aggressive.  Later, the role would become more like that of an advisor, the principal activity being to propose ideas. But throughout these phases, their personnel would be actively involved.

In the case of the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation, this aspect of the executive secretary role varied, depending upon the nature of the project and the extent to which the activity overlapped my own experience. Because of our commitment to our rationale and because of the inherent difficulties experienced by grantees in achieving the objectives of improving civic competence, site visits were occasions for raising questions. But questions were raised by letter also. Several grantees were kind enough to say that this was quite helpful to them, especially with respect to seeing more clearly what it was that they wanted to do and how they might proceed. One such intervention involved the Industrial Areas Foundation.

The aim of its CSO program in California was to develop the abilities of Mexican-Americans through their involvement in community action. They did learn to act. My question to Alinsky was: To what ends are the actions directed? Was there not a need, I asked, for some kind of educational program to help those participating in the action programs to consider why they were doing what they were doing and with what results? These questions led to subsequent proposals for funding, to make available persons who could conduct educational activities, which in certain communities had a profound effect on the operations of Community Service Organizations. One of the later proposals provided for the employment of women as educational leaders also in order to increase the informed participation of women in the CSO program. After some initial hesitation, this program was given strong support by Fred Ross, who was in charge of organizing for the Industrial Areas Foundation in California. He recognized that better informed members would be invaluable to the organizing effort. But when funds were requested by the IAF to organize in Woodlawn in South Chicago, no funds for such purposes were listed. This omission seems consistent with the view that Alinsky was not an educator at heart. It was the power of the organization that mattered.

In the case of the 4H Club project, I offered to indicate something of the range of possible commitments which might be made under the rubric of citizenship education. This was done in a three-page memorandum. Three major emphases were developed: the state and political process, the citizen as determiner of policy and the citizen as requiring certain character traits. Something of the range of choices possible in connection with each of the three was also set forth. The principal value probably lay in pointing out that conclusions about ends and means could not be taken for granted; choices must be made.

A different relationship developed with the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago and the Metropolitan Housing and Planning Council. To recapitulate briefly: These two metropolitan level organizations applied for support at the same time; were proposing to work at a neighborhood level in the same city; and the program activities proposed by them-though clearly different-were, nevertheless, closely complementary. That is to say (with respect to the last point), the WCMC proposed to hire field staff to assist community organizations to form, or, if already in existence, to become more effective. The MHPC proposed to hire a field staff to provide technical assistance to any such organizations which wanted help on housing, planning, zoning or urban renewal problems. The need for and value of coordinating their efforts, rather than ignoring each other, seemed obvious. The desirability of trying to bring about such coordination was discussed with the trustees at their spring 1956 meeting, and it was agreed that the applicants should be approached on the matter. Subsequently, Leonard Rieser, vice-president of the Foundation, whose office was in Chicago, undertook to open discussions with the two applicants. The presidents of the two organizations approved of our suggestion, and, in due course, project directors and staff of the applicant organizations formed a group to monitor coordination activities, pursuant to a joint understanding by the two applicant agencies. It is our impression, however, that once the formal agreements had been drafted and agreed to, and the funds released, very little joint activity ensued. At least, only meager acknowledgments are made in the final reports of the commitment to joint action.

Why did it not? There were probably several reasons. (1) Most important, there was too little shared ground of concepts, values and professional goals on which the two staffs could meet and work together. (2) The MHPC could not wait for the WCMC staff to develop a community organization with which the MHPC could work. And in any case, the WCMC staff was only minimally successful in organizing or promoting the effectiveness of existing neighborhood or community organizations to a stage of development such that the MHPC involvement would be appropriate. In this connection, the MHPC report noted that community organizations were "more concerned about issues than their capability as organizations, and the issues in most cases were urban renewal and conservation." The report goes on to assert that the same could be said of the Association of Community Councils through which the WCMC was trying to work. And (3) cooperation, even had the staffs felt a genuine commitment, would depend in part on visible evidence of the possibility of successful collaboration in specific cases. Success, of course, depended upon the willingness of city agencies to work with local groups. But such cooperation on the part of city departments and agencies was not very evident although, "maximum feasible participation" on the part of local citizens was legislated as a fundamental principle.

In the end, cooperation and coordination could not be imposed from above nor from the outside. Each group was the prisoner of its own rhetoric, grounded in its own professional values and perceptions. To the extent that there were significant differences in these respects, cooperation would be unlikely to result. The memorandum of understanding between the two applicants quickly became a dead letter, if, indeed, it was not stillborn. We do not know that our effort to promote cooperation between two grantees worked to their disadvantage, except for the wasted time and effort involved. On the other hand, there is no evidence that there was any beneficial result,

A different kind of intervention occurred in the case of the AFSC Interns-in-Community Service program. Sometime after our support began, we proposed to the AFSC that a study be made to discover whether and to what extent changes took place in participants consistent with the objectives of the project. In this case, the attempt to get the grantee to agree to something not contemplated in the original application seemed to have turned out well. It provided the Foundation and the AFSC with evidence of tangible progress toward project objectives and pointed the way to desirable changes in the larger program of the AFSC. It also contributed significant information to the field at large concerning the citizenship education of young adults in residential situations.

Reporting on Project Experience

The Foundation's concern with reporting was expressed in a variety of ways.

1. Our general practice was to make production of a final report a condition of grant approval, this requirement being waived in only a few cases. In requesting a final report, it was usually stated that it should include a discussion of the aims or purposes of the project, as well as a description of the activities to be conducted. In addition, there was to be an explanation of the relevant principles for making the program work and a demonstration of the mutual appropriateness of the activities and purposes. Usually, I would meet with the applicant to discuss the kinds of information and insights we were interested in receiving. An outline of topics to be covered would be developed and confirmed by letter.

In several circumstances, grants were made with a budget item earmarked for preparation of a report.4The results were mixed. In the case of Hull House, a substantive, detailed history of its citizenship project was prepared by a member of the history faculty of Roosevelt University. Produced in mimeographed form, it is a gripping story of the dynamics which defeated a vision of the good of a whole community. But the report focuses almost entirely on what happened in dealing with the problems of a deteriorating urban environment and hardly at all on the changes in the residents. However, the lack of information on this latter point can properly be attributed to the lack of substantive activity involving citizens per se.

In view of the critical importance of the results, it is especially regrettable that the sums made available to Highlander Folk School and to the Industrial Areas Foundation for the preparation of reports were never adequately redeemed. In the case of Highlander Folk School, the individual commissioned to undertake the necessary study and report could reasonably have been considered fully competent to present an outstanding document. Unfortunately, a debilitating illness, becoming progressively worse over time, prevented the work from being done.  The writer accepted and used the funds but never produced the product. Fortunately, Aimee Horton undertook an exploration of the historical development and significance of the school and its program as her doctoral dissertation at the University of Chicago, and this document was most helpful in the preparation of this report.

It is ironical, too, that the recipient of the largest grants (the IAF) did not fully meet its report commitments either, even though $5,000 had been made available for that purpose. A lengthy narrative document was produced by Fred Ross which contained a great deal of valuable material, but its structure and direction did not conform to the original charge which Alinsky had accepted. In an effort to extract as much value as possible from this material, I proposed to Alinsky that he undertake to annotate this manuscript, to underline the principles and tactics with respect to their interrelationships. He agreed but failed to do so.

2. In several instances, where it seemed that a substantive program had emerged, that a project staff member with writing ability was available and that a publisher might be interested, additional funds were provided to make the writing possible. For example, a special grant was made to enable Algernon Black to take the necessary time to write a book on the Encampment for Citizenship program. In addition, a subvention of $2,500 was made available to the publisher to enable the price of the book The Young Citizens to be reduced.

Similarly, a special grant was made in the case of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference to make it possible for Julia Abrahamson to write A Neighborhood Finds Itself. In addition, the Foundation assisted in the negotiations with Harper and Brothers concerning its publication and distribution (which were further supported by a subvention). A grant was also made for preparation of a final report on the Migrant Ministry's Migrant Citizenship Education Project. The report was published by Friendship Press under the title Dignity of Their Own. According to the Migrant Ministry, the press run was to be between 50,000 and 100,000 copies. They were to be extensively utilized in the 1966-1967 men's discussion programs in various denominations, the theme of which was poverty.

3. In a few cases, where the activity appeared to be generating significant results, arrangements were made to provide additional support to strengthen the reporting process. For example, the AFSC Interns-in-Community Service was judged to be such a project. And because a competent research group was available and interested and because the grantee was willing, an arrangement was made with the National Opinion Research Center to make a scientific study of the program. The results were published by the NORC under the title "The Young Volunteers: An Evaluation of Three Programs of the American Friends Service Committee." In the case of the Encampment for Citizenship, the initial grant was made to support a research study by Herbert H. Hyman and Charles R. Wright ("Youth inTransition"). Later, the results of this research were combined with studies of other encampments and published under the title Applications of Methods of Evaluation: Four Studies of the Encampment for Citizenship by Herbert H. Hyman, Charles R. Wright and Terence K. Hopkins.

4. In 1967, the Foundation asked Herman Blake (a member of the faculty in sociology of the University of California at Santa Cruz and whose father had been born on Johns Island) to spend a summer in the Sea Islands and in Woodlawn to see what more could be learned about the results of these projects. He received excellent cooperation from Highlander, and was able to spend a great deal of time with Esau Jenkins, Septima Clark, Bernice Robinson and others.  His insights were very helpful. (It is gratifying to note that a principal focus of Blake's research subsequently became concerned with the Sea Islands and the developments there. In addition, Daufuskie Island and St. Helena have become the locus of an active field study program of the Santa Cruz campus.)

Blake's attempt to explore the results of the Woodlawn project received very little help from the grantee. In fact, Alinsky refused to see him apparently because of his own involvement in the writing of Rules for Radicals. This was unfortunate because at that time the situation in Woodlawn was not one to make it easy for strangers to learn much about the community and its activities. Nevertheless, the descriptions of the work of various Woodlawn subgroups were very valuable in documenting the kinds of changes in civic competence resulting from the work of TWO. Woodlawn presented a unique problem for the Foundation from the standpoint of reporting because it became such a closed community to outsiders. Although Reverend Arthur M. Brazier's book describing TWO filled in a great many gaps, it did not supply sufficiently pointed information for our purposes on achievements in the area of citizen behavior. It was necessary to rely on inferences from the data available.

5. In addition to final reports, we asked for copies of any annual reports published by the grantee, as well as reports on an annual basis specific to the activities covered by the grant. We also requested copies of current newsletters produced and distributed by the grantee. The latter kind of material was valuable because it usually provided an ongoing record of activities involving outside groups, which in turn gave some clues to the nature and success of activities of grantees. From such information, inferences could often be drawn as to the kind of training such activities were providing for participants in the project.

In spite of these several devices to ensure adequate reporting, the reporting requirement turned out to be difficult to implement. In the first place, grantees were primarily concerned with the activities for which they had requested support.5 They were interested in achieving some goal. They wanted to do good. They saw the obligation to devote energy and time to the preparation of a report as a diversion from their main concerns. Second, many lacked a conceptual framework and the skills needed to prepare an adequate report. Third, writing is for many people a highly disagreeable task. A fourth difficulty was that changes in staff introduced different perceptions of the ongoing activity, together with some loss of awareness of what had gone on before. The new staff, not having made the commitment to produce the report, understandably did not feel the same obligation to do so. And, of course, some projects were buried by external events, as, for example, in certain redevelopment areas.

In retrospect, it might have suited the Foundation's purposes better to have employed full-time staff to insure getting as much data from the grantees as possible and then producing a summary report covering the range of Foundation activity (or, alternatively, producing a series of reports on different aspects of the Foundation's grant-making activity). This, of course, could and should be supplemented by evaluation and reports by outside groups, which could bring to a particular project the specific expertise lacked by the Foundation.

What might have been done differently in order to improve project reporting and evaluation? (1) It is the view of the trustees that it would have been desirable to have supported more evaluative research studies like the NORC and encampment studies. (2) The study made of the League of Women Voters by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan was, of course, a substantive scientific effort. Perhaps the Foundation should have initiated discussions with the center and league on the desirability of publishing the results in more appropriate form and for wider distribution. And (3) there were also other reports which, even though they were not the equivalent of technical research surveys, were substantive enough to have merited publication. Included in this group are D'Arcy McNickle's report on Crownpoint, Paul B. Johnson's historical analysis of the Hull House project, Ernestine Neff's report on the American Studies Program of Roosevelt University, and Glenn Dildine's extensive documentation on the 4H Club Foundation's citizenship program. Hindsight indicates that Foundation attention and funding would have been better directed toward assisting in their publication than to supporting some of the community organization projects which we funded-except for learning something worthwhile about what not to do.

For the majority of projects, the best we can say about them is that perhaps they did some good and little harm. Furthermore, we can only try to infer from the sometimes meager reports, the reasons for failure to achieve the results hoped for. But there are other projects where some kind of further investigation would have been useful. We did make an attempt to do something in the case of the American Indian Center in Chicago. In considering how to assess the AIC contribution to the improvement of civic competence, it occurred to us that it might be helpful to have a series of case studies of individuals who had been active in the AIC. Robert Rietz, executive director of the AIC, believed that the internal program of the center, as well as those activities involving cooperation with outsiders, provided suitable and acceptable opportunities for center members to relate to the outside world without unduly compromising their Indianness. We felt that a series of extended interviews in the Chicago area, especially with persons involved in some leadership role in the program, would have made it possible to document behavioral changes relating to civic matters. When this was proposed to Rietz, there was no reply; the condition of his health would not permit it, and his death followed soon thereafter. It was not feasible to pursue the matter without him.

There were two other possibilities for study, both relating to the CSO programs in California. First, the astonishing expansion of the adult class programs in English and citizenship, which had been organized by the various CSO chapters, has never been documented. Yet, it surely was one of the most significant single activities ever undertaken in conjunction with community adult schools in California. This task might still be done as an important contribution to the historical record, for it contains lessons still relevant to the promotion of basic education of adults-provided there is involvement by an effective community organization. The second opportunity which the Foundation did not pursue concerned the "educationals," which had such a powerful impact on those CSO chapters where they took hold. Had an independent study been undertaken at the time, some very valuable insights could have been gathered about the interrelation of education and action.

There were other projects in which an interview approach could have yielded valuable data. A follow-up in selected areas in South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama would have determined the extent to which citizenship schools helped to develop community leadership. The South Chicago Community Center's report on its work in Trumbull Park Homes did not describe the adult individuals and the tasks each performed, nor whether community skills learned within the SCCC framework were ever employed in other contexts. The same could also be said about those who worked in the Chelsea project, the Earlham program in Kentucky, and those who took part in the Migrant Ministry training program in California and the young leaders in the Benton House clubs.

Unfortunately, in the beginning, we relied too much on grantee reports and failed to provide sufficient funds for the documentation of progress made toward achieving objectives. By the time it became clear that we would not get much of the evidence we expected, it was too late to pursue alternatives. In the end, out of the forty-three projects for which a final report was required, there were seven final reports published in letter press; ten mimeographed documents, in some cases consisting of several volumes each, which had been prepared by competent social scientists; twelve reports by grantees suggesting a significant basis for certain conclusions; and five projects which supplied somewhat fragmentary materials, from which at least some conclusions might be drawn. We can say something useful at least about thirty-four of the forty-three projects.

Evaluation

Like any institution which undertakes to bring about certain changes, the Foundation was concerned to find out whether a given effort had achieved any significant success.6The question seems simple, but getting useful answers was not so easy-especially as the answers depended on activities carried on by others and, furthermore, on what evidence they could provide of success or failure. In addition, concealed in this seemingly simple question were other questions with which grantees were not ready to deal effectively. For example, some were not really clear about their objectives, nor were they certain about what constituted evidence of progress toward them.

It should be made clear, too, that although we expected grantees to be honest and prudent in their expenditure of funds, our reporting requirements did not concentrate on this. Nor were we looking for a mere recital of activities. Rather, we wanted reports from the grantee showing clearly what was done and why, what difficulties were encountered, what results could be identified, what reasons could be advanced for observed successes and failures in reaching the objectives and the consequences that flowed from these results. By paying attention to such matters, we hoped both parties would obtain a clearer picture of the reality in the situation. By raising such questions with grantees, we were asking them to test their perceptions of reality. Is the situation really what they think it is? We were trying "to help the operator to see potentialities for improvement they may otherwise have overlooked."7

In summary form, our evaluation approach embodied the following elements: (1) The goal of the Foundation was to assist applicants to bring about certain changes in individuals, that is, improvements in their abilities as citizens in a democratic society; and (2) these changes in behavior involved changes in ways of thinking, feeling and acting which were specific to citizenship. Some examples of such behavior were gaining information concerning requirements for voter registration, developing understanding of an issue such as conservation versus redevelopment of a neighborhood and learning to think creatively about how to apply zoning regulations to improve conditions in a neighborhood. Feeling in one's citizen role might refer to developing an attitude of acceptance of others for what they are as individuals-free of stereotypes; developing a conviction that joining with others to try to solve neighborhood problems would be worthwhile; developing a willingness to serve in some capacity, say, as chairman of a committee; gaining the courage to stand up for one's rights: and developing a sensitivity to the rights and feelings of others. Acting in a citizen role would also imply a range of possible behavior: gaining the skills of leading a discussion on some problem or issue facing one's group or neighborhood and learning to organize and conduct a campaign to solve such a problem.

Acting includes thinking and feeling, behavior which becomes effective in action as one gains the skills to mobilize the strengths on one's own side (if that is the appropriate model in the given situation) to surmount the obstacles to achievement of a goal. Anyone of average intelligence should be capable of understanding these models of behavior. Yet it became obvious that in almost all cases applicants had never thought about their programs in this way. The 4-H Club study staff was, of course, an obvious exception. But county 4-H Club agents, when asked what they were doing to achieve citizenship objectives, would merely respond by listing activities which they conducted.

Hence, a good deal of my discussion with grantees about final reports focused on the kinds of changes that might be brought about in the behavior of people. But to most applicants, a focus on behavioral changes had not been their starting point. Like the 4-H Club agents, their concern was with participation in some activity. It is our hope that these discussions enabled participants to identify more fundamental purposes than they had originally envisaged. That is, for a staff to bring about some result in the community would be less useful in the long run than helping the participants to bring about changes. There was also another aspect of the problem which presented difficulties. If a change were sought in some behavior (suitably identified and stated), how could one ascertain that progress had been made toward achieving it? What kinds of evidence must one look for? This question was also explored with grantees.

The following will illustrate some of the types of answers as to what might constitute evidence of progress toward objectives. (1) When blacks on Johns Island learned that payment of taxes on property above a certain value would qualify them to register, regardless of their ability to read, this represented evidence of their progress toward the objective of gaining information about their rights of franchise-gaining information is an aspect of thinking. (2) When CSO members in Stockton studied the proposed urban redevelopment project which would affect their barrio, they learned that annexation meant their homes would be condemned because they could not meet housing code requirements and that any purchase payments would be applied against welfare payments previously received, Through the discussions in an "education" meeting they came to understand (another aspect of thinking) that every interest would benefit but themselves. (3) When I asked an old man what the CSO meant to him and he replied, "Senor, we are no longer afraid," he was providing evidence of a gain in courage, a most important kind of change in feeling. And (4) when the president of a local group appeared before the city council for the first time in his life and argued effectively in support of his group's position, answering questions, countering objections and marshaling arguments, he had learned to act as a leader of a group.

In addition to the items discussed above, attention was also given to exploring with grantees the kinds of data needed for evaluation. If precise data could be produced, this would be welcome. But one must not confuse precision with relevance.8Very often, common sense data could be very helpful in establishing what and why it happened, with what result and what, if any connection existed with subsequent results. As already noted, these simple examples seemed difficult for grantees to grasp and place at the core of their reporting. One reason for this may be that the goals of grantee and grantor were usually not the same. We were interested in people acquiring new, or improving existing, behavior appropriate to citizenship. The grantee would typically be interested in forming an organization or solving a problem. The grantee report would emphasize activities carried out rather than changes in various attitudes involved in the role of citizen. Hence, the hoped for changes in individuals had to be inferred from grantee reports. However, certain reports did provide direct evidence of behavioral change. The most noteworthy were the NORC report on the AFSC Interns-in-Community Service and reports by the Bureau for Applied Social Research on the Encampment for Citizenship. These evaluation research studies provided substantive, detailed evidence of behavioral change, especially in attitudes.

There is one further point to be noted. It was stated earlier that the trustees had no intention of initiating projects to achieve their goals for the improvement of American citizenship, either as direct undertakings by Foundation staff or by contracting with others. At the same time, we have acknowledged our discussions with grantees, in which we raised questions about what they were doing. In the process, we challenged their assumptions and questioned the mutual consistency of their objectives and activities. And we talked with them about participant activities as embodying various citizenship functions and about ways of encouraging change in citizenship behavior. For some grantees, such questions had the effect of pushing them into new ground. Most of these, I believe, welcomed the new perspective, but not all. Alinsky moved in this direction only grudgingly. He, after all, saw the goal as the building of power, and the problem was to teach local leaders his way of achieving power. In conclusion, insofar as the questions I raised significantly changed the grantee's goals and its conception of how to achieve them, then to that extent the Foundation's view had had some measure of influence on the grantee's view. To that degree, the Foundation shared some responsibility for the project.

What Was Learned About the Improvement of Civic Competence

I come now to the question of what was learned from grantee projects about citizenship education. The answers will be dealt with in two parts. The first part is concerned with what was learned about the reasons for success and failure in the formation and operation of citizen organizations established more or lesson a community basis. Based on the experience of our grantees, I believe that we can assert that certain principles and methods were more effective than others. Because this account is based on the projects supported by this foundation, it will not constitute a comprehensive treatment of the field. Nevertheless, the results are sufficiently useful to warrant offering statements about such matters as the appropriateness of the basic aim of the grantee vis-à-vis the people served, who should be included in a community organizing effort (anyone or just those with certain interests? individuals or organizations?), availability of local leadership, the need for staff and the reasons therefor, the possibilities for financing staff and other costs, confrontation versus cooperation as an organizational tactic and the comparative effectiveness of various kinds of sponsorship. The second part deals with what was learned about changes in participant behavior which were relevant to citizen roles. What kinds of changes occurred in ways of thinking, feeling and acting? Under what circumstances did they take place? What were the dynamics which appeared to be at work? Did participation in citizen organizations encourage significant improvements in civic competence? What can we say about the relative impacts of didactic instruction and of interactions of members of a group?

As noted earlier, in some cases the evidence on such questions is often frustratingly meager. Furthermore, by considering such problems separately (as we must), we are, in effect, trying to free the content of a given question from the web of interrelated variables affecting the interactions of individuals in a specific situation. Thus, in our attempt to grasp the reality of what has occurred, by looking at one element at a time, we do violence to the total picture. Hence, whatever we may say about any one element must usually be qualified by reference to other variables. Nevertheless, I believe something useful can be said.

What Was Learned About Community Organizing

Before proceeding to explore the principles employed, by design or otherwise, by our grantees in assisting the formation of citizen organizations, there are two general considerations to be noted. The first concerns those grantees whose projects involved a community focus and how they understood the idea of community. The second question, which arises from time to time, asks whether someone has the right to go into a community with the purpose of changing it. Although the latter point is not one which was raised in more than a very few cases, it did come up.

The Community as Understood by Grantees

Although an extensive literature on community theory does exist, our grantees, for the most part, did not seem to be overtly concerned with theory. The materials describing the various projects-American Indian Development, Community Dynamics Program, Goddard College, Industrial Areas Foundation, Migrant Ministry, Highlander Folk School, Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, and South Chicago Community Center do, however, contain statements which can be taken as overtly indicative of the nature of the community, that is, any community which the several grantees might seek to address. In certain other cases, elements of such a theoretical commitment can be inferred from the activities undertaken. In still other cases, the nature of the community seems to have been taken entirely for granted, and we are left with a mere description of boundaries or of ethnic composition or of some other variable applicable to a particular community.

For D'Arcy McNickle, the "community" referred to a cultural homogeneity, to kinship threads which bound the people together, rather than to mere physical proximity. It is a place where common interests are shared, where people work together, where trouble between people can be settled where it occurs, where there is mutual respect, trust and tolerance. Then differences can be resolved for the good of the group. But in this instance, these considerations are imbedded in a value system quite different from that of white culture. Hence, the worker from the outside must be extremely careful not to damage the community by inappropriate initiatives, no matter how well intentioned. In a community so conceptualized, the power of decision must rest in the hands of the people, to be exercised in accordance with their traditions, modified as they come to see the need to do so, in order to adjust as they see fit to changing conditions. For such a change to occur, there must be a process of self-realization. This process can be assisted but it cannot be imposed.

Strangely enough, the Goddard College project eventually came to a view of the community not so far removed from that of American Indian Development (AID). But the Goddard College project reflected a change in the concept of community between the drafting of the proposal and its implementation. Initially, the community was thought of as a locality which had not yet realized that its problems were to a significant degree due to a profound shift in the relative importance of agriculture and industry in Vermont. The proposed annual residential workshop (the establishment of which had been urged by the Vermont Labor and Farm Council) was thought of as a vehicle through which lay people and professionals in various state organizations would discuss the problems of the state and the resources available to deal with them. The fruits of their labors were to be conveyed to the local community level through their several contacts and be utilized there with the help of project staff.

The assumption that this process would work from the top down proved faulty. The anticipated connection between a statewide official or representative and a specific community did not materialize. And, in any case, the concept was quite at variance with what the project staff person believed. To see local people as the starting point was part of his definition of community. He saw them as being able to choose goals and move toward them in ways they would find satisfying, without his interference by way of suggestions as to community needs, to desirable activities or to methods of action.

Put in these terms, we can see some similarity to the AID concept of the Crownpoint Navajo community and of how the staff should work with it. A difference, of course, was that the Vermont community would vigorously reject what it would perceive as an attempt to infringe upon its independence. The Crownpoint Navajo would simply withdraw-but, I would expect, with their disillusionment remaining as a barrier to participation by an outsider in any future community development initiative. The responses would be different, of course, because the two communities differed from each other.

To William and Loureide Biddle, a community is a potential thing, an aggregation of people who have the capacity for cooperative, self-directed activity toward pro-social goals. The people are seen as able to become intelligently and ethically self-controlled individuals with the assistance of helpful but non-domineering friends. Each person is valuable, unique and capable of growth toward responsibility. Each has underdeveloped leadership abilities. Their abilities tend to emerge when they work together in small groups that seek to serve the common good. Although there will always be differences, they can be handled in such a way as to make the differences creative. The responsibility for the welfare of the whole (of all persons) rests upon responsible groups made up of responsible individuals. A concept of the common good can grow out of group experience addressed to the welfare of all residents in an area. This sense of community must be rediscovered for most people today. The goal is not the solution of this or that problem but to achieve "responsible competence to work on their problems."9 Ultimately, the concept of community derives from a Christian belief in the redemptive capacity of each human being. Like the AID and Goddard College projects, the emphasis in the Community Dynamics Program (CDP) is on the people and the need to respect them as the focus for change. The difference seems to lie in the level of initiative taken by the project workers in each case. In the AID, the staff stood ready to help, but only if asked. In the Goddard College project, the staff is only modestly more assertive. In the CDP, the Biddles went to a community and "visited around" on the assumption that there must be problems, which, after their articulation, the Biddles offered their services to help the community learn to solve.

The view of the community held by these grantees assumed that any resident should be able to take part in a community effort on a basis of equality with any other. Others viewed the community as containing adversary interests, one of which was to be chosen to be helped. The Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), for example, sought to organize those residents in a community who were the victims of discrimination because they lacked the power to secure fair treatment. Gaining and using power was necessary because otherwise those guilty of discrimination would not stop such practices. Appeals to good will, reason or justice were seen as likely to be ineffectual. The Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference (HP-KCC) defined its part-community as consisting of those residents who wanted to live in an interracial community of high standards. Therefore, it did not recruit among members of the real estate profession. Nevertheless, it felt that cooperation of the contrary-minded could be forthcoming if they could be involved in a realistic appraisal of the facts in the situation. Appeals to abstract moral principles were considered counterproductive. The South Chicago Community Center addressed itself to that group of parents in Trumbull Park Homes and South Deering who wanted a nursery school for their children even though it would be integrated. The South Chicago Community Center position on tactics was not too dissimilar from that of the HPKCC. Highlander also identified part-communities when it helped disenfranchised blacks through its training programs to become registered to vote. Each served a constituency needing help to get fair treatment from the larger community. Each also saw its constituency as needing help to learn how to carry on for itself when the project was over.

The Migrant Citizenship Education Project (MCEP) ostensibly saw the community in similar terms, its part-community being migrant workers, but, historically, it had also included establishment interests (churches, social work agencies, growers) in its program approach. Hence, its operations were somewhat ambivalent, attempting in some circumstances to try to serve two masters-which it could not successfully do. On the other hand, the Migrant Ministry staff in California identified about as closely with the approach used by Ross and Chavez as an evangelical organization could be expected to do. The difference lay primarily in the holdover in the MCEP of old patterns of providing services to migrants with a nod to the need for their own self-development and the emphasis given in the California trainee program for Migrant Ministry staff, stressing the importance of learning to help oneself, especially within an organization including one's fellows. (Between the ending of the MCEP and the eventual acceptance by several religious organizations at the national level of the idea of community development as a vehicle for service by the church to the migrant community, there seems to have been a change-not totally, but a change, nevertheless in thinking by MCEP staff as revealed in final reports on the Migrant Ministry projects.)

Even though there was a great deal of variation in what our grantees said or implied about the nature of the community with which they intended to work (and some said nothing about this), they all said something that was descriptive of the particular community in which the grantee proposed to work. The most obvious response to what constituted the community was to describe it geographically. This was, of course, an element common to all of the community organizing projects. Geographic boundaries were sometimes stated precisely, for example, by the streets bounding the community. In Crownpoint, the community was defined by those chapter areas, for example, a drainage area, whose leaders elected to travel to Crownpoint. In fact, the Crownpoint community expanded as leaders who lived farther away from Crownpoint than did the original group decided that it would be worthwhile to take part in the Navajo Development Committee meetings. Granted, however, that the geographic element was a necessary factor, the only project known to be affected in a decisive way by a choice of geographic boundaries was Hull House. Because the boundaries in this case included a large Italian area, controlled politically by the West Side, the way was blocked to gaining support for an urban conservation and renewal program.

In other cases, factors such as ethnic composition became part of the definition. So, in the case of the Community Service Organization (CSO) program, although articles and bylaws typically rejected ethnic exclusivity, in practice it was rare for a CSO member to be other than a Mexican-American. The citizenship schools, which evolved from the Highlander project, recruited blacks only.

The Woodlawn Organization (TWO) was not entirely black, but virtually so, the exceptions being a few white merchants and clergy and a few Latinos. But then, the Woodlawn community was almost entirely black by the time organizing was well underway.

Social class also proved to be a factor. As an example, the Freedom House project started because its middle-class members wanted to protect their substantial investments in their homes. Their immediate concerns were not those of the lower-class majority. And this touches on one of the most significant issues involved in assisting citizens to improve their communities: the question of who should be organized, which will be discussed below.

And, lastly, because no community organization included everyone in the community, those not sharing in the range of interests defined by the areas of organization activity would not be members of that organizational community. Hence, the specific elements which singly or in some combination served to delineate a particular community were geography, ethnic composition, social class and interests or concerns.

Who Decides to Organize?

Only four grantees (AID, Earlham College, Goddard College and the IAF) asked the question, By what right does an outsider enter (intrude) into a community to try to change it? AID, of course, would deny that it entered the community with intent to change it. And the IAF said that it responded only to an invitation from a community. In the other community projects, the Foundation acted on the premise that the situation in virtually any community could stand improvement, and if an outsider was willing to help on terms acceptable to community residents and in ways consistent with the Foundation's purposes, then a request for financial assistance should be considered. This view may seem straightforward enough, but insome projects, agreement on what was acceptable was less than community-wide because the organizing effort was directed only to a part of the community

But let us look at the various positions on this issue as revealed in the projects we supported. First, we should note that in a case like the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, the organizing effort was wholly indigenous. Intervention from the outside was not an issue. Second, in all the other cases involving the community, the grantee was in some sense an outsider. But within this group there were differences as to assumptions on whether change ought to take place and as to what the relationship of project and community ought to be.

The grantee most overtly concerned with the question of intrusion was American Indian Development. This was so because the staff did not see itself as coming to Crownpoint with the intention of helping the Navajo to change. If after considering the matter, the Navajo indicated a wish to move in a certain direction, and if they wished the staff to help them, the staff stood ready to do so. But when, at the end, they saw the group make a decision which the staff believed to be disastrous and which they might have prevented, they refrained from doing so because "saving the project" could not be done in this way. They would merely have destroyed the trust which had been built up, and they would have been perceived by the Indians as being just another group of manipulators of their future. The AID staff believed that they could be helpful but only if and so long as the Navajo could continue to trust the AID staff.

In its original form, the Goddard College project stressed a commitment to help communities solve problems which the grantee had already identified in part. But when the staff person was hired, he began to talk about the community as the place in which "areas, directions, motivation and methods of change--if any--are deemed to reside most meaningfully...."10The process was conceived of as entirely open ended. Changes would be important to a community only if they were self-chosen. The grantee's initiative was to be limited to offering to meet with a community group and to discuss what they would like to do and how the staff could help. All of the initiative was to reside with the local community.

The other community-oriented programs all involved some commitment to the notion that some kind of change ought to take place. But they seemed to differ as to the degree of initiative to be taken, and the amount of "guidance" to be given, by the grantee to the community. Highlander was probably closest in this group to the AID viewpoint. If queried about the AID position, Myles Horton would have understood it. At the same time, he would feel justified in taking a more active role while being careful not to preempt the community residents' responsibility for decisions. The principle steadily followed was that not only must the interested citizens in the community make the decisions but that the decision should be an informed one. This view emphasized change in the individual rather than solving a problem merely for the sake of doing so.

The Community Dynamics Program of Earlham College, like Highlander's, emphasized the development of citizen competence to solve their own problems "in contact with helpful but non-domineering friends."11 The central goal was not to solve problems but the growth of individuals toward handling responsibility. A difference between them, however, was that Earlham staff played a more active role in the community than Horton customarily did. The Biddles, assuming problems existed, went into communities to work with local residents.

When we look at other projects with a community focus, we find that each grantee believed that problems existed in the community and that assistance should be made available. The IAF wanted to help eliminate the discrimination practiced against members of lower socio-economic groups. Because it believed that powerlessness was at the root of the problem, its first task was to convince enough members of a community that this was a valid diagnosis and that something could be done about it. Nevertheless, Alinsky would say that the IAF would only undertake to organize in a community upon invitation of local residents. How bona fide an invitation this might be, it is hard to judge. Certainly, a significant group invited the IAF to come into Woodlawn. And in at least some California communities, local citizens requested assistance to set up a CSO like those they had observed or heard about elsewhere. But in most cases involving the IAF, some preliminary explorations and discussions by IAF staff preceded the invitation.

Other grantees, also servicing lower socio-economic groups, were more direct. The Migrant Ministry's MCEP staff simply kept looking until they found some individual or group with which to cooperate. Neighborhood houses considered themselves to be members of their neighborhoods, so, presumably, they did not view an organizing effort as an intrusion but merely as a way of helping their neighbors. Many lower-status residents, of course, might not necessarily look at the matter in this way. In the case of Hudson Guild, for example, it is doubtful that more than a handful of Chelsea residents were aware of the application for funds to support an organizing effort. But Hudson Guild saw the need to solve problems, including securing better housing, as justifying its taking the initiative.

If we think of the various initiatives described above as lying along a continuum, I would suggest that the National Conference of Catholic Charities (NCCC) projects represent the most arbitrary form of entering a community. I say this because the decision was two steps removed from the local residents. That is to say, the NCCC was in the position of having to find a local sponsor, which would then have the responsibility of managing a program it had not conceptualized in the first place. This circumstance would seem to have been a negative factor in subsequent events, especially in Lackawanna. It is remarkable that in Butte the sponsoring group accomplished as much as it did.

Upon reviewing the various attitudes of grantees toward undertaking some kind of organizing in a community, one may conclude that the AID position was grounded in a commendable fundamental principle, but does this make the IAF position wrong? I would not say so. The Crownpoint Navajo, as McNickle encountered them, were still largely members of a folk culture. To have tried to push them beyond what they would consider acceptable behavior would have been self-defeating. On the other hand, in California the IAF was dealing with people who could see that their interests were adversely affected by the rules and practices of growers, local governments, welfare departments and Immigration and Naturalization staff. They were anxious to fight back, once they were convinced it would not be futile. They might become disillusioned and apathetic upon failure to secure redress of their grievances, but it seems unlikely that hope would be shattered beyond retrieval.

On the basis of the record available to us, it seems to me that in only a few cases did the manner of entry into the community, or the differences in outlook between would-be server and those to be served, determine the success or failure of organizing efforts. In these few cases, the "invitation" was not real, or those proffering help differed so greatly from the community involved that little if anything happened. In Altoona, the Highlander staff workers who tried to start something, "from out of nowhere," as it were, were unable to overcome the mistrust of community residents. In Lackawanna, there was no real invitation; Catholic Charities of Buffalo merely agreed to accept and spend the money. There was no genuine burning desire to organize; the organizing effort never seemed to come to grips with interests and issues in the community. This could be said of several of the neighborhood house projects as well. Chicago Commons Association (CCA) and Hull House can be cited as further examples of the gap between the would-be helper and the community because of fundamental differences in values and perceptions of community needs. In sum, the Foundation took the view that so long as the grantee staff was prepared to work with community residents in such a way that the latter could make decisions on an informed basis, significant good and minimum damage might be expected to result.

So much for general considerations. Let us now turn to a review of what was learned, insofar as the record discloses it, from the carrying out of the various community-oriented projects.

Factors Affecting Success or Failure

In the pages which follow, I propose to describe some of the principles which appeared to influence the success or failure of efforts by our grantees to form and operate community organizations. The elements which seemed to be critical in these projects included the following: (1) Was the purpose to solve problems or to teach local citizens how to do so? This issue deals with the question of why the activity is undertaken. (2) Who was to be included? anyone or only those with certain interests? (3) What is to be the basis of membership? individuals or organizations? (4) How can prospective members be reached? (5) How is the program to be conducted? Are program elements mutually consistent? How are goals and activities to be decided? How are goals to be achieved? through conflict or cooperation? (6) Where may leadership be found? anywhere? Who makes decisions? staff or members? How can leaders be trained? (7) Why is staff needed? (8) How can organization costs be financed? (9) What considerations, if any, applied especially to Indian projects? and (10) How does the kind of sponsorship affect the result?

These points appear to have been critical to the success or failure of projects conducted by those grantees who undertook, more or less directly, to assist citizens to form community organizations. Although they can be treated separately, in practice they were, for the most part, interconnected. For example, if the purpose were to help citizens learn to help themselves, then the role of community leaders would be maximized and the staff role muted accordingly. In order to clarify the impact of the factors listed above, there follow selected illustrations of their effect in practice.

Basic Intent. It is not my intention here to review the wide range of the many specific project purposes. Rather, I wish to indicate the markedly different views held by grantees with respect to the basic reason for helping citizens form a community organization. Some saw the amelioration or solution of problems (for example, discrimination or lack of housing at affordable costs) as the reason for organizing a community. But of these, at least one grantee saw that solving the problem required the development of sufficient power to accomplish the result. This depended in turn on helping members of the organization learn how to build a power base. In a sense, however, being able to use power to eliminate the problem was primary and the learning was subordinate to that purpose.

Others, while not rejecting the solution of problems as desirable, saw the primary goal as bringing about changes in the behavior of people so that they could learn to take responsibility for deciding what problems to tackle, if any, and for solving their problems themselves. Those who held this view considered it, first, more consistent with an attitude of respect for the individual (which some felt to be an imperative, especially in some of the projects involving Indians), and second, a way of ensuring that the community would continue to be able to solve its problems after the grant ended. Another kind of purpose characterized only the United Community Fund (UCF) project in San Francisco. In this case, problem solving was eschewed by the staff in favor of trying to create a sense of community among neighborhood residents.

It should not be expected, of course, that our projects fitted neatly into the groupings just noted. There were gradations from one to another. Perhaps at one extreme was American Indian Development, which stood ready to help the Crownpoint Navajo learn how to deal with community problems but only if they wished AID to help them do so. AID would respond but only with great sensitivity. It would help only in ways which would not contravene basic values of the Crownpoint Navajo-even at the risk of "failing" to solve, for example, the problem of how to put the Community House and its service enterprises on a sound footing. The value of this emphasis on change in the individuals involved was recognized by the area director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs when he contrasted McNickle's approach with that of his own staff who have "no time to teach." The emphasis in their work was on conduct of a program to extend services. The changes needed in the individual to enable him to incorporate new possibilities into his mode of life tend to be ignored in the typical bureaucratic program.

Other examples include the American Indian Center. Its success in developing a sense of identity and self-esteem was directly dependent on the freedom of each participant in the center to create and test, in a sense, his own program. The American Indian Chicago Conference exemplifies remarkable growth in the outlook of many Indians, a growth which was possible because from the beginning it was made clear that this was to be an Indian program and not a program for Indians. The key principles were open communication and the right to decide. Other grantees also emphasized the importance of the individual's role in the process of organizing to solve problems. Highlander continually turned responsibility back to the individuals in the group to determine what should be done about a situation. The Community Dynamics Program, too, was concerned with the individual's development as the primary, though not only, goal.

Alinsky's approach was somewhat different. For him, there were twin goals. The primary goal was to achieve the solution of the problems identified by the organization and, secondarily, to develop the abilities of leaders and members of the organization (and staff, if there were any) to the point where an effective problem-solving organization could maintain its power on a continuing basis. Development of individuals was considered necessary to creating the organization power base upon which solution of problems depended. Ross, I believe, shared this position to a point. The principal difference would have been that Ross would place a relatively higher value on development of the individual.

On a smaller scale, the staff of the Metropolitan Center for Neighborhood Renewal (MCNR) although established to promote education and action to improve neighborhoods, especially its physical aspects, was very careful to encourage the local organizations with which it worked to take responsibility. Hence, the latter were able to develop the ability to apply what they had learned to new situations, taking and carrying out new responsibilities.

The Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, because of the complexity of its structure (involving a relatively large, high-status board of directors, hundreds of persons in block clubs represented by a Block Steering Committee and hundreds of volunteers coordinated by a relatively large professional staff), is more difficult to categorize. Because of the nature of the problems faced and the complexity of the urban renewal program and the fact that the conference must act in an uneasy alliance with the South East Chicago Commission and the University of Chicago, the staff at times took action which may have preempted responsibility that should have been exercised elsewhere in the organization. On the other hand, the staff went to great lengths to communicate to members and other residents of the community what the conference was trying to accomplish and what it was, in fact, doing. And, of course, the hundreds of volunteers learned much about working together to deal with public problems.

The Migrant Citizenship Education Project is of particular interest on this question because it shows the effect of conflicting purpose. The genesis of the project lay in the perception that those served by the Migrant Ministry needed the chance to learn to exercise greater control over their own lives. This required a shift from the traditional pattern of providing services to migrants under the aegis of local committees made up of Migrant Ministry staff, church and other agency personnel and growers. In reality, however, customary practice sometimes prevailed. For example, at the first public meeting held in two of the communities to determine whether a commitment should be made to continue organizing efforts, it was the MCEP staff member who reviewed the purposes and history of the organizing activity and only then turned the meeting over to a local leader. An excellent training opportunity for the local leader was missed. Fortunately, in this case, the organization was able to continue on its own. But in Metro Heights, organizational growth was dampened by the emphasis given to improving welfare services. Gradually, however, the staff began to function in ways that were more nearly consistent with project goals.

In contrast with the projects just discussed, there were others in which the grantees did not seem to appreciate the importance of participant involvement in decision making, of participant responsibility for managing their own affairs or of learning how to establish and maintain a continuing framework for local action. On the Pine Ridge reservation, for example, Indians were asked to serve on a committee advisory to the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) staff-the reverse of what should have been done had the goal really been to help Indians to take responsibility for their situation. In the case of Freedom House, the social work-trained staff continued to do things for the community organization (serving as officers, chairing meetings, etc.) instead of encouraging the members of the organization to take responsibility, The Citizen Participation Project staff of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago (WCMC) complained about one community group because it wanted to discuss physical facilities rather than social welfare problems. To try to decide which problems local citizens should discuss is certainly an extreme example of denying organization members the right to take responsibility for decisions about matters fundamental to building a viable citizen organization.

In sum, we have seen that while circumstances differed in different communities, in general, projects committed to the development of individuals were more successful in helping communities than those which were primarily concerned with the solving of problems and without due regard to the right of and need for community residents to take responsibility for the decisions affecting them.

Who Should Be Included? There were two principal positions on the question of who should be recruited into an organizing program. A third view was applicable to only one project. One principal position was that organizing can only be done effectively by bringing together individuals who share or can be brought to share a sense of certain needs or problems. The other was that one and all should be invited to join and work together to help solve community problems. Of those who reflected this latter position (principally social work-oriented persons), some did so from the conviction that it would be morally wrong to exclude anyone from a community organizing effort. Others may not have seen an issue on this point at all but merely assumed that a community effort should include everyone. The third position was really not concerned with solving problems as such but saw the purpose as developing a sense of community as an end in itself.

The rationale for the mutually reinforcing cluster-of-interests position, that is, organizing on the basis of interests and issues, included several elements. First, it made sense to some grantees to recruit members who would have a strong motivation to work for the organization. Second, it was important that the interests be diverse enough to ensure bringing in sufficient members for the organization to become powerful enough to make a difference. Alinsky, especially, urged these principles. Third, it was important not to incorporate interests which were inimical to the goals of the organization. To do otherwise would be self-defeating. For this reason, the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference deliberately refrained from recruiting among groups affiliated with the real estate industry in order not to compromise its goal of building an interracial community. This principle was not fully observed, however, in the case of the Community Service Organization (CSO). Typically, a CSO would be organized on the basis of a cluster of issues which, as a whole or in part, would appeal to less-advantaged Mexican-Americans. (Almost no Anglos or blacks were members.) These issues/problems included discrimination with respect to naturalization, police activities and access to social welfare and employment. When a CSO devoted itself to such issues, it achieved a significant base. But when middle-class elements joined to share in CSO-achieved power and status and in the process succeeded in moving the program emphasis away from confrontation on issues which embarrassed middle-class members, the bulk of the chapter membership vanished. (The consequence of such frustrating developments in one CSO after another contributed to Cesar Chavez' decision to organize farm workers into a new kind of union, that is, one that would be free of the tactical clichés of the existing union organizations and free of the internal incompatibilities which led ultimately to the breakdown of the CSO program. The fact that the union was limited to farm workers in itself ensured that the cluster of interests principle was being applied.)

The cluster-of-interests principle was even more successfully applied in The Woodlawn Organization (TWO). Many issues such as fair business practices and better health programs were of concern to all. As for issues of concern to low-income members, such as welfare, no evidence came to my notice that such issues were a problem to middle-class members in Woodlawn. Although its ESF project was very successful, Highlander is somewhat more difficult to analyze in relation to this cluster principle because it did not take responsibility for organizing communities as did the IAF. Nevertheless, it did train leaders and potential leaders, and in certain circumstances its staff assisted local leaders to organize citizenship schools.

Who, then, constituted the community to be addressed? The citizenship school program, for example, included only blacks, but all of them were interested in supporting the goal of acquiring the franchise. Although this goal could not be openly opposed by any black, some would hesitate to declare themselves on so dangerous an issue. Therefore, the goal determined the membership; hence, the success of the organization was unlikely to be vitiated by self-canceling struggles in the organization (except, of course, as struggles for control might ensue). And once voter registration of blacks reached significant levels in a community, interest in political campaigns, both in issues and candidates, followed.  Then others could visualize the possibility of reducing discrimination in jobs or access to services. A series of compatible interests could grow and attract corresponding support. The Highlander programs supported by ESF and others were perhaps as successful as any to which we contributed in part because they were based upon a cluster of compatible interests.

The consequence of failing to recruit on the basis of a compatible cluster of interests can be seen in the MCEP project in Fruit Plain. In fact, initially there was a failure to include minority group representation at all. When such persons were invited, it became obvious that they wanted to have nothing to do with migrants and their problems. Only when a leader of a group of recent dropouts from the migrant stream was persuaded to try to bring other blacks like himself together with black migrants could an organization begin to coalesce. The problem of the MCEP was that it could not quite erase from its memory the notion that the Establishment committee in the community was the proper starting point-in spite of basic incompatibilities of interest with migrants.

The effectiveness of associating compatible interests, even in the face of overwhelming odds, was forcefully demonstrated in Trumbull Park Homes. In this case, a sagacious, dedicated social worker staff was able to build an interracial group of parents, concerned for the welfare of their children, into an effective organization in spite of the violent, anti-black, anti-welfare campaign waged by the surrounding community. When certain church groups tried to make integration the issue, the SCCC director rejected their participation. But the SCCC succeeded in integrating its program; the church groups did not. Everett Cope, SCCC director, also stressed the importance of seeking another problem to work on, as soon as the first problem was on the way to solution. So establishment of a successful nursery school was followed by a club program for teenagers from both Trumbull Park Homes and South Deering. Later, meeting the needs of the elderly became the basis for discussion and cooperative action. For Cope, this process meant that by remaining united in efforts to solve a problem, the group could better defend itself against attacks seeking to destroy the enterprise.

Of the projects described above, the three funded to test the possibility that others might use IAF principles were unsuccessful. They were unsuccessful in part for reasons related to the cluster-of-interests principle. In organizing Butte, about which effort Alinsky was quite euphoric in the initial stages, interests were recruited which eventually failed to agree on important issues. The organizing campaign had proceeded so vigorously as to become in effect a "whole community" approach-an approach quite contrary to IAF principles. Splits developed between Protestant and Catholic interests and between business and labor interests. Appointing a prominent union leader as chair of the committee on industry proved to be a mistake. There was a dispute over fund raising. But it must at the same time be recognized that there were other negatives which affected the eventual failure: authoritarian leadership, strikes, economic depression, etc. In Lackawanna, organizing was conducted as though disclosure of interests was to be avoided to protect the organization and its program from becoming labeled as controversial. No issues were identified as a rallying point for recruitment of members while various groups (for example, the Chamber of Commerce) worried about threats to their own interests. Some successes were achieved, but they were sporadic, and no clear, vigorous program emerged from the conflicting array of interests and non-interests. It is almost as though the Citizens Federation of Lackawanna (CFL) was trying to avoid playing a forthright role. Because there was no step-by-step development of a set of interests undertaken with due regard for their mutual compatibility and for their potential for attracting support, there were only a few exceptions to a record of comparative inaction.

Chelsea displayed a different, and also unsuccessful, version of the interest cluster principle. In this case, the organization was fatally flawed from the beginning because it was based on irreconcilable elements. The commitment of the grantee's board to the construction of Penn Station South was incompatible with the interests of some 10,000 Irish-Catholic residents of Chelsea, plus many Puerto Ricans as well. Even when it became evident that construction of Penn Station South was inevitable, the internal conflicts which had developed prevented a successful campaign to provide for a more humane and effective relocation program.

That the Chelsea project turned out as it did was also due, in part, to the incompatibility of goals articulated by Alinsky in the staff training process (looking to the development of local leadership and working for an effective relocation program) and those reflecting the interests of Hudson Guild. While the latter did not demonstrate its ability to promote a mass citizen organization, its position in the community meant that it could block the other side. And it did. Irreconcilable goals and interests defeated the enterprise.

Contrasted with the cluster-of-interests idea which, in effect, sought to limit organizing to those members of the community sharing such interests, is what I call the whole community approach, which several of our grantees employed. For example, the Community Dynamics Program of Earlham College was wholly devoted to it. It seemed to the Biddles that a community organization should be all-inclusive because rejection of consensus and mutual acceptance as goals would be morally indefensible. Inthe CDP project in Kentucky, this approach appeared to work well presumably because flood control was a problem of concern to all. But in Indianapolis, significant issues could not be undertaken in the same way as, for example, in Hyde Park-Kenwood where there were enough blacks and whites who would support efforts to maintain an interracial community because they valued the privilege of living in an area of high (that is, middle-class) standards even if this required the addition of a staff person to encourage white tenancy to prevent apartment buildings from becoming all black. In Indianapolis, blacks could not accept such a commitment. Therefore, the organization could only work on such relatively bland issues as protecting a neighborhood park (successfully) from conversion to a parking lot. If a group in the neighborhood wanted to try to work toward an interracial community, it could not do so within the organization because it would be immobilized by those who did not accept the goal.

What of the other grantees who preferred a whole community approach? In the Crownpoint community, our grantee was concerned that whatever was done should be acceptable to the Indians served. But, of course, Indian societies, like white societies, have their internal differences. But all were free to join in the meetings of the Navajo Development Committee. Decisions were arrived at by consensus in the traditional way. Excellent progress was being made when there was a sudden overturn in the tribal government in which young tribal members defeated older council members, the educated "progressives" ousted the more traditional Navajo and got control, not only of the Tribal Council but of the tribal staff and, through these, of the new wealth from mineral leases. The slow but steady growth, as a result of the project, in information, understanding and confidence of the traditional leaders of the off-reservation Navajo around Crownpoint was callously ignored and came to a halt. The Crownpoint leaders asked for little in comparison with the sums the new tribal staff members offered. What the former could not accept was that the purposes to be served were not those identified by the leaders of the community but purposes imposed by the tribal bureaucracy. So the whole community approach proved to be only partial in practice but not because of any decision by the project sponsor. (Also, it must be remembered that the tribal staff at Window Rock was far away and, hence, was not part of the Crownpoint community. The community which has the power to control events may well extend beyond the limits of the community within which organization members live.)

The Goddard College program also encouraged a community-wide basis for its work. In at least one case, the approach worked in spite of undertaking to deal (successfully) with a school consolidation problem which had divided the community for many years. In San Francisco, on the other hand, the United Community Fund project failed in the attempt to inaugurate a housing program in Haight-Ashbury. It failed because in the absence of any membership requirement, opponents could simply take over any meeting by dint of superior numbers. In this case, the whole community approach became an exercise in anarchy.

From the above experience, it appears that most of the successful community organizing programs were those which began by identifying a cluster of reasonably compatible concerns. The cluster identified those interested in being part of the organization, who were or could be motivated to work together toward the agreed goals. Such cooperation could also characterize projects which welcomed all in the community to join; but, in such cases, the goals must be such that all would support them. The whole community approach depends, then, upon an indispensable minimum of shared values and interests. However, if an important issue should arise on which some would register vigorous dissent, the organization would be likely to split or become immobilized. Even if the point is implicit in what has already been said, it should be reemphasized that where a minority had to struggle to secure basic rights-civil, economic or political-the inclusion of those opposed to making vigorous use of the organization to secure such rights would be self-defeating. It was the businessmen and school personnel in Lackawanna who opposed the appeal of the Albright tenants for help. Hence, if the purpose of the organizing effort were to combat discrimination against part of the community, it would not be served if the organization also recruited those who discriminated or wished to pretend that discrimination could be eliminated by being "cooperative."

Before leaving this topic, note should be taken of a collateral aspect. In its final report, the Metropolitan Center for Neighborhood Renewal (MCNR) noted several community organizations which it thought were less representative than they should have been. In one case, an existing organization ignored black newcomers. The latter formed their own organization and ignored the whites in turn. The MCNR thought this was a bad thing. My view is that we cannot be sure of this until we know what their respective goals were. A second case seems clearer; a businessmen's group was successful in improving its own area but ignored the surrounding residential section. Its deterioration undid the benefits achieved from renewal of the business area. In this case, the goals of the businessmen's group were too restricted to serve their own best interests. The boundaries of the community should have been widened to include others who had other, though compatible, interests.

Basis of Membership. Closely related to the matter of who should be organized is the question of whether the emphasis should be on recruiting members as individuals or by groups. The record of our grantees does not provide unqualified answers to this question. What the record does show, however, is that, with few exceptions, the choice of one approach or the other seems to have been determined by local circumstances rather than principle. Alinsky's position was one exception. Having emphasized the development of power to influence events as the prerequisite to achievement of its ends by a citizen organization, he argued that the most effective way to do this was to recruit organizations sharing the purposes of those trying to build the citizen organization. This approach would bring in more members quickly. The organizations would offer ready channels of communication into the community. Also, he believed that it would be easier to raise money from dues if they were paid by organizations rather than by individuals. The risk in trying to build an organization of organizations, of course, was that the range of viewpoints within some groups might be so diverse that the thrust of the organization toward its goals might be adversely affected.

In Woodlawn, the organization-of-organizations model worked very well. There were many church groups, fraternal organizations, block clubs and improvement clubs. Because so many residents shared many of the same problems, recruiting organizations as members did not dilute the force of TWO's program. (It is not irrelevant that Woodlawn was almost entirely black.) With organization dues set at $125, TWO received a significant amount of income, sufficient to bridge the gap until other sources could be developed. Also, because each member organization sent perhaps eight to ten delegates, plus several alternates, to the annual Community Congress, there was a great deal of participation and involvement in the business of the organization. The organizational structure was further strengthened by the policy of asking someone who came to TWO for help, for example, a problem with the owner of an apartment building, to organize the other tenants as a group holding membership in TWO.

Even in Butte and Chelsea, significant community organizations were built on the basis of organizational membership. Their failures were due to the incompatibility of elements among the members, among other reasons. But in some cases, forming an organization of organizations was simply not feasible. In the Mexican-American community of California there were virtually no effective organizations. Hence, individual membership was the only feasible alternative. Had the service center idea been pursued earlier in connection with a financial program to support a staff, the CSO might have persisted much longer. But individual membership was the preferred choice of the HP-KCC. It was chosen as the basis of membership because organizational membership might not meet the test of support for the goal of building an interracial community. In this effort, it was successful.

In Lackawanna, neither membership option was clearly espoused. The organizers recognized that if a powerful organization were the goal, it would be helpful if powerful organizations would become members. They were not invited to do so, however, because it would first be necessary to explain what the proposed organization hoped to do. And this, it was feared, would, given the previous history of Lackawanna in dealing with community matters, lead to condemnation of the proposed program as controversial. So, individuals known to be influential in a number of organizations were invited to join what eventually became the CFL. In effect, the discussion of issues was deliberately muted; hence, there was no clear program on the basis of which interested persons and groups could be recruited and organized into an effective force to achieve agreed-upon ends. Because discussion of issues was suppressed at the beginning, elements became involved which proved to be mutually antagonistic. The unwillingness to explore openly what the basis of membership should be suggests that Lackawanna was not an appropriate place for the project in the first place.

In sum, it appears that if the possibility of choice exists, an organization of organizations can probably aggregate power more quickly than can an individual membership approach. But of greater significance is the question of compatibility of interests among the members and the level of competence with which the organizing effort is pursued.

Organizing Tactics. I have pointed out that the basic intent of the grantee had much to do with the kinds of results achieved. But whether the intent was to eliminate a particular problem (for example, inadequate housing) or to help eliminate discrimination against minority citizens or to help citizens to learn how to cope more effectively for themselves, the grantee had to find a way to reach those to be helped. Unfortunately, few of our grantees provided information on this question.

There are, however, a few points which can be made. (1) It did not prove useful to try to approach through other groups the persons who were to be helped. For example, little happened of value to migrants in Fruit Plain so long as the MCEP staff tried to work through the local council of churches. Nor did it help to bring in "leaders" of the black community who were known to council members. Only when the staff began working with a leader of those who had only recently been migrant workers was any progress made. The organizing work had to be done among those who were to be served. (2) Because conditions varied from group to group, the techniques for seeking out persons who might support the organization differed also. In a middle-class community like Hyde Park, membership and other support could be sought through existing organizations-churches, meetings, synagogues, PTA groups, etc. This is a conventional and often an effective approach. But it would not work in the Californian Mexican-American community of the fifties or sixties. The device which worked there was the house meeting, bringing together relatives and trusted friends. The house meeting was a vital key to organizing in such communities. Another useful starting point in low-income communities was the neighborhood bar (the clubhouse in depressed urban areas). And (3) once the organization was functioning, the more successful organizations combined program activity with recruitment of new members, vide, use of the service center idea by the CSO and the TWO practice of basing help to an individual on his undertaking to organize others with the same problem into a group which would then join TWO. These three techniques seem obvious in retrospect but many grantees appeared unaware of them.

Mode of Operation. By "mode of operation," I refer to the approach or methods used in conducting the activities of the citizen organization, including the ways in which grantee staff, organization staff and members interacted. Actions, of course, are guided by a point of view; and, in the present context, mode of operation includes views about staff and their proper role and the degree to which the decisions of the organization should be influenced by professionals or determined by the members, and about how the organization relates to the larger community-whether it asks for help as a boon to be given or demands certain help as a matter of right or, going a step beyond, marshals its forces to compel concessions to its goals. There follow several subsections in which I explore such views held by our grantees which had an impact on results of the projects.

If those being organized are not to become confused or frustrated or even reject the tutelage of project staff, there must be consistency in principles, that is, the advice or training provided must be consistent with the purposes of the program as the former understands them. Given the understanding of community residents that the staff of the Citizen Participation Project of the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago (WCMC) was to help them to form their own organization, it was a violation of the understanding for the staff to urge the organization to work on problems other than those the latter had chosen. For this reason, and others, the work of this grantee was largely ineffective.

That the members should decide was a leading principle in the more successful projects (even though in the case of Crownpoint it led to disaster, a disaster which may well have resulted anyway for other reasons). In the American Indian Center (AIC) and the American Indian Chicago Conference (AICC), the successes were clearly dependent on the fact of citizen control. And Highlander would not work with any group which was not prepared to operate on the basis of democratic process. Democratic process was also stressed in the CSO program. The project staff was committed to this principle and made every effort to help members and officers take responsibility for the organizational program efforts. Many learned to do so very effectively. It is unfortunate that in perhaps most CSO's the majority could be misled by more sophisticated members so that new leadership was able to use the organization for its own purposes. When this happened, success was followed by failure. Success depended not only on the right to decide but also on the level of understanding of what was involved.

TWO was an outstanding example of a successful project in which self-determination was a fundamental commitment. The Community Congress, with approximately a thousand voting delegates, elected the officers and determined policy. A Delegates Council met monthly, and the large, active, standing committees which met weekly broadened participation even further. Communication among the various elements of the organization kept the goals continually before the membership and informed it of progress being made.

Many other projects were characterized by an outlook which consciously or unconsciously assumed that the professional knew best. Those projects which tried to work from the top down made little or no progress toward their goals. The reader will recall a number of examples from the preceding chapters. The WCMC staff tried to persuade a community organization to work on problems primarily of concern to the social work agencies. Freedom House staff engaged in or directed activities which should have been left to members. The AFSC staff in Pine Ridge invited Indians and others to act in an advisory capacity to them, instead of the reverse. The MCEP in Fruit Plain and Metro Heights achieved little until the staff began to get to the people with the problems instead of trying to work through the social agencies. None of these projects flourished so long as the people with problems were not involved in a meaningful way. So long as staff continued to try to do things for people instead of helping them learn to do things for themselves, nothing of significance happened.

No issue involving citizen organization has stirred more debate than the question of the kind of tactics, that is, conflict or cooperation, to be used in the conduct of the affairs of such organizations. Of the two principal views, one group sees the relationship between the organization and its milieu as requiring a search for grounds on which cooperation can be worked out. They believe that we must and can deal with one another on the basis of goodwill and fair play, that rational discussion will show the way to the right resolution of differences. This view is generally held by people working through various social agencies, institutions and organizations, especially those with a background in social work. They find it hard to accept the notion that such an approach may be ineffectual, that the opposition will not acquiesce in the face of rational, moral argument. Others, while not, perhaps, rejecting such a model totally, are inclined to accept its applicability only in limited circumstances. They would see reconciliation of differences growing more difficult as the interests of the various parties diverge. And if there are gross differences in status between two sides, this, too, would inhibit a solution that would be fair to the weaker side. Alinsky, in fact, would have said that in such a circumstance, the weaker side would lose and injustice would prevail.

Before exploring these positions further, however, it is necessary to clarify the term "conflict." Conflict may take many forms. For instance, it can take the form of a petition or complaint presented to some agency official by representatives of a group pressing for a change in policy or for reversal of a decision on some matter which the group deems to have been unjust. Or, members of a community organization may appear en masse before the city council, demanding reversal of some action. Or a black organization (for example, on Johns Island) may quietly urge blacks to vote for the least objectionable among the white candidates for local judge, while at the same time encouraging voter registration among blacks. Or a demand may be publicized by organization leaders in a press conference. Or the organization may organize a boycott against certain merchants accused of dishonest treatment of customers or against a bus system over the issue of segregated seating.

These examples differ from one another in that some are more overt than others. Some involve little more than a statement calling for redress of grievances. At the other extreme in the list is the boycott, the backers of which are prepared, for example, to destroy the financial viability of a bus system in order to eliminate segregated seating. The latter is a confrontation. Falling in between would be a campaign to elect a judge on Johns Island. This campaign would involve conflict because, quiet though it might be, it proposes to alter the balance of power, and it might, therefore, provoke strong, even violent, reaction from the white community. Few of our grantees with a social work or similar background became involved with the kinds of conflict just enumerated. Presumably, they saw a conflict situation as producing divisiveness and destroying goodwill. What they may not have appreciated was that in some situations the divisions already existed, that they may have been merely latent because those suffering some ill treatment were disillusioned about the possibility of gaining redress. Alinsky took the opposite view. He did not believe that those who enjoyed privileges as against others, or who engaged in discriminatory acts, could be depended upon to change their ways merely because of appeals to a sense of fairness or goodwill. Change in such practices would occur only in response to pressure. Hence, for him, the purpose of citizen organization must be to gain sufficient strength to enable it to negotiate successfully in behalf of its interests against those who discriminated against its members.

Let us see what our record shows concerning this issue. The reader will recall many examples of such withholding of fair treatment: the refusal, contrary to law, to give qualified applicants citizenship examinations in Spanish; the refusal to allow residents of the barrio to serve as deputy voter registrars; the overcrowding in black schools in Chicago, although rooms stood empty in white schools; the failure of a judge on Johns Island to make fair rulings between blacks and whites in his court; or the dishonest practices of certain merchants in Woodlawn. Protests against such behavior were useless until the victims were able, through their organizations, to register enough voters to influence elections, to picket, to organize a boycott or to exert some other form of pressure. Accordingly, it was necessary to confront those guilty of discrimination with a multiple argument: the power of moral principle (for example, fairness), the power of statutes and regulations and the power of the ballot or boycott. Exercising some kind of power proved to be not only necessary but successful for CSO's, for TWO and for blacks on Johns Island. By contributing the votes decisive to his election, blacks on Johns Island began to get fair treatment from the local judge. In California, vigorous voter registration and electoral campaigns gave Mexican-Americans the power to exert significant influence on elections and, by extension, on the way they were treated by government agencies and in the community at large. But the potential benefits from the use of such tactics were lost when middle-class CSO officers sought to avoid such conflict situations.

The situation faced by those helped by Highlander was somewhat different since the risk of direct confrontation was far greater than in the case of Mexican-Americans. Both groups might suffer from economic retaliation, but blacks might also be subject to violent attack against person and property. Therefore, confrontation had to be much more circumspect. But reliance on cooperation was no more likely to produce an end to discrimination for blacks than for Mexican-Americans. So, once the citizenship school on Johns Island had proved itself and black registration began to have an impact, every effort was made by Esau Jenkins and others to expand citizenship schools and voter registration to other Sea Islands, to the rest of the state and then to other states in the South. The impact on elections became evident once black voter registration increased.  This remained a strong emphasis in the Highlander program, consistent with its emphasis on education. Without the pressure of the vote, progress toward eliminating gross discrimination against blacks would have been slow indeed.

TWO, of course, is one of the prime successful examples among our projects which felt the need for power to influence decisions favorable to its interests. The impact of forty-five busloads of Woodlawn residents going to city hall to register was not lost on Mayor Daley, nor was that of the continuing voter registration effort. The threat of public opposition to the University of Chicago's original plans for expansion in Woodlawn was a potent factor (given the federal requirement of maximum feasible participation) in the mayor's decision to give TWO a substantial voice in the urban renewal program. But it is unnecessary to recite more instances of the exercise by TWO of its growing strength. Given the low status of blacks in Chicago, there would have been little improvement in their situation in Woodlawn without something like TWO to press for change. And, of course, success in achieving its goals helped to build the organization, which, in turn, improved the success of its negotiating efforts.

Next door, so to speak, the approach of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference was quite different. Its leadership believed in the efficacy of cooperation and negotiation on the basis of marshaled facts and reasoned arguments concerning deterioration, community change, population trends and the need to deal constructively with these problems. The conference attempt to deal with real fears and problems of the many unconvinced residents had to overcome, of course, the consequences of actions at the beginning by some who "took an offensively moral tone, pointing out the meaning of democracy, Christianity, and the brotherhood of man." Thelen continued to emphasize the need to approach the unconvinced "with concrete proposals for cooperation on the basis of their own interests."12Eventually, those unsympathetic to this approach dropped out of the conference but the resentment aroused by their holier-than-thou tactics lingered on. (Cope and the SCCC would have endorsed the conference view.)

What allowed the conference view to prevail? In part, it was an appeal to one's sense of justice to which many in Hyde Park-Kenwood would respond. But self-interest was also appealed to. After all, most substantial property owners would rather see property values maintained. What was needed was their acknowledgment that this was possible. To gain acceptance of this became a conference goal, to be achieved by working against forces leading to deterioration and supporting efforts to promote rehabilitation. Once enough people were persuaded of the possibility of maintaining the community, then their self-interest could be enlisted in a long-range program.

It should not be assumed, however, that the conference relied only on argument and persuasion. It was prepared to seek realistic application of, for example, zoning and building codes against property owners whose operations were leading to further deterioration of the community. In this effort, the conference, working with the building department, pioneered some novel and effective tactics. What it would not do was to take direct action as a private body to punish behavior to which it was opposed. It did not organize demonstrations or rent strikes against slumlords as TWO did. It preferred to work to make the penalties of the law effective. In this effort, the fact that as many as 7,000 residents were involved in one way or another in the conference program was not ignored by city hall. And recognition must also be given to the outstanding communication effort mounted by the conference which served to encourage and mobilize its constituency on the one hand and sought to allay the fears of the unconvinced on the other. (But let us not forget that the South East Chicago Commission felt no such inhibitions if it could find a lever to bring pressure to bear, for example, via the holder of a mortgage on the property of a code violator.)

The Community Dynamics Program also believed in cooperation rather than confrontation as the appropriate tactic. By working together on flood control, repair of community churches, building playgrounds and studying the use of county tax funds, the citizens of the Kentucky community were able to evolve a cohesive group. As such, they had a potential impact going significantly beyond what was possible before. Hence, local politicians began to attend their meetings. And when their study of the road tax showed they were not getting their proportionate share, they forwarded a petition to redress the imbalance and got favorable action. We do not know if voices were raised or demands uttered, but the fact that the potential for a bloc of votes existed was presumably not overlooked by the county authorities. In the Indianapolis program, the members, although not a cohesive group in relation to issues concerning race, could stand together and were listened to by the authorities on other problems, such as the threatened loss of a playground.

One other significant project, headed by a social worker, succeeded in the face of overwhelming odds. I refer to Trumbull Park Homes and the SCCC. What accounted for its success? It is not that Cope's project was not seen as an affront by the bigots of South Deering. In fact, it might easily have led to escalated violence in the area. Nevertheless, Cope continued to work quietly, but with determination, to form a group of parents who would find the courage, willingness and ability to function, interracially, in the service of their children. There were certain critical elements in his approach which did not seem to be part of the other social worker-directed projects we supported, for example, lack of fear of controversy.

First, Cope took the position that we cannot build on differences (as other social workers would probably agree), that we must look for problems in which each has a common stake and seek positive action to solve the problem in the hope that cooperation will follow. He focused on a program which no one could oppose publicly-parents trying to provide a better life for children. In his view, confrontation with South Deering over the issue of integration would precipitate even worse violence. Hence, it was futile to base the project on the idea of "fighting South Deering." It was his hope that proof of serving the basic needs of worthy people would begin to crack the opposition front. And there began to be evidence that this was happening.

Second, the program was concerned with a real, concrete problem. Third, Cope was uncompromising in conducting the program; he hired a nursery school teacher who was black. But he did not go out of his way to confront the community by staging demonstrations. As it was, it was necessary for the police to escort her to and from the project for some time. Fourth, he succeeded in changing the self-image and developing the skills of the mothers in Trumbull Park Homes. He also provided them with essential information, which enabled them to become markedly more competent as parents. The changes were evident and helped to correct the stereotype held by at least some South Deering residents. Fifth, the youth program of the SCCC became the vehicle by which both youth and adult leaders, from inside and outside the housing project, could be brought together in significant activities. This served to reduce the stereotypes further. And, finally, parents organized to work on a problem. Seeking a solution in mere talk and appeals to "goodwill" would have fallen on deaf ears. A shrewd choice of problems and tactics, carried through with insight, a sense of what was real and qualities of courage and dedication enabled this social worker to organize successfully.

Among our projects there were only a few in which a cooperative approach or process was seen to be sufficient. It appears that where it was effective, there had to be some approximate equivalence in the positions of the parties concerned-in social status, power of the ballot, relevant statutes and regulations, moral power, shrewdness or some such element. In the case of Hyde Park-Kenwood, the balance lay in the moral power of the idea of establishing an interracial community of high standards. Also important were the intelligent, courageous and practical arguments advanced in negotiation with others; the status of its members; and the fact that it could count on some support from the SECC. Hence, reasoned argument, energetically pursued, was not to be summarily pushed aside by bureaucrats in city agencies. Of course, where the requests were modest enough, it was not too difficult to extend cooperation (vide the fifteen litter cans placed in Upper Noe in San Francisco).

On the question, then, of conflict versus cooperation, where the stakes were high in relation to the status of those in need, cooperation was unlikely to be extended. Discrimination against Mexican-Americans in California would not vanish merely because discrimination was wrong. Nor would dishonest merchants in Woodlawn stop cheating from a desire to promote goodwill. There, it was necessary to organize, expose dishonest merchants and wage a boycott. Unfortunately, with too many of our community-oriented projects, the issue between cooperation and confrontation was moot because the grantee was not able to build an effective organization in the first place. However, as stated above, given the worsening conditions in many of their communities, it may be questioned whether successful organization would be a feasible goal. In other cases, we may wonder if they really understood what they were undertaking to do.

In reviewing the range of projects having a community focus, there were very obvious differences among the grantees with respect to organizational sense, understanding and determination. Let us recall some instances to illustrate the point. Many examples can be cited from the CSO experience. When Cirillo Lopez was advised by the bank to file a formal complaint with the district attorney in order to compel the treasurer to turn over CSO funds to the new treasurer, Lopez felt that the ensuing publicity would be bad for the chapter which he was trying to reorganize. He found a better way, thus demonstrating his sensitivity to public relations issues and his ability to choose tactics which would not damage the organization. When Chavez undertook to organize a CSO at Oxnard, a very substantial program was established in a relatively short time. Perhaps the outstanding achievement was the exposure of collusion to deny jobs to local farm workers in favor of imported Mexican nationals. To have recruited hundreds of farm workers into the CSO in the face of such powerful opposition was remarkable. The achievement was due to his intelligence, determination and shrewd sense of tactics. Not the least important quality involved here was the ability to see that such discrimination had to be confronted and attacked until the battle was won. An appeal to the goodwill of the growers would have been useless and destructive of hope for the future success of his project. He did not ignore the need to make such appeals but recognized the importance of a just cause and a well-thought out, feasible program to be pursued with determination and without compromising its essential principles. His grasp of tactics was shrewd and he persisted in his effort.

In most of the other neighborhood projects sponsored by neighborhood houses or metropolitan organizations-such as Lower North Center, the Better Housing League (BHL) project in Cincinnati, or Colony House after Sara MacAulley's departure, there is little evidence of any significant accomplishment. It is as though the staff members had little idea of how to proceed. They seemed unable to bring together persons who might make a difference in the community. In some cases, the difficulty may have been an inability to identify what the real problems were because the staff was not in effective touch with the people who had the problems. In some projects there was an apparent unwillingness to "grasp the nettle" of action. Some substitute for effective action would be proposed, such as a survey or an interagency committee with a few community "leaders" added.

For many who had graduated from some professional school, a survey was seen as a good in itself--a good thing to do. But to people with little education and little margin on which to survive, a survey had to have a very direct and obvious relevance before they would invest any interest in it. Let us recall some instances. The Kenwood-Ellis Community Center (K-ECC) undertook a study of its community with the help of students and faculty of Roosevelt College, which culminated in a set of planning and program proposals. As a study, it was competently done, but community involvement was minimal. When the rather small group of middle-class black residents, who remained, learned that one of the recommendations called for some low-income housing to be built in the area, their vociferous protests effectively stifled the K-ECC efforts to promote public discussion of the survey reports. The K-ECC did not know how to use the reports, or any of the data they contained, to try to reach any of the majority group of low-income community residents. In this case, the survey was irrelevant. On the other hand, the housing survey conducted by the Hanford CSO in the interest of its members and the community was organically connected with the chapter's program. They not only sought the facts about housing needs of Mexican-Americans but also looked into the various possibilities for solving the problem--with the "educational" taking the lead in exploring the implications. This survey was a necessary part of action. It was an appropriate tactic.

The difference between success and failure depended upon the abilities of the staff and organization leadership, the tactics employed and upon the limitations inherent in the objective situation. A good organizing sense involved a grasp of principles relevant to effective organizing. It meant having a sense of the dynamics of a community and of how to help community residents coalesce to formulate an aggregation of legitimate interests. Above all, it involved having the courage and determination to carry a program through. Only a few of our grantees showed such abilities.

Local Leadership. Among our grantee staffs were persons who were skeptical of the ability of local persons lacking in education or status to provide leadership for their fellow citizens. Some denied that any leadership could be found in the most depressed black urban ghettos. Some seemed to believe that even the capability of becoming an effective leader was lacking. This skepticism was evident both in word and deed. In the latter case, it could be seen in the behavior of staff people, who continued to keep initiatives and decisions in their own hands. Of course, there is nothing especially rare about such views.

What holders of the more extreme views did not recognize was that in any society there are those who can and will take some initiative about a problem affecting others and those who will look to them for leadership to resolve such problems. In Fruit Plain, there were several leaders of extended family groups. But it did take some time before the MCEP staff found Willard Fletcher, the leader of one of these family groups. He "was able to see the possibilities of an organization in which people worked together.... Willard was also astute enough to realize that it would be necessary for the Fletcher family to learn how to work with others, and he expressed his own willingness to put aside his immediate interests for the common good."13With the help of the staff worker, he and his co-leaders were put on the road to learning how to organize and to run a community-wide organization. That it took so long to find a person around whom an organization could be built was due in large measure to the fact that almost no one else could see the possibility or the value of doing so or could face up to the responsibility of being the leader of such an organization.

There was another reason why the process took so long, and that was due to the assumptions of church council members as to who the leaders in the black community were. The MCEP discovered that the black "leaders" known to social agency personnel in Fruit Plain represented only themselves. On a similar point, the executive secretary of the South Carolina Council on Human Relations noted that in many black organizations, superannuated, incompetent leaders refused to withdraw and were reelected time after time, thereby blocking any change toward new, more relevant goals.

In a lecture at Cornell University in 1967, Ed Chambers pointed out that in the IAF experience, as soon as an effective democratic organization emerged, the more or less self-appointed, preexisting leaders would stay away because they could not get elected and the average age level of leaders would drop from about fifty-five to thirty-five. The existing leadership was usually inadequate to deal with a multi-group organization covering a wide area, which had been brought together to address new tasks which often meant troublesome confrontations and even danger. An action-oriented civic organization requires a more dynamic and aggressive leadership, able and willing to engage in tactics not contemplated by more typical community organizations (church, service, fraternal).

So, in starting to organize, the IAF looked for persons with a following, those to whom others went for advice. Involve the leader, and the organization would gain a group. It was shown in California over and over again that persons with little formal education and with little or no status in the Anglo world could learn to function effectively as officers, as heads of committees, as spokesmen for CSO's--vide, Cirillo Lopez, who revived the Madera CSO. It is instructive, too, to recall my 1962 field trip with Fred Ross to visit a number of CSO's, during which it became so evident that the active chapters were generally headed by persons who were poorly educated and those that were moribund by better-even college-educated officers. Potentially effective leadership can be found among the relatively unschooled.

Of course, not everyone with a following would prove to be an effective leader of a community organization. Some might be unable to generalize beyond a family circle. They might not feel a concern for the welfare of a wider community, or have the self-confidence or the know-how to work on a wider stage. Some would be "naturals"; others, however, would need to be taught most of what they needed to know. But even naturals like Esau Jenkins had something to learn from others, for example, the need for and the possibility of identifying leaders in other communities, who could help to build voter registration. But it took time before Septima Clark could get Esau Jenkins to see that there were potential leaders who could be recruited, thereby bringing him nearer to his goal of building voter strength among blacks.

But even when real leaders in the community had been identified, it did not follow that they would automatically be able to respond effectively to the challenge of leadership in a community-wide organization. Hence, their willingness and aptitude to respond to training would have an important impact on the success or failure of the organization. For Alinsky, it was essential that the leader be able to learn to see and understand the dynamic elements in the situation facing the organization and to plan the strategy and tactics appropriate to meeting its goals. That such training was effective is attested by the evidence of successes achieved by the CSO's and by TWO. Few would have predicted that such an extraordinary range and quality of leadership would emerge, once an effective approach to mass organization was made available. It is little short of incredible that in so bleak a community as Woodlawn and in so short a time, leadership could have been developed to manage an annual congress of over a thousand delegates, to mobilize nearly 2,000 people to travel by bus to city hall to register on a Saturday morning and to run the myriad committees and subcommittees which kept the organization's programs moving forward. A leadership that was able to conduct the many demonstrations needed to bring their case before the public, to undertake critical negotiations concerning the plan for urban renewal in Woodlawn, to develop a successful job training and placement program and, mirabile dictu, to achieve a self-support budget was certainly a competent one. As the organization and its program grew in size, scope and complexity, the leadership also grew, becoming increasingly sophisticated in its performance and in its pursuit of self-determination for Woodlawn.

For Highlander, training of leaders was the focus around which all else revolved. Training was its special focus because it saw its primary role as helping others to solve the problems they had identified in their own communities. Having identified them, they came to Highlander for assistance. These training programs made it possible for, indeed encouraged, thousands of persons to find facilities, promote enrollment, teach English and the rudiments of the political system and follow up with students to see to it they had registered to vote. Many accomplished this much. Some went beyond this to recruit other teachers and organize more classes, tried to broaden their efforts to a county or multi-county level or undertook to become active in party affairs.

How, then, was leader training to be accomplished? Our record, unfortunately, does not provide as much detail as we would like. Insofar as the IAF program was concerned, we can say that training was considered to be a fundamental necessity, and attention was devoted to it so long as staff resources were available. It was expected that training of organization leaders would be a continuing responsibility of IAF staff in the field. Its method emphasized, first, careful planning of program activities, trying to anticipate what would happen. This was followed by the examination and evaluation of some experience (such as a meeting of the membership, a confrontation with some public official, a voter registration campaign or whatever) with a view to learning to do better in the future. If something had gone wrong at the previous meeting, why had it happened? Could it have been foreseen and forestalled, and if so, how? If a meeting with some official had failed, what was the reason? Had a plan been made in advance as to who was to speak, and what was to be said? Had it been adhered to? What should have been done differently? What could be done to retrieve the failure?

If a member felt he had not received his due from some agency, what did the law and the regulations say about the issue? What action could the CSO take? If a committee was not doing its job, what could be done with the least damage? If the CSO did not feel strong enough to gain some goal, where might allies be found? Was membership and attendance at meetings falling off? Why was this so, and what could be done? Did the program of the CSO no longer reflect the interests of the majority of the members? What changes should be made? As long as there was someone available to ask such questions, which would remind leaders and members of what the purpose of CSO was and enable leaders and members to learn from experience, the CSO could move forward. Unfortunately, the IAF never had more than two staff persons at any given time in California (excluding the part-time persons employed for varying periods to conduct the educationals), and for a period there was only one. So the amount of training which could be given in any one community was not great. Because the tasks facing the organization and its leadership were complex, they could not be learned quickly. The staff was torn between the need to provide further training in one place and the need to go on to try to establish another citizen organization somewhere else.

Nevertheless, much was accomplished. The effectiveness of training was due to a variety of factors including the following. The training dealt with real problems. It was conducted in the context of action; it was not done in an artificial setting. It was learning-by-doing with the responsibility firmly placed on the leader and not on the staff members. Even in the educational where much learning took place, the topics dealt with action taken or contemplated by the chapter. Although not all CSO's chose to organize educationals, in those cases where they were organized, many leaders benefited greatly from the analytic discussions conducted therein. It was in such sessions that they gained a deeper understanding of what they were about: not only an insight into the purposes being served, but also into a wider range of influences in the community having an impact on the CSO program. They acquired greater sensitivity to the needs of members, greater awareness of the obstacles in the way of meeting such needs and greater skill in leading the organization toward its goals.

Working in quite a different way from the IAF, Highlander was able to attract a substantial number of persons from all over the South to its workshops. The fact that many of these persons were lacking in formal education did not deter them from learning to think realistically about the problems of their communities and what they could do back home to solve them. They were talking about things that were within their own experience. But in talking about them in the light of others' experiences, they gained new insights into their own situations and recognized new possibilities for moving from where they were to where they felt they ought to be. The central focus was not on information to be conveyed through lectures by outsiders. The focus was on their own problems and how they could move to solve them. And the continued emphasis on the "why" of a proposal kept attention centered on the objectives to be reached.

Because Highlander's aims were not focused on building community organizations, its leader training could not as readily be undertaken in the context of action as it was in the case of the IAF. But the residential sessions were not so removed from reality as to lose their effectiveness. Typically, a trainee came because of a desire to learn to deal with some community problem. The "context of action" was, in a sense, brought from the community to the workshop. The discussion dealt with realities even though far removed from the locus of the problem. The contributions of others only widened the reality and the range of possibilities. The fact that participants were removed from their home environments encouraged them to see possibilities with new eyes. And the cooperative association on a basis of equality, in an interracial setting, provided "practice" in the use of new roles, practice which could do much to help overcome barriers to community effort back home. A further consequence of the Highlander training format was the degree of commitment to action when the trainee returned home. This sense of commitment was the result of the declaration by each person, at the closing session of each workshop, of what he or she intended to do. It was the decision to drop this session which, in Septima Clark's view, seriously compromised the effectiveness of the SCLC training program for organizers and teachers of citizenship classes.14

Almost no other community-oriented grantee used the residential training workshop partly because of the expense but also because they had little sense of the value of this approach. There were some exceptions, however. The reader will recall D'Arcy McNickle's comment about the occasion when he took the Crownpoint leaders, the House Committee, to the state capital for three days of discussion. There, "away from the bleating of their sheep," they finally understood that their work encompassed much more than managing a place in which to meet. With the Community House as a symbol of the Crownpoint community, the members of the House Committee, as part of the Navajo Development Committee (NDC), came to see their organization as a way of addressing community problems. It was as though the physical separation from Crownpoint and their daily activities enabled various elements of their experience to fall into a visible pattern. Penn Community Center and the South Carolina Commission on Human Relations also held a number of residential workshops which had significant impact.

In Hyde Park-Kenwood, the conference conducted training under Herbert Thelen's direction, especially for new block leaders. In one intensive period, a "community clinic" was held every three weeks for a year. These clinics were concerned with the purposes of the program, how to involve others and how to conduct meetings focusing on problem solving. Other kinds of training were provided, too, such as for membership and fund-raising drives. These training activities were conducted at a very practical level. They were built around problems encountered in the conduct of conference programs, but they were discussed in the context of conference purposes and the experiences of others. Experiential methods such as role playing were emphasized. These clinics were effective with those who were hospitable to the requirements of democratic leadership. For others, the process may have been too threatening. But overall, the training activities contributed very significantly to the success of the HP-KCC. The training was successful because it was grounded in real problems and conducted in a way which could be readily applied in action.

The importance of tying training to a need to act can be observed in the activities of other grantees as well. The Metropolitan Center for Neighborhood Renewal (MCNR) staff was quite successful in teaching one neighborhood council to deal with a zoning problem ultimately involving some rather complex moves. Later, the council was able to undertake further action on its own in another area. When the Human Relations Center was asked to help the Between-the-Tracks Council learn to organize block groups, the effort was successful. But in Lawndale, presumably for political reasons, the staff was reluctant to get involved in helping one of the sponsoring groups to embark on an activity important to that group. (The reason may have been that the scope of the request was too broad for the Human Relations Center to handle.) What it did instead was too abstract to be of interest to local residents (judging by the poor attendance record, at least). And in one more instance, involving a workshop course (Training for Block Directors), it was preceded by individual interviews with the participants. The purpose was to assess their level of sophistication but did not include any assessment of training needs as expressed by participants. The training curriculum was entirely predetermined by the center. Needless to say, the fifteen participants, all professionals or semiprofessionals working with block groups, rejected the center proposal that the first half of the training sessions be devoted to study of group process methods. Instead, the first third of the sessions was devoted to problems encountered by trainees on the job. The revised trainee-oriented curriculum led to some significant organizing achievements by the participants.

Reviewing all these instances, we see again the importance of identifying those persons who are recognized as leaders by the community, the problems of which are the occasion for the organizing effort. We recognize that acknowledged leaders for one kind of task may not be appropriate for another, and that the training activities must be based on the needs of those to be served. It becomes obvious that training was especially effective in the context of action in which the trainees were involved and that the responsibility for leadership must lie with the local people, giving them every opportunity to learn to help themselves. The actions of the organization must be reviewed in order to do better in the future. We see the value of withdrawal from familiar scenes, to rethink the complexities of one's situation and how to respond appropriately. And we learn of the continuing need for commitment from each in the presence of their peers to maintain the effort without which the organization and its program would fail.

Staff.  Each applicant undertaking a project with a community focus requested support for staff. It may be useful, then, to summarize some examples of functions or activities for which staff were found to be essential to the success of the organization. A review of such instances shows that there was a not unexpected difference between those projects involving attempts to counter discrimination, or secure redress as might be deemed justifiable, or to achieve some uniquely difficult goal such as that sought by the HP-KCC, and those in which the goal was limited to some more modest improvement, requiring merely acquisition of certain information and skills. In the first group, change could occur only by overcoming the opposition of those who practiced discrimination; in the latter group, this would not be the case. Of course, in both groups the success of projects depended on learning new information and skills, seeking new insights and gaining confidence in the possibility of improvement. But the obstacles in the way of success in the first situation were far more serious than for the second. Hence, the need for staff help could be more critical.

The need for staff was demonstrated most clearly in the IAF-sponsored projects. Without the many contributions of IAF staff (and, for a time, of the National CSO staff), few, if any, organizations comparable to a CSO would have emerged during the fifties, let alone have survived for any length of time. The reader will recall Cesar Chavez' experience in Oxnard. The role of the staff worker was decisive in building the case on the growers' illegal use of braceros. But even more needed to be done. It took some time before Chavez was able to reach high enough in the appropriate state and federal hierarchies to alert officials to what was going on so that they would realize that corrective action had to be taken. (At one stage, it was necessary for Chavez to send copies of documentation to the home address of an official in Sacramento because personnel in his own agency were "losing" the documents.)

Faced with the economic power of growers supported by acquiescent government employees, the farm workers had retreated into an apathy which lent credence to the assertion that there was no local labor supply available. It took facts, understanding, skill, determination, persuasiveness, courage and integrity to defeat this myth. When this was accomplished, earlier hiring patterns, such as grower pick-up of workers, were reestablished. Without Chavez' efforts as National CSO staff worker, this achievement would not have been possible. But with the departure of Chavez, it soon became apparent that a year of training local leaders was not sufficient to offset the destruction wrought by the union staff members. The CSO board members, not all of whom were concerned about the plight of the farm workers, were soon fighting among themselves, The office no longer opened at 4:30 A.M. to serve the field workers but at 8:30 A.M. because the Board preferred to believe that the problem had been solved. They were content to leave the responsibility in the hands of the union staff workers.

In effect, however, the union staff took over not only from Chavez but from the workers. There was no discussion at meetings, merely staff harangues against the growers. Meetings of the Employment Committee were called without notice and for no discernible purpose. Instead of taking workers to ranches where a relationship had been established, they would go to the placement office to pick a fight about referral cards-a fight already won. Then, they decided to invade the ranch of a small grower, fought with some braceros and were jailed. At this point, the growers refused to hire anyone without a referral card or pick up workers each morning at the CSO office. The workers were back where they started. They withdrew. Virtually all that had been won was lost. Competent staff devoted to worker interests had achieved an impressive victory, a victory thrown away by union staff more concerned with serving their own need to act out traditional union tactics without reference to worker needs and goals. This example indicates the kind of leadership required to help persons so victimized by both economic interests and government bureaus.

There were many examples in CSO programs of problems which required astute and dedicated help. In many counties in California, the county clerk refused to appoint deputy registrars who could go into a barrio to register residents to vote. It took a person who would become knowledgeable about the law governing voter registration and who could determine how to apply pressure against discrimination in testing and approving deputy registrars. Finally, it needed someone who could work with the CSO leaders to organize an effective campaign. Each step in this process had to be investigated, negotiated, often fought for and carried through with infinite patience and attention to detail. Once registered, however, the battle was not yet over. For instance, in one city, Republican party poll watchers began to challenge any Mexican-American, whose handwriting was less than perfect, to demonstrate their literacy competence. The CSO quickly instructed members to challenge Anglos on the same basis. But the afternoon newspaper headlined the Republican challenge, and it was feared that much of the anticipated heavy after-work vote in the barrio would not materialize. After a hasty strategy session, a staff member called the Spanish language radio station to acquaint the station staff with what had happened. The station announcer read the article over the air, pointed out the purpose and asked if Mexican-Americans could be scared so easily. That evening there were long lines at the polling places in the barrio. This was a good example of Alinsky's dictum to the effect that every negative has a positive and vice versa. In this case, an attack was converted into a plus for the CSO cause, owing to quick thinking on the part of the staff.

The staff role was vital, too, in getting the organization's program underway. Even a relatively simple problem, like helping a group of residents in one CSO to get sidewalks, proved to have its own complexities. The reader will recall how Fred Ross worked with the committee chairman before the meeting, encouraging him to think of possible problems which might arise and how they could be handled. By example, Ross got across the importance of asking questions, of letting committee members contribute freely. Inthe course of the meeting, Ross raised one or two questions to bring out a possible danger or to suggest another alternative. After the meeting, he met with the chairman to review what had happened, identifying the good and bad points, underscoring the principles of conducting an effective meeting and relating the experience to the building of the organization.

The staff contributions described above were not especially esoteric but they covered points often overlooked. Democratic process in daily affairs is not always observed. And in those communities where discrimination in treatment was typical, it was essential to develop the conviction that something could be done, to keep before everyone the idea that it was the responsibility of the people to do it and to help the community learn what the obstacles were and how to overcome them. At least in the first years, staff help to accomplish these things was essential.

This is not to say that a community organization could not be formed and continue without staff. After all, Esau Jenkins and the Citizens Club and Progressive Club had persisted for some time. But another vision of how to proceed, of how to go beyond current limits to a point where organization could make a decisive difference in the wider community--that had to wait until Septima Clark could open his eyes to the need to multiply the available leadership. Some instructive examples can also be found in the Lackawanna project not because it was successful but because it is the only project for which periodic reports by staff organizers were made available to the Foundation. The early reports by Ed Chambers reflect his confusion and concern about his role in relation to the officers and committee chairmen in the Lackawanna Neighborhood Cooperative Committee (LNCC; later changed to Citizens Federation of Lackawanna). What things should he do, and what should he not do? If he did not do them, might they not simply be left undone? Any kind of action involved a myriad of details, which someone had to take care of if activities were to take place on schedule.

There were other kinds of problems. In the spring, an Education Committee was suddenly appointed without any advance discussion. The end of the school year was, of course, a poor time to start such a venture, but Chambers had no chance to make his views known until it was too late. Later, he was startled to read a news story from the Education Committee, which he discovered had been approved by the committee chairman, but not by the Publicity Committee. A little investigation turned up the fact that someone on the committee had a personal interest in a matter which had serious political implications. It was necessary to try to get the chairman to see how the organization was being used and how he must use his authority as chairman to prevent this from occurring again.

Another example came up in the course of a discussion of a flooding problem in a certain neighborhood. It was decided by the committee concerned to call a meeting involving the whole neighborhood. Chambers pointed out that little was yet known about this area, and the different interests which might exist there. He suggested that several small meetings be held to bring out what the issues might be that could possibly cause the neighborhood meeting to fail because they were not anticipated. His advice was ignored. Later (but prior to the scheduled date), it became evident that Chambers' point was well taken, so new arrangements were made which allowed for a wider exploration of the problem. The neighborhood meeting was more constructive as a result. The point is that with few exceptions, residents of the community were not prepared to deal with problems at this level. In the flooding case, their attention tended to be fixed on the flooding-the damage done and what agency might be persuaded to build a levee. The staff organizer, on the other hand, was concerned about the relation between solving a problem and building the strength of the organization. Chambers saw the move to set up and use the Education Committee for the benefit of a small group as a threat to the health of the organization. Similarly, by failing to move first on a small scale in dealing with the flooding problem, the organization ran the risk of receiving a demoralizing setback. Chambers came to see his role as primarily one of teaching the leaders so that they could learn to see what lay beneath the surface, what the implications of any given action might be.

To summarize briefly, those community projects seem to have flourished best which had staff who emphasized the importance of the people taking responsibility for their own problems, who used ongoing organization activities as opportunities for training leaders and potential leaders, who were alert to questions of tactics and strategy and who could advise leaders of the organization of dangers on the one hand and opportunities on the other. The effort to teach how to do things rather than to preempt the responsibility was a hallmark of the more successful projects.

In unsuccessful projects, where the record offers a clue on this point, we find that the staff did not encourage assumption of responsibility by the leaders and members. Examples include the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) project at Pine Ridge, the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago (WCMC) project in Chicago, and Freedom House in Roxbury. We can recall instances in which the staff chaired meetings as officers of the organization. In such a case, the staff showed its failure to recognize its teaching responsibility as trainer of citizens to further their own civic competence.

It remains to ask what our projects showed as to the kind of education, experience and personal qualities a staff member should have. On this question, it is difficult to generalize with much assurance. There were, however, two contrasting positions among our grantees. The conventional view was that a project staff position was a professional one, for which advanced educational preparation would be necessary. Project sponsors with a social work-oriented mission tended to employ social workers. Their view of such a position would emphasize possessing information about community social institutions, agencies and organizations and how they fit together; information about community resources (legislation and programs) which might be available to solve community problems; and a grasp of group processes useful in securing the cooperation of those who might be in a position to help solve the problems. In general, such a view assumed: (1) that the purpose of organizing in a community was to solve problems, for example, making good a deficiency in housing; (2) that lack of information was a principal obstacle to solving community problems; and (3) that persons of goodwill would be able to explore issues and emerge with as satisfactory a resolution of problems as available resources would allow. Improving conditions per se rather than helping people learn how to change conditions was their primary concern.

Among our grantees, the most typical examples of such views included Hull House, Kenwood-Ellis Community Center, Freedom House and the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. All of these projects were virtual failures. I do not include Lower North Center and Better Housing League only because they attempted so little that it is inappropriate to attribute their failure to the reasons that Hull House and the others failed. The contrasting position was articulated most vigorously by Alinsky. It was his view that graduate training would contribute little if anything to the success of a community organizer and, indeed, would more likely be a handicap. Far more important were certain personal qualities of intelligence, determination, concern to combat injustice, the ability to understand and work with people and a concern to help others learn to help themselves. How to apply these qualities could, in his view, only be learned on the job.

As indicated, the projects conducted in accordance with IAF principles were relatively successful. The fact that CSO's eventually tended to fade away was due, primarily, to their having incorporated members who were mutually incompatible. This error was corrected when Chavez started organizing farm workers. However, there was an anomaly in the makeup of the IAF staff. Although Chavez, who was an outstanding organizer, had not had a great deal of formal education and, hence, fit the IAF formula, several other IAF organizers, such as Fred Ross, had had graduate training (though not in social work).

But what about the staff employed in those projects which did not fit so neatly into the two groups we have just discussed? Several of these were relatively successful, especially Highlander. Highlander staff, insofar as the ESF project was concerned, was mixed. Although trained as a teacher, Septima Clark did not have any professional training in the community field. Bernice Robinson had had no professional training except as a beautician. So we can say that to the extent the Highlander citizenship project involved organizing, the staff members learned their roles very well. Also, they showed courage and determination in pressing forward to help black communities gain redress of grievances. And, finally, they recognized, as did the IAF, the need to teach community leaders to do things for themselves.

The Earlham Community Dynamics Program was successful in Kentucky, but less so in Indianapolis. The staff had a professional background, but their commitment was to try to change people so that they could learn to help themselves. The problem to be solved was important, to be sure, but primarily as the means by which those having the problem could learn to solve it. The SCCC project was a clear exception to the Alinsky position. The SCCC was a social work agency which hired professionally trained staff, but it was not afraid to push toward its goal in spite of strong, even dangerous opposition, and it sought to get its clientele to assume responsibility as rapidly as possible. Its achievements were of major importance. Unfortunately, its potential was never reached presumably because of a change in agency sponsorship.

In the projects involving American Indians, we can see contrasting approaches. In the AFSC project at Pine Ridge, the staff retained responsibility. There was no evidence of improvement in the competence of the local people. In the Crownpoint project, the backgrounds of the two staff persons were in anthropology and public health. But they did not impose their expertise on those with whom they worked. It was their policy to encourage the community leaders to take responsibility for decisions about the many matters which were strange to their culture. As local leaders gained in information, understanding and confidence, they reached a point where they became able to call public officials to account for failing to consult them and to move forward in other ways. In the case of the AIC and the AICC, staff was trained in anthropology, but, as with McNickle, the staff goal was to help people learn to help themselves.

In the case of the three projects which were supposed to be modeled on IAF principles, the complexity of factors which resulted in the ultimate failure of each does not allow clear-cut connections to be made between characteristics of the staff and the results. In Lackawanna, a seasoned IAF organizer had to withdraw prematurely, leaving a relatively untrained IAF organizer to try to cope with a local person as a co-organizer who was quite unsuited to the role. In Butte, the training period was too short and although a local trainee, who did not have any graduate professional training, achieved some success, his departure for greener pastures, left the Butte Citizens Project (BCP) without essential assistance. In Chelsea, as in Butte and Lackawanna, the goal of producing a citizens organization faced overwhelming obstacles. But Alinsky acknowledged that Marjorie Buckholz, a social worker, became an effective organizer.

In reviewing what has been said about staff qualifications, it seems to me that Alinsky was only partially correct. He may well have been right in thinking that most professionally trained people, especially social workers, would be likely to concentrate on supplying some service rather than teaching those needing help how to get it or to take care of the problem themselves. And most staff trained in this way would also feel uncomfortable about the organization putting pressure on someone to gain some goal. But not all staff people so trained reacted as he predicted they would on the basis of their training. At least some social workers showed that they understood the importance of teaching others to help themselves and that a simple request to be treated justly would not always be honored. At the same time, there were outstanding examples of relatively uneducated persons, and others with no more than a high school education, who became very successful staff people.

Enough has been said about whether it was necessary to recruit staff with professional training in community work. What other qualities were thought to be important? As noted above, it was important for Alinsky that a prospective staff member be intelligent, genuinely concerned to reduce injustice and willing to learn. It was his assumption that anyone who had not had experience in an IAF organizing program would have a great deal to learn and could only learn it within such a framework. It was also important that he have the stamina and the motivation to live and work under conditions involving great tension. And it was essential to have the moral capacity to use power for good purposes.

The CSO staff role required the ability to view situations realistically in full awareness of the fact that the membership expected results now and not in some distant future. A staff member who wanted to assemble "all the facts" before the CSO took action would soon have no organization. On the other hand, in a largely middle-class neighborhood like Hyde Park-Kenwood, it was appropriate to have staff with a middle-class professional background. The people served were largely middle class, and middle-class oriented methods could be used in working with city departments, provided the realities of working with the city were understood. Of course, such an approach could work mote readily in the case of the HP-KCC because the South East Chicago Commission was there to exert more direct pressure on resisting interests.

I have not mentioned race in discussing criteria for selecting staff. On this point, it was Myles Horton's view that a white person ought not to try to work with blacks on Johns Island. His reasons were that, first, a black community needed black models, and, second, the black residents were concerned about having a white stranger among them for fear that local whites might take drastic countermeasures. So, citizenship schools were organized, run and taught by blacks. On the other hand, Nicholas Von Hoffman was the first IAF organizer in Woodlawn, and at least two subsequent organizers were white. However, it had been made clear that they were to be replaced by staff hired from the community as rapidly as proved feasible. Although it would probably have been impossible to continue to employ whites as TWO staff, it was recognized at the beginning that a transition period would be necessary.

In working with Hispanic-Americans, ethnicity did not appear to be a problem for the first decade or so. Fred Ross was in charge of IAF organizing activity in California for many years. Eugene Lowery also served in a volunteer staff capacity there. Lester Hunt worked with Puerto Ricans in Chicago, Chelsea and elsewhere. At the same time, it was IAF policy to recruit staff workers from the local community as soon as possible. (All of the hired leaders of the educationals, for example, were Latinos, except for Fred Ross who may have been paid for a short time from the grant in support of educational activities.) It is possible to say, then, that although ethnic identity of staff and organization members was not always essential at the beginning, it seemed to make sense to move in this direction as rapidly as possible.

In sum, the role of staff was one of the critical factors in the success or failure of those projects having a community focus. At least in the beginning, it played a significant role in the effort to organize a citizens organization on a community basis. And if the organization were complex enough, volunteers could not be relied upon to keep the organization functioning properly for an indefinite period. No less important than having persons to do necessary work was the point of view which the staff's work embodied, whether it focused on building the organization through improving the ability of its members to solve problems or seeing its role as doing good for the community (for example, peddling potatoes around Pine Ridge).

Financing the Organization. If, then, staff is needed to provide continuing and systematic encouragement of the community effort, is financing this a feasible goal? What does the record of our projects show? Alinsky's often-stated position on mass organizing in the community was that the organization should (and could) become self-supporting in three years. It was his conviction that a mass organization must be able to finance the cost of its own staff because only then could it pursue its goals independently of controls exercised by others. But of the two major IAF projects receiving ESF funds (CSO and TWO), only TWO achieved self-support on a continuing basis.

It is not entirely clear why TWO was successful, but several factors were likely to have been involved. Even though it was a slum, there were sufficient resources in Woodlawn in comparison with organization needs. A sound organizational approach succeeded in bringing in enough organizations (which contributed $125 each per annum) to provide the indispensable minimum of support. As early as three years after organizing started; it had $10,000 in its treasury. It is noteworthy that so many organizations were able and willing to contribute $125 yearly in dues. (Typically, the black community has been anything but generous in supporting black organizations.) Then, too, someone had a sufficiently well-developed entrepreneurial sense to persuade the organization to undertake to publish a community newspaper and engage in other activities which returned a substantial income to the organization.

One key to the success of TWO in financing itself must have been, it seems to me, the factor of willingness, willingness as a result of the early successes achieved by the organization, which showed the almost entirely black community that it could prevail in a struggle against the white community for self-determination. Taking over publication of a community newspaper in order to articulate more effectively community aspirations and goals helped to build the organization. And the fact that the community was not altogether impoverished allowed the enterprise to produce significant advertising revenue. So, by the end of the first three or four years, TWO was well on its way toward self-support.

The situation in the CSO program was different. Because there were no other organizations of any significance in the Mexican-American community, organizing had to be done on the basis of individual memberships. At the beginning, the core of the membership consisted of persons with very low annual incomes; hence, membership dues were set very low, at two or three dollars per year. (In retrospect, these levels were seen to be lower than they needed to have been had dues been collected in installments.) But income being generated from dues and fund-raising events was far from enough to support full-time staff. Fred Ross concluded that eventually a sound consolidation program, which would develop a service center in each chapter, with an office and a part-time person to handle requests for assistance, might achieve self-support. In addition to charges to be made for services, dues would be raised to $10.00 or $12.50 per year to be paid on an installment basis. Part of the dues would go to the National CSO which would employ a staff organizer. Unfortunately, the proposal was defeated by middle-class elements at the next national convention. (They felt no need for the services which were so important to the poor, including the need to exert pressure on the community on their behalf. Hence, they saw no need to support a staff.) Although it passed the following year, it was too late. For one thing, middle-class members had so compromised the interests of the mass base that the workers had begun to drop out. Because it was the workers he was interested in, Chavez then resigned as National CSO staff organizer. Without someone like Fred Ross or Cesar Chavez who could visit the chapters and keep raising questions about the what, how and why of the program, and focus attention on the interconnection of program and organizing, there was no future. So, by the mid- to late sixties, the active CSO movement had drawn to a close, having failed to assemble the necessary self-support elements in time.

How well did the projects purporting to be modeled after the IAF fare in their efforts to achieve self-support? One might have done well, but the other two could not have succeeded, given the basic circumstances and the errors made in organizing. Of the three organizations, Lackawanna accomplished the least financially. This was consistent, of course, with its persistent weakness on the organization/program front. Because it had no agreed program goals, it had no basis for appealing for funds. The "leaders" in the Citizens Federation of Lackawanna (CFL) never understood the need for staff or the connection between organization and finance. The president urged a ten-dollar annual membership fee, which would have carried the organization for only a month. The first Community Congress was held without any significant commitment about fund raising. Over a year after organizing started, the question of financing a budget had not been effectively raised, let alone deciding how to do it. It is not irrelevant to note on this point that project costs were being paid from an account controlled by Catholic Charities of Buffalo and not by the CFL. The latter was shielded, so to speak, from the realities of paying bills. Control of the purse strings by Catholic Charities had another negative impact in that it made it hard for the Protestants to see the CFL as anything other than a Catholic program.

In July 1958, Ed Chambers had estimated that a minimum of $15,000 would be needed in 1959. He proposed a raffle, dues of ten dollars per individual member, an advertising book and door-to-door soliciting as possible ways of raising the funds. In October, he suggested raffling a home for a low-income worker as the only way of getting a large sum in a short time. This proposal was vetoed by the Protestants. In February 1959, the proposal that each delegate to the Community Congress be assessed ten dollars was rejected. The idea of an advertising book was also rejected because it had already been used so often in behalf of existing organizations. No effective method of meeting even a minimum budget was adopted. It is relevant to note that according to Tom Murphy's activities report for March 20, 1960, the CFL had yet to make arrangements for a hall in which the Community Congress was to be held on April 24. The folly of not having attended to this long before is obvious. The failure to finance the CFL is not then to be wondered at, considering how ineffective the CFL was in its operations. The ability of an organization to finance a budget cannot, of course, be divorced from the question of the effectiveness of its program and, as a consequence, its appeal to its constituency.

The NCCC project in Butte is also instructive. Organizing was conducted vigorously, both with organizations and in neighborhood gatherings. A great deal of significant civic activity took place (but mostly with respect to relatively non-controversial matters). New leadership emerged. But on the critical question of financing staff, no progress was made whatsoever. The effects of the declining economic base of the community and recurring strikes were compounded by the unwillingness of Monsignor Daniel Harrington to share the leadership of the organization and by other developments which led to a deterioration of Protestant-Catholic relations. Also, a proposal to hold a raffle or raise funds at some sort of event at which beer would be sold was vetoed by the Protestants. Clearly, the viability of Butte as a base for a mass citizen organization had not been adequately explored before a commitment of project funds was made. When Butte was forced to close its civic center for lack of funds, it is clear that the community would not undertake to raise $15,000 to finance a citizen organization budget.

The situation in Chelsea was much more hopeful. There, at least, member organizations paid their dues. Although Protestant groups again objected, raffle and bazaar events earned substantial sums, the net amounting to over $22,000 in less than two years. But this achievement became irrelevant once Penn Station South was built, and most of the population responsible for the fund raising was removed.

Each of these three projects clearly required permanent staff to cope with continuing program and organizational tasks which required more time and effort than volunteers could contribute on a long-run basis. And at the beginning, each was thought of as an attempt to apply IAF principles, including the achievement of self-support. Although there was no single reason for their failure, the result of there being a major obstacle in each community was compounded by the absence of an effective organizing effort. Among the reasons for failing to achieve self-support was disagreement over the ethics of fund raising. The IAF fundraising model had been worked out originally in Back-of-the-Yards. Several devices such as dues, a dance or a festival of some kind were used, but the major moneymaker was the Free Fair raffle. The latter could involve several major prizes including Cadillacs. The secret of its success was the wide distribution of raffle books far outside the community through such organizations as labor unions. Because each organization selling books kept half of the proceeds, many books were sold and large sums were raised, supporting a very comfortable budget in the case of the Back-of-the-Yards Council.15

In both Butte and Lackawanna, however, the Protestants threatened to withdraw if a raffle were held. Their successful protest against this kind of fund raising virtually ensured that funds adequate to supporting permanent staff could not be raised. Perhaps ecumenicity (or the appearance of it) was preserved but at the expense of the experiment to establish a mass citizens organization. I do not mean to say that staff support for a mass citizen organization depends upon the raffle. But in lower-middle-class neighborhoods, a raffle, picnic or dance with the sponsor selling beer would be seen as an appropriate way of raising money. In parts of Hyde Park-Kenwood, there were residents who would have found such methods comfortable, too, but most of the middle-status and professional-level persons would not. The latter, who provided the active core of the conference, were much more inclined to emphasize payment of dues (reaching $15,000 in the fourth year), annual fund drives going door-to-door or involving events conducted in homes of the well-to-do, rummage sales, movie benefits and foundation grants. In the sixth year, the latter source was expected to account for 40 percent of the total.

These techniques were more sophisticated than a raffle (although the latter required astute, competent management). The appeal in the HP-KCC program was on giving to achieve some public benefit. In Chelsea, the appeal was the chance to win something-a great deal for very little. The Protestant groups saw this as immoral. In the seventh year, the HP-KCC budget was raised to $64,000, of which two-thirds came from the community and the remainder from foundations. This budget supported a staff of seven professionals and four secretarial/clerical workers. In addition, and this is a very significant point, there were many hundreds of volunteers who contributed a substantial amount of work to the organization (which required staff to coordinate their efforts). As plans for the urban renewal area were completed and operations began, some reduction in staff and budget was possible. The HP-KCC demonstrated that a very substantial citizens organization could find the funds to support a staff commensurate with its responsibilities.

Another major grantee, Highlander Folk School, was quite different from those just discussed, so much so that the point about self-support scarcely applies in this context. That is to say, its primary aim was to train community workers. It almost never took direct responsibility for community organizing, therefore it could keep its staff small. Highlander's budget was raised primarily from benefactor gifts, foundation grants and relatively small sums collected in the form of tuition fees for workshops. No information is available on the extent to which local groups, set up to organize citizenship schools and carry on other civic activities, undertook to raise money to support such activities-that is, over and above the stipends paid to citizenship school teachers from grant funds made available to Highlander or the SCLC.

Of the other community-oriented projects, almost none made a serious attempt to raise a significant amount of funds to support staff to work for its citizens program. Apparently, our neighborhood house grantees did not think in those terms. They were accustomed to receiving financial support from their sponsoring organization, contributions from trustees, gifts and assistance from the Community Fund or its equivalent. They also depended on dues and fees assessed (in nominal amounts) so that those served should feel some shared responsibility for the enterprise. We may speculate that this view of financing a program was consistent with the notion that the goal was to provide services, to alleviate problems. This goal stands in contrast with the one of teaching people to help themselves. Achieving this latter aim implies that those helped must become independent, able to support their own enterprise, including staff if that is required. But for the great majority of our grantees who were undertaking to promote community organization, continuing staff support became an irrelevant consideration in view of the fact that they were unsuccessful in building any significant organizations in the first place.

I do not wish to imply that every citizen organization requires paid staff; to some degree, volunteers can do what needs to be done. And if the situation did not require attention to a great many detailed activities, citizens of the community could easily cope with management of organizational affairs on a volunteer basis. This view seems to fit the Community Dynamics Program pattern in the Kentucky project. There, grant-funded staff worked with local people for a time, helping them learn how to size up their situation and then take appropriate action. There was no need to combat gross discrimination but merely to improve their ability to compete for public resources such as road funds. The elements in the situation were simple as compared, for example, with Woodlawn, hence, a good deal could be accomplished without paid staff.

There is one further consideration to note. We can ask whether choosing individual or organizational membership affected the financial viability of the organization. It was Alinsky's position that recruiting organizations would result in involving a larger number of people and, by extension, tap larger financial resources. This model was effective in Woodlawn. In California, however, individual membership was the only alternative. Given the poverty of many of the people in such communities, it does not surprise us that the CSO did not raise sufficient funds to cover the salary of a staff person. (There were, of course, other factors at work: differences as to the aims of the CSO, a history of lack of integrity in the management of funds in local organizations and the lack of a tradition of participation in voluntary organizations.) But in Ross' view, the fact that CSO's were so inadequately supported financially did not prove that an organization based on individual membership could not be viable. He believes that had the service center idea been adopted earlier, it could have made the difference insofar as financial support for staff is concerned.

Special Considerations Applicable to Indian Communities. In some of our Indian projects, progress toward project goals seemed to be inhibited by a factor I will call persistence of values. The reader will recall as one example the problem of Tamacraft, a potentially profitable commercial enterprise, which required interpersonal transactions of a kind which would be inconsistent with Fox views of authority and its exercise. It appears, then, that if a project involves members of a folk culture in learning behaviors derived from the linear, cause-and-effect, reconstructing view of the world characteristic of Western culture-it may take a very long time before such a change can take place. In general, the projects seeking to help Indians learn to solve problems in their communities needed support over a much longer time frame.

To say that information was an important element in the determination of success or failure of a project may seem like a truism, but in the case of Crownpoint certain information was crucial. Because so many in the Crownpoint area spoke only Navajo, because the tribal headquarters was so far away and because they were not accorded the same status as the reservation Navajo to the West, they were ignorant about many vital matters, for example, the crazy-quilt pattern of ownership of large areas of land on which they grazed their sheep, the mysteries of the law and order code and the nature and availability of health services. The fact that the project staff was able to organize opportunities to obtain and discuss information on such matters was a powerful factor in promoting the growth of the Navajo Development Committee. The information was highly relevant to their interests and needs.

There is one other point which emerged in an Indian project and which appeared significantly related to success or failure. AID discovered that it was futile to try to convene a meeting to discuss an agenda on a single topic such as health. The Navajo could not limit themselves in this way. To them, everything was related to everything else-health, land, livestock, schools, employment and so forth. Problems were interdependent.

Effect of Kind of Sponsorship. In the course of discussing the factors involved in the success or failure of community organizing efforts, I have alluded to, but not dealt with, the effect of the kind of sponsorship on the question of success or failure. Looking at the factor of sponsorship, we can see that the grantees concerned with community organization fell into certain categories. The most significant sponsorship category consisted of free-standing organizations, each of which was an extension of an individual's concept. None was the creation of some institution or organization serving other purposes as well. This category included the Industrial Areas Foundation, American Indian Development and Highlander Folk School. A second category consisted of national organizations, which included community organization as only one of many concerns, for example, the American Friends Service Committee, the Migrant Ministry and the National Conference of Catholic Charities. A third category included metropolitan associations and agencies, such as the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago. A fourth category consisted of neighborhood houses. The fifth category included colleges. And the sixth category consisted only of one instance, an indigenous neighborhood association-the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference.

Having offered these categories as appropriate, I must acknowledge that an effort to assert a causal connection between the kind of sponsorship and the success or failure of a project is fraught with some danger. There may be a connection but it could, for example, be indirect rather than direct. That is, grantees in the first category might be successful because they had deliberately organized themselves to promote citizens organization whereas neighborhood houses had been organized primarily to provide services to individuals and families in need. Proposing to form a citizens organization would be an offshoot of the basic mission to provide services. It would seem reasonable to believe that grantees in the first category would, accordingly, be more effective than those in the latter category. But it may also be plausible to conclude that being trained to provide services would inhibit an effort to help others to organize so that they might solve their own problems. Finally, it will be of some value to note which categories of sponsors seemed to have a preponderance of successes and failures, recognizing, of course, that the fifth category includes only two grantees and the sixth, only one.

In an overall sense, the grantees in the first category were by far the most successful. Even though success was not complete, the approach was sound and accomplishments were significant. Given resources adequate to the task, the shortcomings could well have been made good. TWO was clearly an outstanding success; certainly it was unique at its inception and may still be so. The CSO program gave enormous impetus to the growth of civic competence in the Mexican-American community. Highlander, too, had a profound impact through its training and consultation efforts. New possibilities were opened for blacks throughout the South through methods adopted and spread by others. The AID project at Crownpoint was conceived on a much smaller scale and achieved only modest gains. Given the folk culture character of much of the Crownpoint community, only modest gains were to be expected. Nevertheless, gains were made, and if the project could have been conducted for a longer time, it is conceivable that the Crownpoint leaders might have achieved a sufficient level of self-determination to have made a major difference.

Each of these sponsors in the first category shared certain characteristics. As already noted, each was more or less devoted to a single kind of program. Each was headed by an individual who wanted to help those who were wrongfully excluded from sharing in the benefits of American citizenship. Each saw that those thus deprived must be encouraged, through their own effort, to learn to help themselves. Each had a realistic view of what needed to be done and the determination to act accordingly. Each found associates who shared the goals and basic approaches. This last statement, however, requires an amendment in the case of the CSO program. In that instance, Alinsky was fortunate in finding Fred Ross, who met the criteria noted above and had already established mass organizations in several California communities. So when the IAF secured funding in 1952 and 1953, Ross was ready to expand a campaign he already had underway. Insum, these projects were carried forward by persons who felt a strong commitment and whose organizations were adequately set up for the kinds of purposes for which the grants had been made. And if some interests were made uncomfortable by the activities of our grantees, that did not deter them.

The second category included the National Conference of Catholic Charities and the American Friends Service Committee. However, Catholic Charities of Montana and Catholic Charities of Buffalo must also be included in this context. These latter, of course, were the local sponsors of the Butte and Lackawanna projects, respectively. So in spite of Monsignor John O'Grady's convictions about the efficacy of Alinsky's approach to and the need for mass organization, in practice, direction of the projects was placed in the hands of sponsors who had not conceptualized the projects, nor did they show strong commitment to the goal of teaching citizens to help themselves. Monsignor O'Grady was responsible for a broad range of programs; hence, even had he been in good health, he could not have devoted much time to overseeing these projects. As a result, his commitment became so attenuated in practice as to be quite ineffective.

The MCEP of the Migrant Ministry while initiated in part, at least, because of the IAF model, was staffed by persons trained in social work. As already described, the results were mixed. There does seem reason, however, to associate the less effective results with activities conducted in accordance with a social work orientation and more effective results with work conducted in accordance with the IAF/CSO model. The AFSC situation was similar to that of the NCCC in that the kind of project conducted at Pine Ridge was only one of many kinds undertaken by the grantee. In Pine Ridge, the fault lay in the failure of the sponsor to take action when the field staff reported such developments as asking Indians to serve as advisors to staff, instead of the other way around. Perhaps the basic fault lay in the lack of clear ideas as to how to help Indians.

The third category was a mixed group; hence, we may not, strictly speaking, be dealing with a decisive category at all. And indeed, this group included, along with some good though limited results, some of the least effective results observed. This suggests that being a metropolitan association does not to any significant degree determine success or failure of a community organizing enterprise. Let me touch briefly on the evidence. The Citizens Planning and Housing Association of Baltimore had built an organization of business and professional people in the city, which had achieved considerable success in its efforts to improve planning, zoning and housing legislation and administration. Its project designed to create a similar force in Baltimore County was largely unsuccessful. But it was not the nature of the sponsorship (unless the county was rejecting a city-based organization, which might possibly have been a factor) so much as it was the unwieldiness of the county as an area in which to work. More important were the lack of any sense of community at the county level and the power of entrenched economic interests opposed to limits on individual entrepreneurial goals in behalf of the broader public interest.

As for the Welfare Council of Metropolitan Chicago and the Better Housing League of Cincinnati, we can only say that their projects were failures. The WCMC staff did not seem to know what to do. The BHL staff did not seem to know how to go about its work either. They did not demonstrate that they knew how to work with people toward helping them deal with community problems. The United Community Fund of San Francisco (UCF) staff converted the project purpose from problem solving to an effort to discover a sense of community for its own sake (although why the UCF thought lower-middle-class people would meet for such a purpose is unclear). The accomplishments appear to have been minor.

The remaining sponsor in this group, the Metropolitan Planning and Housing Association of Chicago, did have staff which had some sense of how to work with people. To be sure, its role was limited to supplying technical information to community groups. But it did so with competence based on insight as to what was required if citizens were to learn to use information about planning, zoning and housing matters effectively for community purposes. The results achieved by the several sponsors in this group did not reflect the nature of their organizational pattern so much as the competence and point of view of the staffs involved.

The fourth category included eight neighborhood houses, all of which were directed by persons of social work or closely related background. Only one of these, the South Chicago Community Center, achieved success. The Colony House project was making good progress until its director left, at which point the project deteriorated. Howell Neighborhood House made some gains, but so far as the record shows, these were not extended to a point where the effect was significant. Freedom House showed some promise at first, but then it appeared that it was not emphasizing development of the abilities of members of the organization. The staff was taking too much of the responsibility, performing tasks which should have been done by the members. As for Hull House, Kenwood-Ellis Community Center and Lower North Center, none was able to form an effective neighborhood organization. In fairness it must be said that the first two were trying to work in rapidly deteriorating sections of the city.

Except for the SCCC, none of the social worker-oriented staffs seemed to have any understanding of the political aspects of an effort to form a citizen organization, nor any inclination to confront such realities. They were reluctant to challenge one group in order that the interests of some other group might be served. And, finally, their approach was one of "doing for" rather than teaching members how to do for themselves. The SCCC project stands in sharp contrast to the others in this group. In the case of this category of grantees, there does seem to be a connection between the kind of sponsorship and the lack of success in promoting the formation of citizen organizations.

I am not saying that social workers are necessarily bound to fail in efforts to help some disadvantaged group organize to bring about a basic change in their situation. In any case, I am only reporting on a limited number of projects; hence, I cannot make assertions about social workers in general as organizers of citizen groups. But almost all of our social work agency-sponsored projects were unsuccessful. Cope succeeded because he analyzed the situation realistically, chose a sound ground on which to base the program, was committed to helping parents learn to help themselves and carried out necessary action with determination and competence.16

Looking at the enormous expenditures by public and private agencies in behalf of "newcomers" to New York City, in comparison with any apparent change in the level of their achievements, Dan Dodson concluded that very little had been accomplished. The involvement of people in a "good fellow" kind of process and recognition of earned performance ("which is at the core of social work") seemed to effect changes but changes limited to some of the young who ended by becoming alienated from their families and communities. The alternative, he concluded, was "the organization of power through which to demand respect for rights with the idea that human development will come through new self-perceptions achieved because there has been dignity acquired in the process of the struggle for it. "17 This process began to occur in Chelsea but was not carried to a conclusion in part because the price of success was too high to be paid by Hudson Guild in view of the inevitable impact on its own situation.

We may speculate on other considerations relevant to this issue. Neighborhood house staff seemed reluctant even to seek the power, let alone to use it, to influence decisions on issues of importance to the community. Social workers also seemed to be uncomfortable about the idea of pushing for something which was acceptable to some people but not to others. And it may be that grantees were not insensitive to the likely connection between challenges to the Establishment and the sources of the funds on which their agencies and organizations depended.

The fifth category included two college grantees. In this category, too, the results were mixed. The Biddles had a point of view about community organization which was effective, provided differences in the community were not too difficult to reconcile. This proviso had to be met because ideologically the Biddles would not have been comfortable with a principle which would have excluded anyone. So, in Kentucky, the organization could meet its goals, but in Indianapolis it fell short. Goddard College, too, achieved some success in the sense that its staff person was able to keep working with at least two local groups until some benefits had been realized. Although the results were modest, it should be noted that a rural electric cooperative offered to fund a continuation of the program after grant funds were exhausted.

Although the results of these projects were partly successful, we must question whether a college or university can successfully engage in efforts to form or encourage a community organization. Its mission is primarily educational, and it is vulnerable to political attack by those whose interests may be adversely affected by actions leading to the redistribution of community power. Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine that the financial resources available to a college could possibly enable it to sponsor a community organizing effort on a continuing basis. And, in fact, the more effective of this group of grantees was forced to close the Community Dynamics Program for lack of funds.

The last category includes but a single grantee-the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference. It stands separate because the project and the sponsor were one. The community analyzed its problems and decided on the way itbelieved it must follow to solve them. Because its purpose and methods and the problems attacked were mutually appropriate, its efforts were relatively successful. Because those who formulated the basic concepts of the organizing effort knew their own minds and were able to keep their vision steady, the conference resembled the grantees in the first category in these respects.

Perhaps I overemphasize the distinctions among various forms of organizational sponsorship. But it does seem to me that the several kinds of sponsors differed in significant ways. For example, the IAF and Highlander were created to help a significant group of those who were deprived and discriminated against, to learn how to alter their situation in relation to others in a community. A neighborhood house would not have been established to achieve such a goal. It would offer services instead, providing opportunities to which self-selected individuals would respond for their own benefit, eventually, in many cases, leaving the community. If a neighborhood house were to embark on an effort to create a community organization, its tendency would be to work toward the maximization of services to individuals without disturbing any power relationships in the community. This tendency can be seen in the efforts of the WCMC staff to persuade citizens in one of Chicago's neighborhoods to work on problems of concern to social work agencies and drop their efforts on the problems they had identified as important.

Another problem, which Hudson Guild, for example, did not foresee, was that the more successful the organizing effort, the more visible and powerful the organization would become at the expense of the sponsor. So, when one of these institutions decided it would like to try to form a citizens organization, going outside a conventional frame of reference, it did not, with two or possibly three exceptions, change its own mode of operation. Howell Neighborhood House may have been an exception at the beginning, but the later reports are too sketchy to support conclusions on the point. Colony House was an exception while Sara McCaulley was director. Upon her departure, the project became a case work program. In general, I conclude that making grants to neighborhood houses to organize citizen groups was not a good risk.

The potential conflicts of purpose between a metropolitan association and a citizens organization, and the tendency of many professionally trained persons to denigrate the roles and abilities of citizens also affected the results of organizing efforts sponsored by most such groups. The exceptions were the CPHA, which failed because of the difficulty of the task, and the MPHA staff which functioned effectively as technical consultants to a few community groups, strengthening them organizationally in the process. The other groups were quite ineffective. The two colleges, although they achieved some successes, are too few in number to allow much generalizing.

In sum, the effect of the kind of sponsorship on success in organizing citizen groups was dependent on the actual purposes served and the intentions and competence of the staffs involved. Unless the staffs understood the problems involved, had a realistic view of community dynamics, were committed to helping people learn to help themselves in a situation encouraging self-determination and had the courage to do so in spite of opposition, success was unlikely. In broad terms, we can say that grantees in the first category were much more successful than were those in the fourth category.

Summary. In the preceding pages, I have identified the factors which appeared to influence the success or failure of the projects which involved, in some form or another, efforts to assist residents of a community to learn to work together for their mutual benefit. The projects which achieved some significant success involved at least some of the following characteristics:

1. A focus on helping people learn how to deal with their own problems and on helping develop the means (the power) to carry out what they had learned. The contrary approach emphasized providing services or solving problems for people.

2. A genuine opportunity to take and exercise responsibility for decisions. Self-determination by the membership must be the mode.

3. Communication, education and training conducted in the context of action.

4. Organizing on the basis of a reasonably compatible cluster of interests, problems and interests. The obverse of this was to invite anyone to join in the interest of some broad purpose such as "improving the community." This could work only if the approach to the problem worked on would be supported by all.

5. Undertaking to organize by going directly to the people experiencing the problems, to the solutions of which action would be directed.

6. Activities conducted in ways which served to strengthen the organization.

7. An internally consistent set of purposes and activities.

8. Use of tactics (whether of cooperation or confrontation) appropriate to the situation.

9. Availability of leadership and staff possessing organizing sense, courage and determination. The leaders were leaders because they had a following and had shown they could cope with new kinds of responsibilities. Staff saw their role as helping others learn to do things for themselves, not preempting their responsibilities. In recruiting staff, graduate professional work was not a decisive positive factor; innate qualities were more important.

10. In the case of Highlander, the public commitment to one's fellow trainees about what one would do back home was an important device. Dropping this feature in the SCLC program, significantly reduced its effectiveness in Septima Clark's opinion.

11. A hard-headed fund-raising program adequate to support at least minimum staff, combined with energetic, dedicated volunteer effort.

12. Sponsorship having a clear grasp of principles relevant to community activity and which provided the opportunity to apply them in a forthright way.

In addition to the above list, note should be taken of other points which had a less broad impact among ESF-funded community projects. In the case of Indian projects, it appears that much more time must be allowed for results to be secured than was the case with our other projects. Also, it was important that ample opportunity be provided to learn new roles which at least initially might be seen as incompatible with one's role as an Indian. In the case of Highlander, because it was primarily a leadership training program, its residential workshops were central to achieving its results. In my opinion, the value of learning in a residential setting tends to be undervalued by educators.

This list of conclusions has emphasized the factors encouraging positive results. In general, negative results followed from failure to apply effectively the factors listed above, from ignoring them altogether or from applying their opposites.

What Was Learned About Changing Citizen Behavior

I come now to the second part of this exposition of what was learned from our grantee projects. This part deals with changes in individual behavior or abilities which are directly related to the performance of citizen roles, changes which came about in several contexts. Some occurred in connection with the formation and functioning of a community organization. In some of these cases, such as the projects conducted by American Indian Development and Highlander, the changes were sought intentionally and directly. But in the case of the Industrial Areas Foundation, changes in individuals were generally considered to be, if not a byproduct, at least subsidiary to though supportive of the solution of the problems which gave rise to the organizing effort initially. Nevertheless, changes in abilities relevant to citizenship did occur, but such changes might have been increased even further had this been a specific objective. The reader will recall that many CSO members learned a great deal about what citizens need to know, including how to form and run an organization. But when the educational program was added in some CSO's, those who took part learned much more. They learned not only more things but how to look deeper into the purposes of CSO activity and what the implications of certain actions might be. Yet when the IAF undertook to organize in Woodlawn, the educational was not included as part of the program.

Organizational activity, however, was only one of the contexts in which civic education took place. Some projects were concerned with helping individuals to learn in ways which did not depend on their functioning to build an organization (except as a class in a school or college is a kind of group formed to facilitate learning on the part of individuals). The programs of Roosevelt University and the American Council for Émigrés in the Professions are examples of this kind of context. A third context included projects in which a group and its dynamics were an essential element without being the end or goal of the activity. The AFSC Interns-in-Community Service project is an example which fits this context. (The difference between the second and third kinds of context may have been only a matter of degree. The results in the third case depended to a much greater degree, however, on the internal dynamics of the group.) I introduce this notion of group context because it seems to me in retrospect that the goal of improving the civic competence of the citizen or future citizen was significantly affected by the manner in which and by the extent to which a grantee utilized or failed to utilize opportunities provided by group activity.

Before proceeding to explore what was learned in these contexts, however, it seems appropriate to remind ourselves of the recommendations made by the Committee on Education for American Citizenship concerning the scope of the Foundation's grant program as they were modified by the trustees. The basic recommendation was that grants should be made in support of projects which had as their goal "increasing the effectiveness of individuals and groups in their effort to participate democratically in the solution of our common problems." It was intended that although activities promoting individual welfare or dealing with private interests might be connected with the idea of participation, such activities should be excluded. Only activities promoting abilities needed to participate in matters of concern to the public (in Dewey's sense of the term) were to be supported. Furthermore, the Foundation should be concerned not only with the quantity of citizen activity but its quality as well. (This matter of quality of participation is being explored on at least one front by such scholars as Lawrence Kohlberg and Robert Selman who have been studying stages of moral development and social perspective or role taking.) The committee clarified its concern about quality of participation by noting that support should not be given to efforts to propagate a particular set of conclusions. Instead, liberation of the individual should be the goal. The citizen should be helped to see new possibilities, to become aware of the reasons for, the "why" of actions, and not merely be told that a certain action or position should be taken. Such changes as the growing complexity of modern life, the deterioration of the stock of housing and other social capital, the great expansion of governmental activity (especially federal) with a relative lessening of activity on the part of voluntary groups, led to feelings of impotence and a consequent apathy on the part of many citizens. Because apathy is a condition contrary to a basic principle of a democratic society which is that citizens must share in decisions on public questions and in the control of public action, efforts to encourage citizens to participate effectively should, the committee urged, be supported.

The voluntary association was seen as an appropriate vehicle for improving and encouraging citizen participation in the processes of studying and discussing public problems, the development of proposals for action and the evaluation of results. If participation of individual citizens were to be improved, then individual behavior would need to be changed through educational means. Educational efforts would need to be directed to changes in attitudes (including in some cases acquiring a sense of identity and self-esteem); information about and understanding of public problems, social processes, social values and social institutions; and skills needed to work effectively together.

The committee pointed out that while such objectives were appropriate to improving the generality of citizens, there were millions of citizens who were virtually excluded from participation either because they felt themselves to be outside the system (for example, certain American Indians) and/or were illegally prevented or otherwise effectively discouraged from participating (for example, blacks and Mexican-Americans). Accordingly, the committee urged that a substantial proportion of the Foundation's grant funds be allocated to support efforts of citizens to organize on a community basis in order to improve the quality of the common public life.

Another kind of deterrent was experienced by relatively well-educated émigré professionals who lacked an adequate command of the English language as well as an understanding of the requirements for living in our society. They did not understand our expectations of them nor did they grasp which of their expectations, based upon their previous experience, were no longer valid. Until these needs were satisfactorily addressed, their participation in their new society would be halting and frustrating at best. Some citizens were doubly penalized, being not only discriminated against but illiterate as well. Many Mexican-Americans and blacks were thus doubly handicapped.

As stated in Chapter 1, the Foundation trustees decided to emphasize that portion of the committee's analysis which argued the importance of improving the amount and the quality of citizen participation, especially, but not solely, through activities more overtly educational, activities addressed more directly to the goal of bringing about changes in individual behavior. To summarize, it is the task of this section: (1) to indicate the kinds of changes in behavior related to civic competence which have occurred as a result of the projects supported by the Foundation (to the extent such results can reasonably be claimed), (2) to offer some observations on how the results were affected by the context of the educational activity (whether, for example, in the context of a community organization or group work or a formal class) and (3) to indicate what principles seem to have favored desired changes or, if ignored, resulted in a failure to achieve them.

Speaking in general terms, we wish to know whether project participants became better able to analyze their situation, to define what their problems were, to determine what alternatives for action they had and to choose among them, to act and to review what had happened as a guide to further action. But formidable as this list may be, skill in execution of these steps is not enough. Success also depends upon whether one has come to feel a responsibility to act which depends in turn on seeing oneself as the kind of person who can and should try to make a difference, that is, being willing to try to make a difference and acting with courage and determination. This is a matter of attitude. But if the action is to be wisely carried out, knowledge (information and understanding) is also needed as a guide to action.

As the reader must by now be aware, the several kinds of abilities just enumerated can be broken down into manifold specific educational objectives in the form: to gain information on the requirements to qualify for deputy voter registrar. So specified, we could identify hundreds of behavioral patterns which were learned in the course of carrying out the projects. To do so, however, is not my intention. Instead, I will attempt to bring to the reader's attention significant examples which will illustrate what was accomplished. There is a problem with doing this, of course, in that we must try to distinguish between evidence of good citizenship behavior which was learned because of the project and behavior or competency which individuals or groups already possessed or would normally acquire in the process of living.

In making this attempt, I wish to remind the reader that the quality of our evidence varies greatly over the range of projects. In some cases, we have research studies conducted by competent social scientists. In other cases, the Foundation received extended reports prepared by persons of good judgment based on careful anecdotal records. For a number of projects, I have drawn on whatever materials were available plus, in some cases, my own observations of the activities and their apparent results. In drawing conclusions, I have tried to temper them in accord with the quality of the evidence. I would like to acknowledge also the work of Edwin Fenton, who has identified a set of five kinds of goals appropriate to citizenship education in the high school,18 These goals are based on the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and Robert Selman.19The goals are: (1) to gain knowledge about the political system and how it works, (2) to develop intellectual skills needed for problem solving, (3) to develop participatory skills related to action in a democratic society, (4) to develop a value system essential to functioning in a democratic society and (5) to develop self-esteem essential to feelings of worth which are prerequisite to participating effectively as a citizen.20

Because these goals are specified to the schools, they do not fit entirely comfortably with the range of projects conducted by our grantees although the goal of acquiring knowledge of our political system and how it works obviously fits the Citizenship Clearing House project, which involved college students in political party activities. Nor do these categories fit altogether well with the categories which have been used in this report, that is, the ways of thinking, feeling and acting which are appropriate to the citizen role. Gaining knowledge and intellectual skills can be equated with ways of thinking. Participatory skills refer to ways of acting, but they cannot be divorced from ways of thinking either. The development of a value system appropriate to a democratic society is grounded apparently in intellectual processes (ways of thinking) which then become invested with feelings, a sense of commitment, of wanting to behave in a certain way for the right reasons.

The development of self-esteem is a goal which, according to Fenton, Kohlberg has not addressed directly. Fenton finds this puzzling in that the nature of higher moral stages implies the importance of this curriculum goal because respect for persons and the equality of persons are two of the major attributes of principled thought; hence, a democratic polity requires citizens with a high level of self-esteem. Given this relationship, it is fortunate that a great deal of attention has been given in the schools in recent years to the objective of improving the self-image and enhancing the level of self-esteem in children. Although the experience of some of our grantees shows the need for pursuing this objective among children in non-school situations as well, the greater need shown in our grantees' projects involved strengthening the self-esteem of adults.

Before pursuing the point any further, I believe it would be helpful to a better understanding of Fenton's list of goals if I were to identify for each, one of two projects which served such a goal. In connection with the goal of gaining knowledge of the political system and how it works, I have already mentioned the Citizenship Clearing House. The Encampment for Citizenship clearly attempted, for example, to develop intellectual skills appropriate to analysis of propaganda and presenting a reasoned defense of democratic principles and institutions. When the members of the educational in the Stockton CSO discussed the question of who would benefit and who would be hurt by the proposal to redevelop Goat Valley, they were learning intellectual skills essential to full participation as citizens.

The concept of participatory skills, of course, relates directly to the dominant theme of our grant program. These skills may include data gathering and communicating (speaking, arguing, discussing) which are employed in negotiating, working out compromises or influencing political decision makers. In the course of forming and operating a community organization, the members must, in effect, develop and implement rules to govern themselves. As they do these things and communicate about them among themselves and with outsiders, the viewpoints of others must be dealt with, which in turn may lead to progress toward a wider social perspective and to a higher stage of moral development. (Moral stage and social perspective are important concepts in Kohlberg's schema.) Many of our grantees conducted projects which provided considerable evidence of progress in the development of participatory skills. Illustrations of such achievements will be noted below.

Achievement in the development of moral values, however, can be claimed less readily. This is so, in part, because change in moral outlook is more difficult to bring about than is skill in chairing a meeting. Also, it is often difficult to know whether action is taken for a principled reason or is only done for reasons of expediency. Furthermore, even observation of a moral act cannot tell us whether or not the individual in a comparable situation in the past would have acted in the same way. If he would have, then the project could not claim credit for having brought about a change. In the case of the AFSC Interns-in-Community Service project, however, research results provide valid evidence that individuals became less authoritarian and more tolerant of those whose opinions differed from one's own.

In connection with Fenton's fifth category-developing self-esteem, I have mentioned that is has received increasing attention in recent years in connection with the education of children but not in connection with the education of adults. The force of this point is especially apparent in relation to those participants in our grantee projects who were most discriminated against or who had the weakest sense of identification with the larger community, that is, many Indians, Hispanics and blacks. The CSO, American Indian Development and Highlander projects are cases in point. But the need for greater self-esteem was also to be found among whites who felt that any effort on their part to improve their situation would be futile. They lacked the feeling that they could learn what needed to be done, that their efforts would count, that their opinions would, and should, be considered. And in many situations they would not take a stand or attempt some move for fear of reprisals. To gain the courage to act, to take a stand, was an important aspect of self-esteem in several projects such as those conducted by the IAF in California and by Highlander. And at an even more fundamental level of self-esteem lies the need for a sense of identity. This was the first problem needing to be solved for some Indians before participation in the civic life or even the economic life of the larger society would be possible.

I have already touched on the lack of ready fit between Fenton's list and the scheme embracing ways of thinking, feeling and acting, In one respect the difficulty is a contrived one because in practice the activities conducted in a given project cannot be tagged so neatly whichever scheme one uses. Changes in thinking, feeling and acting might all be involved in a single event. I will, therefore, try to review what was learned about citizenship education by combining the two sets of categories without presuming that they will reveal the uncomplicated truth.

Ways of Feeling: Self-Perceptions, Attitudes and Values

I have indicated that learning to participate effectively in dealing with matters of common public concern requires learning a variety of new behavioral patterns: improved understanding, skills of participation and appropriate attitudes. In the latter category, we must include such behavior as developing a sense of identity and of self-esteem; a willingness to use and accept authority within a democratic framework, a willingness to accept the notion that if you receive help from others that you incur an obligation to reciprocate; a willingness to accept the view that all would benefit if impulsive behavior reflecting only a whim were replaced by a goal-oriented, planned effort; a willingness to accept the participation of others regardless of ethnic or other differences; a willingness to take responsibility for some action for the general good.

1. I have chosen to begin this attempt to illustrate the kinds of changes achieved in citizen behavior with Fenton's category of self-esteem (as a person of worth to whom fair treatment is due and who has a right and duty to contribute to society) and with the notion of identity (as a person who can take on new roles appropriate to a new life situation), which was not directly addressed by him. I do so because it seemed to me, as I observed the development of certain projects, that it was necessary to be someone before one could, more or less consciously, become someone whose outlook and abilities were different, become someone better able to cope with one's circumstances. This notion was suggested particularly by the projects at Crownpoint and Tama, the American Indian Center in Chicago and to a lesser degree the American Indian Workshops for College Students.

Of all our projects, in none was the concept of identity and its importance more carefully articulated than was done by Robert Rietz. At Tama, Pushetonequa could see himself as an artist and a Mesquakie. But he and the others working in Tamacraft could not change their sense of who and what they were to the point where they could acquiesce to another Mesquakie's decision about Tamacraft's operation as a business-in spite of the obvious prospects for its financial success. How long it would have required for the necessary changes in those involved to have taken place, we cannot know, but clearly the time available was too short.

In quite a different context, the American Indian Center, the problem of identity was acute for many-especially for those who were more tribal in their outlook, who had come from reservations. For those most tribally oriented, according to Rietz, the very notion that someone should think of himself as a person who should, or even could, change into someone different, would have seemed nonsensical. Yet some change there must be. And, he said, by taking part in the work of the center, contributing oneself to its activity, one became a builder of the center. Through such action, incorporating new elements, a new role emerged. And as participation extended to new things, one remade himself willy-nilly, became more responsible and more urbanized, a different person. "And this inevitably carries over to other aspects of life."21He quoted Gardner Murphy as saying, "A man can only be what he has been plus what a new situation has to offer."22This, said Rietz, was shorthand for the AIC.

This could be so because of the unique character of the center, controlled as it was by its members not by the staff and a board of directors made up of outsiders. The staff did not organize a variety of activities in which members were invited to participate. Rather, activities were started by members, sometimes without the knowledge of the staff. Anyone could join in if he or she felt comfortable about doing so. Soon a wide variety of opportunities was available, even including sharing in the management of the center or in fund raising. Rietz repeatedly underscored the importance of having the opportunity to take responsibility for who and what one is and for what one does. Taking responsibility in this way came naturally in the AIC. The fact that those coming to the center had made differing adjustments to urban society meant that there was a greater variety of role models to choose to try or emulate if one wished. Rietz was concerned that Indians be helped to become better citizens by using the center program as a way of providing citizen roles inside the center and in the outer community. The goal was not merely to promote an adjustment to urban living but rather the direct and rewarding participation in the life of the urban community as contributing citizens. As these roles were developed and incorporated, the identity itself changed. Activities were only a means to this end, they were not ends in themselves. What made them effective was the freedom to be responsible for them. Rietz saw the relation of achievement to the growth of identity as a fundamental principle which must be recognized as essential to the successful practice of social work. We had in the AIC, then, an example of a group, an organization, an institution which operated in such a way as to maximize learning opportunities for the individual Indians who came to it.

McNickle and Pfrommer were also concerned with the problem of identity and a consequent need to help tribally oriented Navajo to learn to accept new roles as an appropriate part of themselves, roles which would enable them to cope more effectively with the changes inexorably altering the traditional way of life. The discussions in the Navajo Development Committee and the activities resulting therefrom led to a new outlook, a different perception of themselves, as persons who had rights, who had come to an understanding of what needed to be done and who should demand action to make more effective what they were trying to bring about. New roles could be learned within these projects because they were Indian programs, not programs for Indians. No one was constrained to give up an old role while trying a new one (except as pressure from the outside impinged on the Navajo Development Committee-pressure from the tribal staff or from the Bureau of Land Management which wanted to fence the range). These new roles were learned as a consequence of taking a responsibility for action which was freely assumed. New role behavior became possible as its value came to be understood while not forcing the individual to give up previous role behavior before the desirability of doing so was evident. Critical to the process in the AIC and AID was the emphasis on autonomy.

A review of the minutes of the Navajo Development Committee and other documents, showed that the Crownpoint area leaders had made impressive gains in leadership abilities, including growth in self-esteem and, partially as a result, in participatory skills. These changes became evident when they voiced their collective protest of the proposal to close the school farm, when they criticized the Crownpoint school superintendent for calling a meeting of chapter leaders without consulting with the NDC and insisted that its Education Chairman preside ("We must learn to do things ourselves," they said.), when they rejected the tribal staff's version of the public works program and the staff's proposal for a large multipurpose building, and, when, following their study of the law and order code, they argued successfully for restoration of a tribal court and police headquarters at Crownpoint.

Growth in self-esteem became evident in other projects as well. In the American Indian Workshop for College Students (AIWCS), the sympathetic analysis of the Indian worldview as it existed before the white man came (and the objective and just interpretation given of the European worldview, being neither extravagantly praised nor condemned) provided unaccustomed support for the traditionalists who, too often, were simply overwhelmed by the more aggressive assimilationists. By being strengthened in their own self-image, the traditionalists, the more tribally oriented, could consider more rationally the options open to them in a world largely dominated by white values and technology. This intellectual process was aided by the pedagogical approach of the AIWCS, which emphasized the necessity of taking responsibility for one's own learning. This responsibility was reinforced by the emphasis on active discussion of facts and ideas and their implications for one's own conduct and for public policy. Also of great importance was the practice of bringing to each workshop outstanding leaders of Indian communities who provided role models for Indian youth. These various elements combined to produce for at least some participants an improved sense of self-worth, as persons who could make a difference. An example of the success of this process has already been noted-the young woman who refused to plead guilty when arrested falsely.

Among Mexican-Americans, the CSO program provided manifold opportunities for the development of self-esteem. In response to organizing efforts, persons who may have been listened to only among a group of friends or among members of an extended family, found that they could speak for people they barely knew or perhaps did not recognize at all, that they could lead a discussion in a committee, preside at a meeting or present a case before a public body. The leaders came to see themselves as persons of worth. And their neighbors could share in this enhancement of self-image as they saw their leaders securing redress of wrongs.

In Hanford, the whole Mexican-American community shared in a change of self-image when, with the organization of the CSO and the growth of its voting power, it was no longer required that a Mexican-American go first to the dog catcher in order to transact business in city hall. The organizing, the voter registration campaigns, the experience of talking about their problems and deciding what should be done and successful action led to a fundamental change in outlook. Achievement built self-esteem.

One of the early leaders in Stockton referred to his reluctance to speak up about anything before joining the CSO. As members, he and others began to argue for their ideas. It was a revelation to see that ordinary people also could do something useful for the community. "We no longer feel second class. When I go to a government office, I now ask the questions instead of the worker. It was not that way when I started."23Contributing to such a result were several factors: the backing of the organization, the acquisition of facts about problems and possible alternatives and the chance to test one's ideas and gain confidence in the discussions in the CSO, especially where there were educationals.

Merely the experience of spending a week at an interracial workshop at Highlander could have a powerful impact on how one felt about oneself, on one's "sense of personal dignity and respect," as one black teacher testified. Rosa Parks, attending a Highlander workshop, felt free of discrimination for the first time in her life. Finally, a year later, she realized she was no longer a person who could endure being forced to give up her seat and move to the back of the bus. Her refusal began the successful Montgomery bus boycott.

This is another aspect of self-esteem which we must not overlook, the quality of courage, especially when those of marginal social status are involved. The experience of the Stockton CSO member of discovering that he need no longer be afraid was an experience shared by many other Mexican-Americans and was duplicated among many thousands of blacks who persevered in their voter registration and other organizing efforts even in the face of violence or the threat of it. By taking responsibility for action (which also achieved a modicum of success), their self-image was enlarged in ways they had never envisioned. Expanded self-confidence encouraged them to believe that their views were of value; hence, others should be willing to listen. They had grown to a point where they had the confidence, a belief in the "rightness" of efforts to try to lead the organization in a direction which other members would support.

In commenting on the learning process, Horton articulated the connection between growth and action a little differently. He stressed that the teacher (or trainer) must not only look at the adult as what he is but also as what he can become. Then the trainee can be helped to see himself in the same way. So, learning to read and write (the student is illiterate and virtually a non-citizen) occurred in relation to the goal of becoming a voting, participating citizen. This process identified a desired goal, provided the motivation and helped the trainee to see himself anew, as someone who was worthy, hence, able to become a first-class citizen.

On this process, Charles Silberman made a similar point when he called attention to the fact that organizational activity begins to organize the person. He pointed out that the participants in TWO not only recognize they are winning but also that it is they who are winning-which is a mighty step in the growth toward an enhanced self-image. He observed the members of TWO seeing themselves as persons of worth, and, in the process, militancy become matched with a sense of responsibility. 24

In South Chicago, the mothers of Trumbull Park Homes, moved from belief in the inevitability of failure to the recognition that they could do things successfully. Their self-image was stretched by undertaking new roles: as licensed cooks for the nursery schools, as managers of a public library depository, as fund raisers, as participants in interracial activities. These steps were possible because the staff focused attention on goals which at any given stage were generally acceptable and a successful achievement of which was feasible. Each step prepared the way for another step.

In quite a different milieu, the American Council for Émigrés in the Professions found it necessary to salvage the self-esteem of those it served. Forced, more or less, to flee countries where they had had status, their morale was usually very low after coming to the United States. First, there was the barrier of language. Second, there was the difficulty of obtaining employment in one's chosen field (a situation having much more shattering implications for a European than an American). And for lawyers, employment as a lawyer in this country was quite out of the question. An answer to the problem of shattered self-esteem was found in careful counseling and interpretation of the world of work in our society, making available special instruction in English and providing sensitive assistance in job placement. Where these efforts were successful, growth in self-esteem was a principal change.

The need to foster a sense of self-esteem was also a problem faced by some of our grantees working with youth. The reader will recall the adolescent girl in the 4-H program whose view of herself was so negative that her self-other relations were deteriorating, By being helped to learn what was happening to her physically, by learning something about proper carriage and grooming, personal care, styling suitable for her and how to make attractive clothes for herself, she threw off the negative burdens which led to a diminished self-image, her self-esteem was enhanced and her self-other relations improved. The project succeeded in bringing about change necessary to establishing a sounder basis for the self-other relations which are an essential part of good citizenship.

I have taken the view that effective citizenship depends in part upon having a sense of identity and a modicum of self-esteem. I have suggested, further, that where these conditions were lacking, individuals were unlikely to become involved in community affairs. Feeling insecure about oneself is likely to lead to avoidance of involvement. A feeling of self-worth is necessary to a feeling that others should or will pay attention to your views. In a number of our projects, grantees called attention to observed changes in self-esteem (changes in a sense of identity were less common). In general, these changes resulted from taking a responsible part in some kind of successful action.

2. If citizens are to work together effectively and to do so on a democratic basis in order to achieve agreed goals, certain attitudes are necessary. Some involve a moral choice, for example, an attitude of willingness to accept the participation of others regardless of ethnic or other differences or an attitude of recognition of the fact that one incurs a reciprocal obligation if one accepts a benefit or service from another. Other attitudes address themselves to questions of efficiency or effectiveness in getting a job done. An example of this would be an attitude of preferring a planned effort to achieve an agreed goal instead of acting in response to a mere impulse or whim. Another example would be an attitude of acceptance of the need for the exercise of authority within a democratic framework as opposed to a condition of anarchy.

Benton House staff demonstrated that such attitudes could be successfully developed even in a young clientele characterized by a lack of goals, self-centeredness, fear of association with those different from themselves, inability to accept authority or to exercise it properly, inability to accept responsibility, a wish to have a good time without being able to plan and work toward it. The experience of working with these young people indicated, however, that if the effort to bring about change did not start by about the seventh grade, the Benton House program would have a markedly smaller effect.

Group work was to be the means to bring about change. In the summer of the second year, a series of interesting field trips provided opportunities for planning and assigning certain responsibilities; taking roll, collecting and handling the bus money, controlling antisocial behavior. Handling such responsibilities successfully carried over into activities in the house. Committees were organized which planned and managed parties. By this time, the core group was better able to control behavior. With lessened disruptions the positive values of the activities were increased and were appreciated by a growing number.

In the third year, New Teens took on larger responsibilities. Clearly, progress was being made toward developing attitudes conducive to accepting responsibility, to undertaking planning and action on behalf of a club, to accepting and enforcing restraints on antisocial behavior which otherwise would diminish the value of the program for all. The fact that parties were planned to include other house groups indicated progress toward the objective of learning to help others, if others have helped you. Further evidence of progress toward this objective can be seen in the fact that ten members of this group, who moved up to the Teenage Program, agreed to serve in the summer as volunteer junior leaders for New Teens. By the fourth year, clubs proceeded immediately to elect officers, indicating, at least, their acceptance of the need for authority in the group. The fact that several Spanish-speaking boys and girls were taken into clubs showed a greater willingness to accept others regardless of ethnic differences.

Clearly, progress toward desired changes in attitudes was being made, changes which were critical to effective, cooperative action, inclusive of more people than would otherwise be the case, and which recognized that if one received, one should also be prepared to give. And comparable changes were also achieved in work with the Teenage, Young Adult and Adult programs.

3. Closely related to the need to foster attitudes such as those just described is an even more basic need, the need to develop a more inclusive social perspective and a more principled or moral basis for dealing with others on matters of common public concern. Although, as I have said, to claim achievement of such basic objectives is risky, I believe, nevertheless, that in a few cases, at least, such a claim can plausibly be made. For example, members of the Navajo Development Committee (NDC) would discuss and take a position on some program affecting all chapters in the Crownpoint area. But chapter leaders in the Yuba City area on the Navajo reservation to the west would not join in a common stand on a program for better housing. Each would take a position only on behalf of his own subgroup.

What made the difference? I suggest that the principal reason was due to the way in which the Crownpoint project staff worked. The problems worked on were chosen by the Crownpoint leaders. Discussions in the NDC were leisurely. There was time to think about what was being said and what it meant for all of the chapters represented. There was time for the idea of common problems and a response in common to grow and a sense of community to emerge. There does not appear to have been a comparable process at Yuba City. As more and more chapter leaders came to NDC meetings, the range of interests widened, but common elements became clearer as well. A greater readiness emerged to think of the good of all and not merely of the interests of one's own subgroup. (This trend broke down, unfortunately, in the selection of the house manager because clan considerations intervened.)

Although staff members might offer suggestions from time to time, they were careful to leave responsibility for decisions with the people. In the process of exploring problems and issues, considering alternatives and making decisions, a sense of commonality emerged. Another significant bit of evidence of this can be seen in the rejection by the Crownpoint leaders (who came from the different chapters) of the tribal government's proposal to replace the Community House at Crownpoint by building a chapter house for each sub-area. This stand was taken in spite of the obvious temptation to acquiesce in the tribe's offer.

Further evidence of such a change can be seen in the agreement reached at the American Indian Chicago Conference that the needs of all Indians must be included in any comprehensive program for American Indians. How did this unprecedented result come about? In her review of the conference, Nancy Lurie took note of the tensions felt, for example, by the official delegates of the federally recognized tribes on reservations vis-a-vis the discontented members of their own group. Anxiety was also felt by and because of other groups:

... Indians who had lost all or part of their lands because the lands had been inadequately secured to them by the government; Indians living away from their lands because of economic necessity; Indians who never had reservations; and Indians who are not under federal jurisdiction.

She went on, then, to quote from the Declaration of Indian Purpose which was adopted by the conference.

We say emphatically that problems of health, education, economic distress and social non-acceptance rest as heavily on all the Indians in these categories as they do on the reservation Indians and possibly more heavily. Therefore, in all the recommendations herein, it is to be understood that even where non-reservation and off-reservation Indians are not specified, it is our purpose to insist that their needs be taken into account.25

Lurie says further that although it could be argued that this position reflects merely a perception of enlightened self-interest, to do so would be an unfair judgment on the conference. Instead, she credits the character of the conference and its antecedent activities which allowed Indians to get to know one another as people, sharing parts of a larger problem. There were confrontations, many opportunities "to state their own cases and to learn how they had misunderstood other cases." Of even greater importance, she felt, was the way in which dialogue proceeded and how agreements were reached. Robert's Rules of Order were used but sparingly, and "the group as a whole found one another's approach to problems familiar and predictable."26

Just why such a change took place cannot be argued with certainty. But I interpret Lurie's report to be saying that, important though social factors, such as participation in dancing, were in bringing about change in acceptance of, for example, New England Indians because they were seen to behave like Indians, the dialogue begun months before culminated in another kind of change-the broadening of social perspective and a recognition that the burdens of deprivation rested as heavily or perhaps even more so on non-reservation Indians. I take this to mean that not to include the latter came to be seen as unjust. Such a change represents a growth in moral outlook. Hence, all Indians were included in the recommendations embodied in the declaration.

This latter aspect of the change can, it seems to me, be reasonably ascribed to the character of the process leading up to the conference and to the open process which governed the deliberations there. At the first meeting in Denver, the pattern was set, a pattern in which (1) the topics and problems to be addressed were to be decided by Indians, (2) the views emerging from discussions held across the country were to be communicated to all interested Indian groups in such a way that the continuing dialogue would nurture the growth of ideas and testing of alternatives and (3) the conference should be conducted in an open manner. The underlying principle was that this was to be an Indian effort, with the staff charged with facilitating the communication process leading up to the conference. Because it remained an Indian effort, the extraordinary changes noted could occur.

Another example of growth in social perspective and moral outlook comes from San Jose, California. I refer to the incident involving the refusal of a Mexican-American bartender to serve a black because of his color. The members of the educational decided that if it were wrong for Anglos to discriminate against Mexican-Americans, it was just as wrong for the latter to discriminate against blacks. They reported their conclusion at the next members meeting, and the CSO decided to join with the NAACP in a suit against the bar. It is difficult to know, of course, what the precise motivation was or to be sure whether a change in the level of moral outlook actually occurred. To some degree, expediency was no doubt involved. (How can we call for an end to discrimination against us when we discriminate against others?) On the other hand, a substantive discussion ended up with the conclusion that the bartender's action was wrong, an offense against the rights of a person. This took courage because there was a significant amount of tension between Mexican-Americans and blacks. It is unlikely that this result would have been achieved if there had been no small forum dedicated to the exploration of problems and issues. In a small, comfortable, friendly milieu, an "unthinkable" question could be raised and calmly examined. It would have been much less likely to be raised initially in the large member meeting. And had there been no CSO, very possibly the question would not have been posed by anyone at all. The fact of participation in a community organization deserves some of the credit for the issue having been raised.

Related to this objective are the changes in attitudes which took place in the young adults participating in the Encampment for Citizenship and the Interns-in-Community Service programs. Because the results of research on these programs have already been reported in some detail above, I will only list some of the kinds of significant changes. They included a reduction in authoritarianism and increased commitment to such values as civil liberties and civil rights, personal autonomy, tolerance, altruistic service, social action, democratic process and nonviolence.

The findings as to why changes occurred are also of great interest. The study showed that changes occurred in the ICS program primarily as a function of group life rather than the didactic elements. The group factors which had a positive impact were: a higher percentage of women, older members (that is,twenty-two years average rather than twenty), heterogeneity of membership, some stress in the situation (high morale did not promote change) and a higher percentage of politically concerned members. The composition of the group and the character of the group life were decisive in effecting change.

The encampment participants were involved in a six-week program of lectures, discussions and field trips and, of course, were involved in six weeks of communal living. The study concluded that both the didactic elements and the group living were essential to the changes achieved. Group norms clearly had a decisive effect. It appears, too, that the sense of identity with the reference group and its values tended to persist long after the program schedule was completed. The attitudes and values which were achieved in the course of these projects (although some values were held in high measure by many participants at the beginning of these programs) augured well for a high quality of citizen participation in the future.

Ways of Thinking: Acquiring Fundamental Intellectual Competences, Information and Understanding

As I have already noted in connection with Fenton's categories, their range does not encompass all of the educational objectives to which our grantee efforts were directly or indirectly addressed. At the same time, Fenton's description of the necessary elements of a civic education program in the high schools goes, in many respects, beyond the content dealt with by any of our grantees.

What, then, are we concerned with here? Under the rubric ways of thinking, our grantees sought a wide range of educational objectives. Examples indicative of the range are: (1) to achieve basic literacy competence, (2) to acquire information about low-income housing programs, (3) to gain an understanding of the political party system and process (in Stockton, in Kern County, in California, etc.), (4) to understand the role and dynamics of volunteer groups in a community, (5) to gain an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of social agency efforts in an urban ghetto, (6) to gain an understanding of the operation of the formal and informal governmental process in a community, (7) to gain an understanding of the criminal justice system and how it works in one's own community, (8) to become able to analyze the range of interests in the community which are concerned with an issue, (9) to be able to communicate effectively in English (as a second language) about the implications of political cartoons, (10) to gain an understanding of civil rights as embodied in the Constitution and as a right to be enjoyed in one's community and (11) to gain an understanding of the need for authority in a group. Many, many more objectives could be listed in this form.

These objectives can be given another dimension as well. The level at which achievement of a given objective can be sought may vary greatly, depending upon where the individual starts from. Thus, the reading curriculum for the English class in the barrio or in the citizenship school on one of the Sea Islands was far simpler than that developed for students in Roosevelt University's American Studies Program. Similarly, there was probably a difference in the content level at which the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference dealt with planning issues and that at which the Bakersfield CSO fought a proposal to bulldoze part of the barrio.

One further point should be made, obvious though it may be. In discussing objectives concerned with achieving information, understanding or intellectual skills we must remember that in most grantee projects they were pursued in the course of some activity which involved other objectives as well. The study of housing alternatives in Hanford was not conducted in a vacuum. It was bound up with other considerations: the development of a determination (an attitude) to help poor Mexican-Americans who were losing their homes because of a highway relocation and of a congeries of participatory skills needed to wage a campaign to gain approval for a housing program for which a great deal of knowledge was needed as a basis.

One reason why few illustrations of seeking for the kinds of knowledge envisioned by Fenton as being pursued in the schools are to be found in the projects conducted by our grantees is because he is concerned with a different group of students from those with whom our grantees worked. He is concerned with what all young people in our country need to know, for example, about our form of government, in their future role as participating, voting citizens. They require a broad foundation of information and understanding. Most of our grantees, on the other hand, were concerned with more immediate needs of students, whether adolescent or adult. The "students" might be Navajo wanting to know how to go about getting a tribal police headquarters reestablished in order to cope better with violence in the community. Or the student might be a CSO member or a black person in South Carolina seeking information on the provisions of law governing registration of voters, or a TWO committee concerned about the laws relating to subsidized housing. But also, it might be a young college student attending the Encampment for Citizenship who wanted to understand the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to the rights of minorities.

But to meet such a need, it was necessary to possess or to develop something like another of Fenton's goals-intellectual skills. However, he seems to envisage, as does Kohlberg, what they call "formal operational thought," that is, "the ability to hypothesize, to see all possibilities in a situation, to relate evidence to inference, and so forth." Also necessary to the application of such skills are a "full societal perspective" and "sophisticated social science concepts," which are in turn basic to higher moral-stage thought.27No doubt, our grantees would have felt diffident about stating their objectives in such terms. Nevertheless, the success of many projects depended upon learning something about a whole range of topics and questions: what their goals should be; community problems; governmental structure, procedures and programs; how to secure assistance; political parties; etc. In other cases, one of the first tasks was to learn to read and write as an indispensable key to the opening of doors. But for all, learning how to think effectively about such topics and questions was essential at some level. Selected illustrations follow of activities designed to achieve several objectives falling under this rubric of ways of thinking.

1. To achieve a basic literacy competence is essential to being an effective citizen in our society. That at least a basic level of literacy was acquired by many thousands of blacks in the South is clear from what I have recounted in the report on Highlander's work and the program carried on by the SCLC and others. What I wish to underscore here is the factors which made this result possible. First, there was the strong motivation to learn to read in order to register to vote. Highlander continually urged blacks to work to become first-class citizens. A further motivation, of course, was the desire to be able to write a letter, read a newspaper or buy a money order. Second, the organization (the citizens club in the first instance) made it possible to meet in a place where political activity and related topics could be discussed, to hire a teacher who could be flexible in method and materials and responsive to the particular needs of adult students and to organize the class and provide for necessary follow-up in the community. The possibility of providing support outside of the governmental structure was vital. By being more than a class, by being a group seeking to improve not merely individuals but the lot of blacks in the community, the citizenship school program was a phenomenal success. With the help of the Field Foundation, this model was eventually replicated over much of the South.

The CSO program also promoted a significant expansion of literacy among Mexican-Americans, less because of the methods and materials used, which were conventional, but because of the impact of the organization on the numbers reached and the unusually high completion rates achieved.

2. To gain competence in the use of English as a second language at a level appropriate to that of a professionally educated person was an essential objective for those served by the projects conducted by Roosevelt University and the American Council for Emigrés in the Professions. The reader will recall that the English instruction in the American Studies Program was quite different from that conducted in the Highlander and CSO programs. The ASP students had had at least a high school education, and many had attended a university. Although some needed to learn basic vocabulary and grammar, the needs were less concerned with immediate survival than with the need to participate through the English language at a level of understanding appropriate to an educated person and in the light of an understanding of the rich nuances of American culture and society.

The program was successful because the language was not taught as something to be found only in a classroom. The instruction drew on the cues and encounters of everyday life: asking directions, trying to leave a crowded bus or trying to understand a cartoon and the political campaign of which it was a part. And the teachers recognized the intense desire of the students to learn to converse in English at a level equivalent to that at which they could use their native language. The typical adult school did not meet such needs. Achievement of the educational objective was made possible by the ability of the staff to recognize who and what their students were and to act accordingly.

3. To achieve the ability to acquire an understanding of problems and issues through discussion is an important element in both of Fenton's categories of knowledge and intellectual skills which are a part of good citizenship. In a large organization reflecting different interests, there is a danger that the more aggressive, the better educated, the more facile, verbal members will have undue influence in group decisions at the expense of those not sharing such attributes. In some CSO's, the educational became a veritable training ground in which those less articulate members learned how to gain understanding concerning the work of the organization and the skills useful in arguing a point of view. It was a training ground for new leadership.

The educational was important for many reasons. It provided the only opportunity available to explore issues with due regard to their complexity. The large, general meetings were unsuited to this purpose. Many members were too timid to speak up in a large group. And the agenda was always too long. But in the educational, there was time to reflect, to raise the more basic issues of what was fair or right. Participants learned to ask questions which would probe for the purposes to be served, for the "why" of a proposal, for the interests involved, for the bad as well as the good points of some proposal, for possible connections with other parts of the CSO program and for a clue as to the impact of a decision on the organizing effort. The dialogue produced by such questions pointed out implications otherwise unseen, opened up new possibilities, new alternatives. This is liberal education.

In Stockton, it was the educational which unmasked for CSO members the "vision of the bright new future" which the city government depicted if the urban redevelopment project in Goat Valley were approved. The method was Socratic. By pushing questions at the group, the leader had succeeded in helping them to talk their way through to an understanding of a very complicated matter, identifying the conflicting interests involved. They discovered the need for more data, and they organized and made a survey to get them. They identified various alternatives and decided which would serve their community best.

It is possible that a few of the better-educated residents may have been just as effective in thinking through a course of action for themselves. But for the majority, the achievement of information and understanding was dependent upon the group and its process. It was in the group process that one individual's understanding could be tested against that of another, that the contributions of several could stimulate the creativity of all, that the labor of assembling the necessary facts could be shared, that proposed solutions could be tested in the light of collective wisdom and that the commitment and power to act could be mobilized. It is no wonder that a city official asked where the people learned to ask such questions.

It is clear that in Hanford a group of Mexican-Americans who knew very little about the subject of housing was able to conduct a survey of a need resulting from relocation of a highway, assemble a great deal of information about housing program alternatives, make a choice among them and play a critical role in a successful political campaign to get the necessary housing built. The Community Service Organization and especially the educational were indispensable to the learning and action which followed.

There is no question that Highlander enabled and encouraged many persons (especially from 1954 to 1961) to prepare a plan of action for dealing with some problem in their home community, a plan which they understood, including the why of it, and which they felt committed to carrying out. A large proportion of these were concerned with the problem of increasing registration and voting among blacks. Highlander was successful in this relationship because of its commitment to helping individuals learn to solve problems for themselves and because of the effectiveness of the residential workshop experience. Participants came because they had a problem on which they needed help. Because each would contribute his questions and his comments on others' questions, all could learn from one another. In addition, workshop staff would contribute what they knew about the facts about, for example, the laws on registration and voting as they applied in the various states; other information would have been collected previously and made available to the workshop.

In brief, each would describe the situation in his community. Questions would be asked. What is the problem? What percentage of blacks vote? why not more? because of apathy? not qualified? discrimination? fear? Any person's contribution might provide insight to another. Each would be asked to prepare a plan of action and describe it to the group. Comments and criticisms would be offered. As the individual would go through the process, he would come to understand his own position, his own plan better. In addition, he would be committing himself to starting action on his return. Throughout this process, the Highlander staff person would be asking, "Why do you do that?" "Why do you do it that way?" These questions, according to Horton, were the key to the evolution of a program. In such a workshop, free from the distractions of daily living back home, learning could take place in several ways, at all hours. It was not learning to incorporate a predetermined content but to develop a person wanting to learn to solve a problem. In the course of the workshop, the participant learned how to learn, a process which he could use to help his or her fellow citizens back home. He or she learned how a group of people sharing a common interest could discover how to solve a problem.

4. To gain basic information about and understanding of our form of government is an objective obviously appropriate to education for citizenship. One of the most remarkable achievements among our grantees was the astonishing expansion of naturalization among Mexican-Americans in California. This expansion, of course, was made possible by the change in the law which allowed aliens meeting certain criteria to be examined in their native language. What turned a mere possibility into achievement, however, was the role of the CSO. Responding to a real need, the CSO translated the regular adult school citizenship materials into Spanish, recruited Spanish-speaking teachers, fought where necessary the indifference or opposition of adult school administrators, recruited the students (mostly middle aged or older), arranged for classes to be held in the barrio, provided tutors and monitored attendance. A surprisingly high proportion completed the courses, passed the examination and became naturalized citizens having a grasp of at least a skeletonized view of the structure of our government.

All of the program elements just noted were vital to the program. The CSO was responsible for all of them. With only a few exceptions, the attitude of the adult school was negative and bureaucratic. These extraordinary results could not have been reached without a community group having a program commitment like that of the CSO--a commitment to solving many of the problems of Mexican-Americans through making possible wider participation in the political process. This was not a goal of many, if any, adult schools.

5. To acquire information about and understanding of community problems, organizations and institutions, programs, power dynamics, etc., involves primarily the area of participatory skills as described by Fenton. Acquisition of information and the search fox understanding concerning matters of community concern were not, of course, to be conducted for their own sake. They were to be undertaken because they were relevant to some goal which project participants had identified and were pursuing.

What we know about what information and understanding was learned must be largely deduced from what was reported about activities undertaken; no summative evaluation of progress toward such objectives was undertaken. This leaves us with some uncertainty on the matter, of course, in part because we must make assumptions about how much the participants knew before the project started. But certainly, very few lay persons would understand the intricacies of, for example, various housing programs or zoning regulations. In my opinion, with few exceptions, carrying out successfully an activity involving the housing or zoning field can be taken as prima facie evidence that learning must have occurred.

We have, of course, several specific examples, vide, the members of the Hanford CSO who educated themselves on "what was meant by `workable plan' and all those names." The group context was essential to the result. Another example has already been noted in another connection: the successful effort of the members of the West Avalon Community Council who learned, with the help of the Metropolitan Center for Neighborhood Renewal, what was involved in getting the zoning changed for a twelve-block area in order to prevent serious overcrowding. That they did learn is shown by the fact that subsequently they carried through entirely on their own, a successful rezoning campaign covering eight additional blocks.

Clearly, participants in the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference gained much information and understanding of problems and programs in their own community. On the highly critical problem of enforcement of the housing code, conference members analyzed the results of conventional efforts to secure compliance and the reasons for failure thereof and recommended a system of team inspections. This system was adopted with excellent results. An important element in its success was the corps of volunteer court observers, trained by the conference, to ensure that the process continued to work as it was supposed to work. Again, a significant number of community organization members achieved a rather sophisticated grasp of legal and administrative requirements of the housing compliance program, a program of vital importance to the goals of the conference and the residents of the community. Residents learned much that was vital to them as citizens, doing so because they had become involved in the program of an ongoing community organization.

When one considers the range of activities of the working committees of TWO, it is obvious these committees could not have achieved what they did without learning an enormous amount of information on a wide variety of problems and programs as well as an understanding of the interactions of the public and private sectors. For example, the Housing Committee of 200 members had to become informed about a great variety of laws and regulations applying to mortgages, trusts, landlord-tenant relations, building codes, zoning, available housing programs, etc.

A very important function was to conduct negotiations between landlord and tenants concerning needed repairs. (In one case, the committee renegotiated a mortgage so that a larger share of rental income could be spent on repairs.) In some cases, rent strikes were necessary to get a boiler repaired or to cover some other vital need. In one extreme case, a building was placed in the hands of a court-appointed receiver. Committee members participated in visits by building inspectors to slum buildings in order to discover the specific violations and what follow-up was needed. When a tenant brought a complaint to the committee, its help was predicated on the tenant first organizing the other tenants into a block club which then became an organization member of TWO. This process, together with the subsequent discussions with the committee and the landlord, broadened the complainant's view of the matter. He no longer saw it as merely an individual problem but as part of a community problem for which there was a community remedy. In addition, by 1975, TWO controlled about a thousand housing units plus other enterprises representing a capital value of about $35,000,000.

For such activities and enterprises to come about and to flourish, it should need no argument to agree that a vast amount of information about many matters of public concern must be known by a large number of TWO members. The availability and limitations of public powers had to be learned. More than information, of course, was needed; there must also be understanding not only of the facts of a case but also understanding of how TWO must go about defining and achieving its goals in the housing field.

Similarly, other groups in TWO faced the need to assemble information and think their way through to an understanding of how to cope with inappropriate curriculum in the overcrowded schools, to strengthen the health programs and institutions in Woodlawn, to improve implementation of welfare programs, to reduce discrimination in employment and to organize effective job-training programs for Woodlawn youth. Extraordinary progress was made on all these fronts.

To recapitulate, it was necessary that many TWO members learn the facts about one or more of these problem areas: about applicable laws, ordinances and regulations, about who was affected by these problems, about why the responsible officials did not try tosolve the problem, about alternative ways of dealing with a problem, about how to deal with the various obstacles and about what the organization could do. Facts, of course, were not enough; understanding of what the facts meant was also needed.

Almost no individual would ever be likely to acquire the range and depth of knowledge indicated above. And even if such a person were to come to the fore, that individual would not be able to effect much change. In short, it was the group, the organization which made it possible to assemble the information and through discussion achieve an understanding of it. The group was essential to the motivation to undertake the task because it was the power of TWO to make a difference, to solve a problem, that encouraged its members to begin so arduous a task.

6. To gain an understanding of the political system so that one can function more effectively as a citizen is an objective emphasizing participatory skills. It had quickly become apparent that the success of the citizenship schools in helping blacks to gain a basic literacy competence enabling one to register to vote was not enough. Casting a ballot for or against alternatives which had been set up by others, was not enough. So, the citizenship school curriculum was expanded to include several other levels: the political structure and how it works, especially at the local level, choosing candidates, running a campaign, understanding the ways in which the political system was being manipulated to perpetuate discrimination against blacks, knowing the services which should be available to all citizens and how to ensure getting them and how to read a newspaper critically.

As a result of such activities, they were learning to speak better, to read more widely, to serve on committees, to be poll watchers, to run for office at a precinct level and to help to organize and run voter leagues. Teaching directed to the objective of understanding the political system, provided by persons they trusted, building on the experience of the people themselves and conducted in a context of expectation that the group would be active politically led to some impressive results-influencing elections and electing blacks to office.

Ways of Acting: Acquiring Participatory Skills of Data-Gathering, Communicating,Organizing and Negotiating

As I have suggested above, ways of acting involve a variety of skills. But at the same time, acting is the culmination of several other kinds of learned behaviors, for example, having the attitude of self-esteem or sense of confidence to act, possessing the necessary information and understanding of the problem and possible solutions to know what to do, accepting, for example, the moral principle that the right of a property owner to use his property to serve his self-interest as he might see fit must be limited in some degree to protect the rights of others, being aware of the political dynamics in the situation and having the skill to negotiate with the bodies controlling the decision. All of these behavioral patterns were manifest in the successful effort of the Avalon Community Council, taught previously by the MCNR staff, to persuade the board of aldermen to change the zoning of part of their community. But let us look at other illustrations.

I. Given the goal of promoting participation in matters of common public concern, developing the ability to form and maintain a citizen organization is an important objective. Cesar Chavez has underscored the great importance of the discovery that the device of the house meeting made it possible to build an organization among people who had no organization other than the parish church. This was how the CSO's were created, a process carried forward in organizing the United Farm Workers. The Migrant Citizenship Education Project finally came around to its use. Migrant Ministry staff discovered through the training project, the value of this technique, not only to discovering the real needs of the people, but also to mobilizing the cooperative efforts of those they served. The house meeting approach worked because it could be readily expanded from an initial contact through a network of extended families and friends. The device was simple, yet effective. And in both CSO and TWO, staff emphasized the importance of using program activities, especially services provided to individuals, to build the organization.

2. Coordinate with forming and maintaining a citizens organization is the ability to conduct its affairs effectively. An important technique in helping leaders and others who were involved in some activity to improve their effectiveness was the TWO before-and-after caucus. Beforehand, the group would meet to talk about what they hoped to accomplish, how they proposed to do it and who was to do what. Afterward, the group would assess what happened, what worked, what went wrong and what more needed to be done. The result was a better sense of what they were trying to do and of how to go about it and, furthermore, a greater sense of commitment to the organization's program.

Similarly, one of the important lessons learned by the Migrant Ministry trainees was the need to work with organization leaders to review what they were trying to accomplish, what they were going to do and how they were going to involve others. This was training in the course of action. In the fourth year of the Trumbull Park Homes nursery school project, an integrated group of mothers was able to work with six groups of children in a six-week summer program-without any staff person leading a session. Before the project began, none of the mothers would have believed anything even remotely comparable would have been possible.

3. If citizens were concerned to work together to secure their rights, an important objective must be to develop the ability to analyze and to counter discrimination and exploitation. Though many parents on Johns Island were illiterate, we have seen that they wanted very much to learn to read and write-once the possibility had come home to them. But they also wanted better education for their children. A serious gap in the curriculum of the high school for black children was lack of commercial courses, for example, courses in typing. Although they were opposed by the principal and teachers of the black high school (who were afraid of their own jobs), they threatened to appear to enroll their children in the white high school. Soon the program was underway. They succeeded because, within the Citizens Club, they had learned to think about their situation and their problems and discuss and decide what they needed to do.

In another situation, the director of Penn Community Center saw that valuable though the first workshops offered had been, just casting ballots was not enough. So follow-up workshops were held on selection of candidates, running for office, precinct organization and analysis of election results. Information about these matters was discussed in the context of how to use it. The following month, blacks elected one of their number to the executive committee of the Beaufort City Municipal Club, a key organization in local electoral politics. Their increasing sophistication about the local political structure and process was increasing the power of the black community to begin to counter the discrimination practiced against them.

The TWO Square Deal campaign provides another illustration of how exploitation by local businessmen (short-changing, short-weights, faulty credit contracts, inferior goods, etc.) was countered by group action. Many things were learned. Consumers became aware of the differences between fair and unfair credit agreements. They learned what rights and recourse they had as consumers. They discovered they could make common cause with honest merchants and gain their help in dealing with dishonest businessmen. And they learned that much of their problem could be solved through their own efforts instead of depending solely on the often unenthusiastic efforts of the bureaucracy.

4. Not all problem-solving involved a need to oppose or confront some force. Even so, there was much to be learned about how to identify and define a problem and organize a response to it (even though a solution would be widely accepted as being in the public interest). One of the more startling examples of progress toward the objective of providing leadership for the solution of a community problem comes from the 4-H project in Puerto Rico. Presumably because facilities and programs available to their community were comparatively meager, club members, fifteen to eighteen years of age, decided they wanted to undertake a community project. Deciding on health as their first area of interest, they undertook a survey which showed the presence of endemic illness, due principally to poor sanitation. Some 140 privies were built as a result of the coordinated effort undertaken by the club. The club initiated studies, consulted experts, convened community meetings, developed a work plan, coordinated material procurement, etc. Though indispensable assistance was provided by officials and the community, nothing would have happened except for the club.

The project's specific concern, however, was directly focused on the boy and the girl who led the club. The changes in their abilities, as recorded by staff, are worth noting again: (1) They developed a more democratic style of leadership. (2) They learned how to identify and define community problems. (3) They learned to follow through on the steps needing to be taken to solve a problem. (4) They learned how to gain the cooperation of other agencies and community residents in their solution. And (5) in addition they learned to feel and accept the need to participate in leadership necessary to the solution of community problems. These were impressive gains in any context.

5. Often the citizen organization must learn to deal or negotiate with governmental agencies. The preceding pages have noted several examples of successful negotiations with governmental bureaucracies; some have already been described in connection with other kinds of learning objectives.

Perhaps the major negotiation conducted by any grantee was that involving TWO, Mayor Daley and the University of Chicago, which extended over nearly two years. In view of the meager record, we must, perforce, infer what must have been learned in order to achieve the organization's goal. What was learned in order to act in this case was, as in other comparable instances, an aggregate of behaviors-gains in information, understanding, skills and attitudes.

First, TWO had to understand its own situation, including knowing what had happened to local residents in urban renewal projects elsewhere. The members of TWO saw that they must demand to be involved in decision making or run the risk of being eliminated from the community. They had to learn about the tools available to them, about "maximum feasible participation" and about various options under the laws governing public assistance for housing programs. They learned how to build their own power to make a difference-through mobilizing local businessmen among others and pursuing energetically a voter registration campaign. They learned to keep track of hearings and to mobilize community residents to attend in order that the support of local residents for TWO's position was made manifest. They came to see the need to develop sound proposals and plans of their own and hired professional staff to develop them. These proposals were published in the Woodlawn Booster and then widely discussed in committees, the TWO board, community groups and in public meetings throughout the community. At the same time, TWO leaders agreed that the university had needs which the community must recognize. If the university could not get all it might want, neither could the community. Finally, in October 1963, applying what they had learned culminated in the appointment by the mayor of the key citizens urban redevelopment committee, a majority of which, including the chair, were TWO members.

Again, we have in this instance an example of how the development of a group's program requires that its members must learn in order to move from one stage to another, while, at the same time, the carrying out of the organization's activities constitutes a multitude of learning opportunities. The learning takes place in the course of doing and not abstracted from the purposes in action.

In Chelsea, members of a committee learned that it was difficult, if not hopeless, to try to get information on the status of a court case by calling the office responsible for such matters. But a call to the headquarters of the local Democratic club would quickly elicit the information. Some of what was learned, such as the provisions of laws and regulations, might have been found in books. Such information would be seen to be needed by many citizens living, for example, in an urban renewal area and wanting to become involved in its future. But it might not occur to them that a seemingly straightforward request for information about the position of a case on the court docket would not be forthcoming as a matter of course by calling some clerk in an office. In Chelsea, the naive learned from the "wise" that there was a shadow structure which could be tapped more fruitfully.

6. Among the most important goals in the area of participatory skills is to develop leadership abilities. Leadership was cultivated by our grantees in a variety of ways but for the most part as a kind of on-the-job training. Of those which were not, some were more abstract than others. For example, the training provided by the Human Relations Center of the University of Chicago was quite abstract as compared with that which took place in a workshop at Highlander. But let us look at some specific examples.

The training which took place at Highlander was, obviously, not taking place in the trainee's community. At the same time, it was assumed that the trainee had come because of wanting to do something about a problem back home. They were encouraged to talk about these problems. The ensuing discussion was intended to clarify exactly what the problem was, what stood in the way of its solution and what alternatives might be explored in hopes of solving it. The discussion was as concrete as possible. At the end, the trainee had a clearer and more realistic picture of the problem with which he came and of what he must do when he returned home. Furthermore, the trainee had learned a method for analyzing a problem and choosing goals, a method which he could teach to other members of his community as they worked together. So, even though the training took place away from the community, the problems dealt with were real and were explored in a practical way. This approach differed from that of the National Training Laboratory in its workshops which might explore a "constructed" problem in an imaginary community, emphasizing a conceptual framework based on social science research.

As we know, Highlander's training of community leaders also took place in communities (although the extent of it was always limited by lack of funds). Although Esau Jenkins was an outstanding leader, Myles Horton and Septima Clark found his vision strangely limited, fixated, in fact, on the act of getting people registered. He would urge members of the community to register and to persuade others to register. When they did so, he would recognize their contribution and then merely urge them to get more registrants. It took perhaps two years before they got him to visualize specific individuals in different parts of Johns Island as persons who could take responsibility not only for promoting voter registration but for calling together neighbors to discuss not only neighborhood problems faced by blacks but those of Johns Island as a whole. It was only after Horton and Clark got him to identify those who were leaders in each part of the island and got him to persuade them to go to a Highlander workshop, that the program began to move. When this happened, the leaders learned by leading, helped to a significant degree by Clark. In time, Esau Jenkins saw that to go to a community to tell them what to do was not the most effective way to work. Instead, he would describe all of the interrelated activities developed on Johns Island and then tell them that the way to start was to go to a Highlander workshop and then return home and start to develop the kinds of programs needed in their area. As a result, leadership spread at a surprising rate.

The value of the educational in the CSO program has been noted in several contexts. The educational was a powerful mind stretcher, helping its members to see and understand what the CSO program should be trying to do and to grasp a wider range of alternatives. But Ross observed, too, that these discussions encouraged and enabled many members to become heads of committees or to run for office in the organization. Greater understanding of the problems facing the organization and of the alternatives available to it, greater skill in expressing oneself and arguing for a point of view, lent encouragement to members of the educational to take responsibility for action, for being a leader. Discussion in the educational, grounded in the day-to-day actions of the CSO, was a powerful contributor to leadership training. A key element in this process was the constant emphasis on the interconnection between program activities and the strengthening of the organization.

In quite a different context, Herbert Thelen and Bettie Sarchet of the Hyman Dynamics Laboratory made a significant contribution to leadership training in Hyde Park-Kenwood. The training clinics on block organization combined discussion of a set of principles for reducing conflict and encouraging cooperation and their application to the resolution of problems in a block context. The intellectual grasp of principles and organizing techniques was tested immediately against the realities of taking the initiative to meet with one's neighbors to solve problems at a block level. Sound principles applied in practice to concrete situations led to important citizenship learnings.

In an altogether different situation, Benton House achieved some marked successes. Working with teenage youth characterized by lack of discipline, inclined to destructive social behavior and unable to tolerate authority, even among peers, Benton House group workers achieved remarkable success in working with this age group. It was a noteworthy achievement when team captains organized all the details of a house basketball tournament-the first successful attempt at self-government at a departmental level in the history of the house. Next, the teenagers took over responsibility for managing the game room. This was followed in the third year by electing a Teen Committee with a slate of officers-a committee which sponsored and ran dances, undertook important responsibilities for the house fund-raising fiesta, oversaw teen activities and raised and spent money from its own treasury. Some teen members undertook to provide leadership for younger members.

Sensitive and realistic staff guidance had brought a group of young people who had no sense of goals and were in danger of becoming social isolates to the point where they had learned the need to plan toward a goal if a satisfying result were to be gained, the need to accept and exercise authority according to agreed principles, the need to build trust and the need to take responsibility for oneself and others. These are all critical qualities of good citizenship.

In all of these examples, the individual learned in the context of some kind of group activity: a residential workshop, a social work group or a citizen organization. Such activity resulted in a broad range of kinds of learning which contributed significantly to the development of civic competence. This conclusion is based on situations in which: (1) the problems worked on were defined by the participants, (2) the learnings emerged from opportunities to carry out in practice the desired learnings, that is, through the activities undertaken by the group in order to reach its goals, (3) there was sufficient time to discuss what was going on in order that understanding could grow, (4) the responsibility for what took place was increasingly assumed by group members, (5) a sense of individual achievement could result, (6) purposes and methods used were mutually consistent, (7) the program was directed toward helping the participants learn to help themselves rather than to the mere solution of some problem and (8) the group structure was strong enough to secure the successes which were needed to maintain the morale of the members. In short, these groups became a kind of "uncommon school" (in Thoreau's phrase) for the development of civic competence.

What We Learned: In Brief

It is not my intention to present here a summary of summaries but rather attempt, in conclusion, to set down, with only a minimum of explanation or argumentation, a series of statements embodying principles which seem to have been at work, or absent, in the projects described above, thereby affecting their success or failure. To illustrate, it seems important to point out that in the projects we supported discriminatory or exploitive behavior did not disappear merely because attention was called to it or because someone remonstrated on behalf of those exploited. Stronger measures were often needed. Yet some workers in the helping professions seemed loath to believe that such measures were required.

The principle involved in this example requires that a choice be made, a choice which will be made in accordance with one's view of how our society works or ought to work. Some would choose in accordance with their view of how it ought to work, even in the absence of evidence that the results which ought to ensue would in fact do so-and even in the face of evidence that the results would in fact be negative.

Some grantees made one kind of choice on some issues and were in some measure successful; others made a different choice, thereby failing in some degree. Success or failure are not absolutes. But I do make a judgment regarding what constitutes success or failure in relation to goals apparently held by the grantee or by the foundation or both. I do not intend to argue here for these judgments, that having already been done above. I merely wish to bring together in synoptic form my conclusions about how choices about principles involved in the development of civic competence affected the results of the activities we supported.

These choices were, of course, made in different kinds of contexts. The largest context includes the projects which were concerned with citizen organizations and leadership training efforts appropriate to them. At the other extreme from a citizen organization is the classroom group in, for example, the American Studies Program of Roosevelt University. In between are the projects conducted in a social group work context, such as the Benton House project or in a kind of group in which the orientation was more akin to that of the educator than that of the group worker. The Encampment for Citizenship, Interns-in-Community Service and the 4-H program are examples of the educational group context.

Such conclusions as I feel warranted in noting will be grouped according to the context in which they occurred. In addition, I will also try, when appropriate, to connect a principle with the relevant aspect of curriculum which may have been involved. That is, the particular choice of principle embodied in the conclusion will be identified with, for example, the issue of what purpose should be served or the issue of what mode of operation should be employed (understanding that by mode of operation I mean the methods employed and the respective roles of learner and teacher in the learning process).

Conclusions Developed in the Context of Citizen Organization and Community Leader Training

Conclusions Concerning Citizenship Learning Through Participation in Citizen Organization Activity

1. Purpose. Citizenship education appears to have been especially effective where the basic intent of the grantee appears to have been to help people to learn to help themselves rather than to solve problems for them. Highlander's program exemplifies the former intent. On Pine Ridge, the AFSC project director's point of view was fixed on the need to provide recreation or fix a water hydrant for local residents. No change in people was reported.

We ignore the importance of bringing about a change in sense of role in the case of a tribally oriented person who presumably is being helped to accommodate (at least to the extent necessary) to life in an urbanized society. Also, we grossly underestimate the time required and fail to appreciate the importance of the individual being able to choose how and when he will change.

2. Mode of Operation. Progress in developing citizen abilities was especially significant where citizens were encouraged to use the behavior appropriate to such abilities. Development of a sense of responsibility and the ability to accept and exercise it occurred to a significant degree in projects where those served were encouraged to be responsible. This led to an enhanced sense of self-esteem. Robert Rietz saw the principle of "maximum local indigenous autonomy" as an imperative corrective to existing social work practice. Activities provided for such persons would not have this effect. They would not come to see themselves as persons who could and should do things for themselves.

The "post-mortem" session after some event proved to be a powerful training goal for organization leaders and members. It is a powerful tool because it allows review and evaluation of what was said and done while recollection is still vivid. Comparisons can be made with what was agreed to before the event and possible alternative responses can be explored. By being fresh in mind, the results of the evaluation can be effectively incorporated into future action.

The CSO educational model has great potential value. It became, at its best, the vehicle for assembling information on critical problem areas and for achieving understanding as a basis for choosing among alternatives. It was particularly valuable in getting at the why of a program. It has great value as an unusual form of liberal education. Its maximum value was realized when the officers, committee chairmen and interested members took part. When officers remained aloof, the effect was divisive.

The Highlander residential workshop model can be a powerful adjunct to a community action program and should be more widely used (although cost may be a deterrent in many situations). The insulation from the competing claims of one's daily existence back home, the association over many hours of each day with those having similar problems, the experience of living in a free and integrated environment and the workshop sessions themselves which provided a model which could be applied back home to the study of a problem and the search for alternative solutions (why do you do that? in that way?) as a basis for decisions about action deepened the participant's understanding, stirred and broadened his imagination and strengthened his commitment to action.

The Highlander citizenship school model proved to be singularly effective because the school taught what the students most wanted to know, its subject matter and materials were intimately connected with action to improve their condition and it emphasized the relation of what they were learning to an image of what they could become--first-class citizens.

Bringing together individuals from different communities and encouraging them to explore common problems and alternative solutions can lead to significant changes, even including a widening of social perspective.

A group and its activities can have a significant impact on the individuals who choose to contribute to achieving its goals, even helping them to organize their own lives. Charles Silberman made the point that residents of Woodlawn became more organized in their own lives by undertaking to do work in the TWO program.

Where a great gap exists between the cultural patterns of helper and those to be helped, the former must be extremely careful about how the program is initiated. The helper must not expect some aspect of role behavior to be given up until the individual is ready to incorporate some new or altered role behavior. The choice must be left with those to be helped. Their autonomy must be respected. Only then is genuine change possible.

Conclusions Concerning Initiation and Development of Effective Citizen Organizations

Among the principal conclusions, there are several which relate to the relative success or failure attendant upon the formation and operation of community organizations. The particular results depended upon several factors: the objective conditions in the community, the understanding of project staff concerning the role of citizens in the community, the quality of staff performance, the internal consistency of program elements and the kinds of choices made by a grantee as to who should be served, with what purposes in mind and employing what kinds of methods.

1. Appropriateness of Purpose. Helping people learn to help themselves was an effective principle in promoting learnings basic to effective citizenship. It encouraged greater involvement of citizens in the organization, and, further, they became able to be more independent in coping with their situation. To try to bring people together in order to allow the sponsor to do something for them was ineffective.

2. Mode of Operation. The projects for which Myles Horton, Saul Alinsky, Fred Ross and D'Arcy McNickle were responsible attested to the validity of the view that those affected by some condition were the very persons who from the beginning should be involved in analyzing it and deciding how to go about remedying it. The Migrant Citizenship Education Project vacillated between this position and the inclination of at least part of its staff to work through the local establishment-experiencing success or failure accordingly. From the beginning of the organizing effort, the interested citizens in the community must have the opportunity to make decisions about the initiation and conduct of the organizing effort.

Members learn to organize by being involved in organizing. Training occurs in the process of action. Self-esteem also grows as a result of successful efforts to undertake responsible action.

There are local leaders everywhere. Some are intrinsically effective; others are titular leaders only. The organizing effort, assisted by staff, must identify those who can measure up to the novel task of leading a community-wide effort.

An organization grows in strength if it is alert to opportunities to utilize program activities for such end.

If those being organized are a group subjected to exploitation and discrimination, the organization must be helped, deliberately, to acquire the means to secure redress of grievances. Proposing merely to call attention to grievances will not be effective, especially for a membership consisting of citizens of low status in the community.

An appeal to fairness has some impact but, in general, less and less so, the lower the status of those involved. The South Chicago Community Center project was an exception. This was so for several reasons: taking a strong moral position (to help children and to help mothers learn to care for them better) which could not be rejected publicly by the bigots in the surrounding community; maintaining the focus on solving a problem without moralizing about it or attitudinizing; working through a capable, integrated staff; and placing ever-increasing responsibility on those served.

The Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, because of the status of its members, their numbers in the community and the fact that it shared certain goals (high standards) with the University of Chicago, was able to achieve many of its goals through persuasion based on a principle of fairness and good public policy. (But its goals were achieved in part at the expense of many small businessmen and low-status residents who were forced out.)

If an organization expects to bring about significant changes in the community in behalf of its members, it must be prepared to confront or cooperate as circumstances, including political realities, require. Tactics used, whether of cooperation or confrontation, must be appropriate to the situation, recognizing that victims of discrimination often cannot count on discussion or appeals to justice alone to eliminate such treatment.

3. Who Should Be Included? Recruiting members sharing a cluster of compatible interests is essential. If too many incompatible interests are included, activities will cancel each other out. Some grantees seemed to believe, however, that it was wrong to exclude anyone from an organizing effort. This principle did not prevent a successful effort in Kentucky or in Kodak, Tennessee (because differences among community members on organizing were not sharp), but in other cases, such as Hyde Park-Kenwood, it would have been fatal.

4. Supportive Impact of an Effective Community Organization. Although it is a point which lies outside our concern with the development of more competent citizens, I think it worth calling attention to the enhanced results achieved when, for example, a local health agency or adult school agreed to work with an effective citizen organization. Professionals seemed only too eager to sacrifice greatly increased participation in their programs to the convenience of conducting them in their own facilities. The fact that community locations were more successful because they were more convenient and less threatening to the people and because a local organization could interpret effectively the importance of participating seemed unimportant.

5. Internal Consistency of Program Elements. The Foundation's experience supports the view that project elements must be consistent with one another. As Myles Horton put it, we must incorporate in the first step the ideas we want to realize in the end. This principle was not followed in Lackawanna. The fact that a successful organization would probably become controversial was suppressed at the start. Establishment members were recruited but when the Albright Tenants sought help, the former rejected becoming involved with a "fringe" group. (This principle [of internal consistency] was also seen to have been violated in a number of the proposals submitted to the Foundation.)

6. Staff. Up to a point, an organization can carry on with only volunteer direction. Beyond some level of scope and complexity, staff assistance (requiring a financial base) proved to be essential.

Conclusions Developed in the Context of Learning Groups

Citizenship Education of Young Adults

The composition and character of a group can have a marked impact on the question of whether or not significant change takes place in individual group members.

In the Interns-in-Community Service program, individuals already scoring on a pretest close to the liberal end of scales concerned with authoritarianism, escapism, urban savvy and action-mindedness continued to move in the desired direction. It was the communal living aspect of the program rather than the didactic elements which was the more significant factor.

The Encampment for Citizenship program revealed similar results although the didactic elements were much more substantive than in the ICS program. The study concluded that both the didactic elements and the communal life were necessary to produce the results.

The NORC study indicated that some stress in the communal life aspect of the ICS experience encouraged growth in individual members. The encampment study staff did not hold this view at first, but study of later encampments supported the ICS finding.

Citizenship Education of Adolescents

Even in a community where interpersonal relations were weak, where many young people were in trouble with the law and antisocial gangs were strong, social group work methods, intelligently applied and stressing assumption of responsibility by those being served, were able to develop a high level of change in behavior essential to effective citizenship. Group work methods were deliberately directed toward developing activities in which young people would change their behavior in a desired direction. The staff members held a view of their clients which saw the development of a sense of responsibility as an essential requirement for future citizenship as well as seeing the possibility of such a development.

In the 4-H Club program, it was found that personal qualities of citizenship can be learned through intelligent participation in something one feels is important, with group members having as much opportunity to be responsible as possible and with competent leadership providing a supporting climate of feeling. Responsibility is to be developed toward self and others. By emphasizing self-other relations as a focus for development of abilities essential to better citizenship, the 4-H program could tap motivations grounded in the deep concerns of adolescence.

A key development in the outlook of 4-H staff occurred when they came to see that 4-H activities must be viewed as means to achieve citizenship education objectives and not as ends in themselves.

Conclusions Developed from Programs Conducted in a Classroom Context

Working at the Level of the Clientele

Success or failure was in some cases affected by the adequacy of the level of understanding with which the grantee undertook its work with its clientele.

Typical adult schools were unsuccessful with relatively well-educated émigrés because they did not (or could not) appreciate and act upon the existing achievement levels or expectations of such students. Roosevelt University did see the importance of paying attention to the level of understanding of the students and designed its American Studies Program accordingly.

At the other extreme, Chicago Commons Association was able to elicit virtually no response to its class or discussion group offerings and even to its ultimate attempt to offer individual instruction in English to immigrant residents of the community.

Unless we are to assume that, for example, Ukrainians or Puerto Ricans as such have no use for instruction in English or for understanding about such matters as Social Security, then it would appear that the sponsor had not undertaken the investigation needed to establish an effective relationship with the community prerequisite to undertaking an educational program. It is possible, too, that participation by the individual in educational activity has a different significance for a Ukrainian immigrant than for a native-born American. (It is also possible that the result reflected in some measure how the immigrant community perceived the grantee.)

The examples noted underscore the importance of knowing who and what the intended students are and what they expect from the experience.

In Conclusion

As I review what has been written here and ask what the record signifies, the salient points seem to me to be the following:

1. Efforts to promote a basic goal of the Foundation--to promote more effective participation by citizens in solving problems of common public concern--were successful on a significant scale.

2. Several principles affecting success or failure of the various efforts supported by the Foundation to organize citizens on a community basis were identified. Perhaps this was the area, if any, in which the Foundation was most successful in breaking new ground.

3. Although project participants differed in their status (for example, with respect to the degree of discrimination to which they were subjected), every category produced groups achieving growth in civic competence.

4. Leaders were found in every community who were able to learn how to help their fellow citizens learn to help themselves.

5. An astonishing amount of change in ways of thinking, feeling and acting took place as a direct consequence of participation in action, in the process of formation and operation of community organizations.

6. Although few if any new principles of learning were identified, the effectiveness of certain principles was confirmed in many of the projects. For example, learning the abilities necessary to civic competence was readily accomplished by having the opportunity to practice them. Citizens learned to be responsible by having the opportunity to take responsibility. Citizens learned by "doing."

7. Project results underscored the effectiveness of experience in a group setting in encouraging learning--whether in a Highlander residential workshop or in the AFSC Interns-in-Community Service program.

8. Social group work principles, intelligently and courageously applied, could be highly effective in developing the qualities and abilities of good citizenship in adolescents.

9. Consistency of chosen means and intended ends was shown to be essential.

Although I have said that many participants became more competent citizens, this conclusion was not as well documented as would have been desirable. We cannot be sure, for example, that learning to read a section of the Constitution in order to register to vote would be followed by a trip to the ballot box or, indeed, that the choice would be based on informed judgment. But something must be left to the decision of the individual. We can say that many were helped to come closer to achieving the information and understanding, the attitudes and skills which are thought to be necessary to effective citizenship.

The resources available to the Foundation were modest. It was fortunate, therefore, that a number of able and perceptive applicants came forward at a time when changes in our society made their goals especially appropriate for support by the Emil Schwarzhaupt Foundation. As a consequence, it is possible to believe that some contribution was made to developing the ability of citizens to help and be helped, to choose and evaluate leaders, to decide on matters of public concern; in short, to contribute to promoting the upbuilding and betterment of American citizenship, especially by encouraging their participation with other citizens in public affairs.

Unfinished Agenda

Having spent nearly three and a half million dollars and having just set down what we think we learned as a result of this expenditure, we are only too aware of possibilities which might appropriately have been pursued had additional resources been available. I am referring here, of course, only to possibilities connected with the activities which were supported by the Foundation and not to possibilities which might be identified de novo. I do so only with a view to alerting others to possibilities and needs which had at least the merit of arising from activities actually undertaken by our several grantees.

Before undertaking to offer a list of possibilities and needs, even a modest list, I should remind the reader of what the agenda consisted. In brief, we were concerned to help citizens and other residents to participate more effectively in our common public life within the framework of a democratic society. This implied the development of certain attitudes and the acquisition of necessary information and understanding and skills, in short, changes in behavior in ways appropriate to effective participation.

In reviewing the results, several questions arose. For example, were the results we thought we observed real or merely apparent? Did we observe results, valid in themselves, which stemmed from situations specific to certain projects and, hence, needing to be tested in other circumstances? Were there situations (problems) which appear to require a fresh look because they have been largely ignored? And, if we concede that certain desired results were achieved, can we speak with sufficient assurance about the conditions which encouraged their realization? With such questions in mind and in the hope that other grantors or practitioners will find in them a stimulus to committing resources to their exploration, I will discuss only briefly several items in what we see as an unfinished agenda.

1. In the years since the end of World War II, there has been an astonishing expansion in educational programs for adults, giving rise to the phrase "lifelong learning." But the notion that one's education should be a lifelong activity is implemented unevenly at best. For one thing, a large proportion of the adult population is not involved, but of those who are, only a relatively few participate in educational activities which can be specified to citizenship. Given the challenges which confront our body politic, should not attention be given to an examination of ways in which continuing learning appropriate to the improvement of civic competence in its many forms can be encouraged.

2. It can be argued that citizens tend to be more attentive to enjoyment of their rights than they are to their commensurate responsibilities. This point comes to mind in connection with the somewhat tentative effort to see whether progress through the stages of moral development and social perspective discussed by Kohlberg and as adapted to the school curriculum by Fenton could be observed in the results obtained by our grantees. Fenton, in his exploration of the application of these ideas to the school curriculum, identifies the kinds of knowledge required to grasp the groundwork of our constitutional system, the intellectual and participatory skills needed and the democratic values and level of self-esteem which must be developed if our democratic society is to work. But these are objectives of learning which can in appropriate circumstances be as relevant to adults as to school children. And in this last chapter, several examples were noted of learning by adults and by adolescents indicative of achievement of the kinds of objectives discussed by Kohlberg and Fenton.

But the indications were presumptive only. More convincing evidence is needed that such changes in behavior, in fact, took place for the right reasons and as a consequence of grantee activities. And because most of the instances cited involved participation in community organization or in social group work activities, there might well be a substantial benefit to the cause of civic education to be found in these arenas of social activity. The possibility that such activities can be the medium for individual growth in civic competence (in its ramifications in ways of thinking, feeling and acting) ought to be investigated further. If the conclusions are positive, then the direction and content of training of community organizers and social group workers may merit review.

3. The history of efforts to help American Indians is strewn with failures (not totally so, of course). But some successes, we believe, were achieved in those projects involving the Crownpoint Navajo, the American Indian Center in Chicago, the American Indian Chicago Conference and, to a lesser degree, the American Indian College Student Workshops. The key element in these efforts was the degree of self-determination characterizing the participation of Indians. But our conviction about success is not as well supported by data as we would like. Yet the emphasis on self-determination seems to be a promising principle. In view of the long history of failure in the relations of whites and American Indians, should there not be a range of efforts supported on the basis of the self-determination principle, efforts backstopped by adequate attempts to obtain the data which will allow a determination of success or failure to be reliably made?

4. The project conducted by the National 4-H Club Foundation brought into sharp contrast the citizenship activities conducted by certain 4-H Club members in Puerto Rico and those typically conducted by club members on the mainland. I am not speaking of those activities which were addressed to achievement of developmental tasks and of maturation of self-other relations. I am suggesting, instead, that the work undertaken to help the community in Puerto Rico was far more substantive, far more adult and involved a much higher level of responsibility than was true of many of the activities conducted on the mainland. Is this difference inevitable? Have society's tasks on the mainland become so highly organized for adult work that there is no room for the kind of volunteer, amateur yet competent effort of adolescents that made such a significant contribution to improving the health of a Puerto Rican community?

Clearly, the experiences of the Puerto Rican citizenship club made a major contribution to development of civic competence among its members. It could happen, in part, because adults, the parents and professional workers, were prepared to allow late adolescents the freedom and the responsibility to make a contribution worthy of any adult group in the community. Given current concerns about alienation of youth, we suggest the need to seek ways whereby a closer connection between adolescents and their society can be made which they will see as a real and not an imitation one. In many of the projects which we supported, the opportunity to take real responsibility was a significant factor in such success as they achieved. What ways, then, can we find for adolescents to take real responsibility in a community context?

5. Learning to read and write the language of our society are skills fundamental to the role of citizen. The Foundation supported projects concerned with literary skills at levels differing greatly from one another. In the South, Highlander (and, later, the SCLC, SNCC and other black organizations) conducted successful programs starting with those who could neither read the alphabet nor sign their own names. At another level, Roosevelt University and the ACEP taught English to foreigners who, for the most part, had gone beyond high school in their own countries. What they had in common was motivation, specific reasons, to learn to read and write. On Johns Island, the goal was to cease to be a second-class citizen and to become a first-class citizen instead. In the Roosevelt University and ACEP programs the motivation was to escape the limitations of a child's grasp of the language and to learn to use it at a level commensurate with the understanding and outlook of which an educated person would be capable. In short, in all of these cases, the acquisition of literary skills was a means to an end and not an end in itself. Given the current concern about illiteracy in our society, the experience of our grantees suggests the need to identify for each group lacking literacy skills, a purpose or purposes important to such group for which possession of these skills would be an answer to the need.

6. In the case of certain projects, significant results were achieved which could apparently be ascribed at least in part to the residential experience which was involved. Highlander emphasized the educational value of a milieu which provided an opportunity to explore problems of concern to the participants, using a process and treating the members of the group in accordance with democratic principles and, furthermore, isolating the participants from the claims of their day-to-day routines back home. The Interns-in-Community Service and the Encampment for Citizenship programs also achieved significant results which were ascribed in significant measure to the effects of residential group experience on the individual. Because of the studies that were made, we can speak with more assurance about the results of the ICS and encampment programs than we can about the results of the Highlander workshops which typically were scheduled for a week. Yet it seems clear that the latter also had a significant impact.

Because a residential program does involve an added expense by its very nature, it would be helpful to know whether or not such an experience is, in fact, significantly more effective than a nonresidential one. In view of the apparent advantages from a learning standpoint of the residential environment, we suggest that it would be useful to learn what difference it makes whether the educational experience is contained in a total environment, that is, in a separated setting for twenty-four hours a day or is limited to a few hours a day, after which the individual leaves for a separate setting for the remainder of the twenty-four hours. It would also be important to explore the duration of the experience as a variable affecting learning achievement. For example, how effective is a three-day immersion in a residential setting as compared with a week-long workshop? Was a six-week term essential to produce the results achieved in the ICS and encampment programs? Perhaps these questions are too gross in their thrust. Perhaps we need to ask also what is the relationship between various kinds of learning achievement and the nature and duration of the residential learning experience.

7. Lastly, I want to remind the reader of the generalizations offered in this chapter based on our experience with projects involving the formation and functioning of citizen organizations. These generalizations (for example, the points concerning compatibility of interests, basis of membership and mode of operation) seem to us to be credible, but they are, after all, based on a limited number of instances. Because the potential of such organizations as learning environments for the development of civic competence appears so promising, it seems to us that it would be highly useful to test these generalizations in other situations. It would also be useful to investigate the impact of activities comparable to the CSO educational on the individual members and on the citizens organization itself. And much more needs to be established concerning the respective roles of lay leadership and the staff, including the effectiveness of lay leader training methods.

As I said at the beginning of this brief summary, our grant program was not a large one, but it did emphasize problem areas which were not extensively addressed by other foundations, especially in the form of projects concerned with citizenship education of adults in community settings. For this reason, I have thought it useful to point to the need for further work in an area critical for the survival of any democratic society.

NOTES

1. Some years after implementation of this provision, following the resignation of Ethel Wise, Rabbi Julius Mark proposed that Leonard Rieser become a trustee. Later, following the resignation of Charles H. Tuttle and the death of Richard Reid, it was concluded that the diminishing activities of the Foundation made it inappropriate to replace them. Other trustees had also been elected, including Bernard H. Goldfluss, Mr. Gerngross' nephew and an attorney; Dr. Robert Montgomery, president of Muskingum College (New Concord, Ohio); Sidney B. Becker, a businessman and associate of Adolph Hirsch; Barbara Blincoe, daughter of Frederic P. Lee; and Ralph W. Tyler, whose background in education and the social sciences was of special value to the Foundation.

2. Frederic P. Lee, letter to Leo Gerngross and Adolph Hirsch, July 16, 1954, ESF files.

3. About two months prior to the second rejection, the applicant wrote to inquire as to the areas of Foundation interest. The correspondent said, "I make this request because I feel sure that in this program with its many different projects, there are some areas which would conform to the requirements of your Foundation or could very easily be adjusted to conform." This latter notion did not impress the trustees favorably. It made it appear that receiving money without much reference to program purpose was the important goal. Furthermore, in the Foundation's view, it was necessary that if a project were to be successful, the applicant must have thought through the purposes and means to be employed and arrived at a conclusion as to what he wanted to do because he was convinced of its value and practicality. The Foundation was not interested in hiring someone to carry out its ideas.

4. The more substantive reports, which were not published commercially, have been included with the Foundation files deposited with the University of Chicago library. (See Bibliography.)

5. For some applicants, however, just maintaining a flow of grant funds may be essential to their survival. They must keep running to avoid toppling over.

6. Or, as Ralph Tyler expressed it, we wanted to see some evidence about the reality of what happened and be provided with more than the images with which the heads of grantees were furnished when they began. This kind of final judgment about an activity is sometimes called summative evaluation. But evaluation is also thought of in another way which is sometimes referred to as feedback. At some point a reading is taken of how an activity is going. This information may indicate that some aspects of the activity are going well but other aspects may not be. This latter finding may persuade the project staff to change tactics. Feedback provides a basis for corrective action before it is too late. This kind of evaluation is referred to as formative evaluation. The Foundation was concerned with both kinds.

7. Dr. Ralph W. Tyler, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Foundation Grant," Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Conference of the National Council on Philanthropy, Atlanta, Georgia, Oct. 25-27, 1972, p. 36, ESF files.

8. Ibid., p. 37.

9. William W. Biddle and Loureide J. Biddle, "Program of Community Dynamics; A Pattern of Fundamental Education," Earlham College.

10. Alan M. Walker, "Two-year Report of the Vermont Community Development Program," Nov. 1960, p. 1, ESF files.

11. Biddle and Biddle, p. 3.

12. Herbert A. Thelen, paraphrased in Julia Abrahamson, A Neighborhood Finds Itself (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 49.

13. William H. Koch, Jr., Dignity of Their Own (New York: Friendship Press, 1966), p. 72.

14. The importance of a commitment to act, made before one's peers, was also stressed by Fred Ross. For example, in a big registration drive, a review session would be held at the end of the evening at some neighborhood gathering place. Before dispersing, Ross would ask each deputy registrar to tell the group which area he was going to canvass the next night. This campaign in one city council district produced 15,000 registrations.

15. An undated appeal fox funds was received from the council in September 1979 stating that for security reasons the Free Fair could no longer be held.

16. Although Hudson Guild was not included in this category, Marjorie Buckholz is another example of a social worker who became a good organizer. But in the case of this neighborhood house, a flaw was revealed when at the same meeting its board took two actions: to accept responsibility for building a citizen organization and to endorse Penn Station South. Apparently, Hudson Guild did not appreciate that the latter action undermined the former. It seems to me that this failure was due in part to the limitations of a social work orientation.

17. Dan W. Dodson, untitled report to the ESF, Chapter 9, p. 2, Dec. 1960, ESF files.

18. Edwin Fenton, "Educational Programs for Youth in Transition: Implications of Kohlberg's Research for the Schools," in From Youth to Constructive Adult Life: The Role of the Public School, Ralph W. Tyler, ed. (Berkeley, Ca.: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978).

19. Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach," in Moral Development and Social Issues, Thomas Lickona, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976); Robert L. Selman, "Social-Cognitive Understanding: A Guide to Educational and Clinical Practice," in Moral Development and Social Issues, Thomas Lickona, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976).

20. Fenton, p. 139.

21. Robert Rietz, conversation with Tjerandsen, July 23, 1968, ESF files.

22. Gardner Murphy, quoted by Rietz, ibid.

23. Notes of meeting with members of executive board, Stockton CSO, Nov. 8, 1962, ESF files,

24. Charles E. Silberman, Crisis in Black and White (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 346.

25. Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "The Voice of the American Indian: Report on the American Indian Chicago Conference," Current Anthropology, 2(5) (Dec. 1961), 495.

26. Ibid.

27. Fenton, pp. 142-43.