The following are some case studies we came upon as we
looked at
other neighborhoods attempting to counter gentrification and
displacement.
All of them were successful at some point in their campaign,
but some of
the neighborhoods did not ultimately change to the degree the
activists
had hoped. Even though their methods were varied, all of them
utilized
direct-action organizing and campaigning. We hope these case
studies inspire
the reader and stimulate ideas for how your own neighborhoods
might organize
against the increasing plight of gentrification.
The initial research was done by George Kao (library) and Chris Huynh (Internet)--further research was done by each person according to their case studies; the Chicago & Bloomington studies were done by Jeremy Hays; the Harlem and Suffolk studies by Chris Huynh; the Tenderloin and Santa Fe studies by Jon Lau; the Lower East Side study by Radhika Kunamneni; integration and formatting of the paper by George and Chris. The Presentation was prepared and given by: Jeremy, Radhika, Jon, and George.
The South Loop Development without Displacement
Campaign (SLDWDC)
Chicago Coalition for the Homeless (CCH)
Chicago Affordable Housing Coalition (CAHC)
The South Loop has been transformed by Chicago's shift from industrial economy to service economy. Warehouses and industrial buildings that used to serve the Loop (CBD) have been converted to upscale housing just 10 minutes from downtown. The city of Chicago has encouraged redevelopment of the area by granting subsidies to developers for infrastructure improvement. In 1990 a tax increment financing (TIF) ordinance further stimulated mixed-use redevelopment in the area. Mayor Daley now lives in the South Loop, but increasing land costs and the demolition of Single Room Occupancy (SRO) hotels have displaced many of the indigenous low-income African American community.
The Campaign
The CCH and CAHC, responding to a lack of citizen input in the redevelopment process, launched a community planning process in the fall of 1994. The planning process evolved into the SLDWDC whose goals were as follows:
· 20% of all new housing should be set aside for low and very low-income families.
· Existing low-income housing in the South Loop should be preserved and improved. Non-profit developers should have the opportunity to rehabilitate and manage single room occupancy hotels (SROs).
· A mandate should be implemented stating that the property developers of Central Station set aside 20% of the units for low and moderate-income tenants.
· South Loop small businesses should be supported and preserved.
· 50% of all jobs created by South Loop development should be set aside for women, minorities and homeless Chicagoans.
The campaign brought pressure directly on Mayor Daley by protesting outside his new South Loop home every Tuesday for two months leading up to the 1995 mayoral campaign. They also dumped horse manure at the proposed site of a new development that did not meet their low-income accessibility demands. Other in-your-face tactics included protesting at the 1996 Democratic Convention and protesting at the mayor's office.
The results
The city adopted a policy that mandated a 20% set aside for affordable housing in any new market-rate, owner-occupied housing produced in the South Loop using TIF funds. Two new SRO hotels, one with an attached worker center, were constructed in the area by non-profit CDCs with financial assistance from the city. Another was scheduled to be built. A coalition developed to organize on the state level to prevent TIF misuse, to allow the public to monitor their creation and use, and prevent the displacement that TIFs often cause.
Analysis
· This was a solid direct action campaign coupled with specific demands (affordable housing set-asides, preservation of SRO hotels as a housing option).
· The message was very clear: "Development without Displacement."
· The 1995 mayoral elections provided a political lever for the SLDWDC.
· The community outreach was very broad via the planning process.
· The campaign was largely the result of a collaboration between two major organizations which were already well established (i.e. had staff) and linked to larger (state, national, international) networks.
· The campaign took two years and cost approximately $250,000 in staff hours and stipends to homeless activists.
· Enforcement of the 20% policy will likely be an issue as developers have not yet built any residential units and therefore aren't required to build affordable housing.
Despite the success of the campaign, displacement has not significantly slowed in the South Loop. A more comprehensive program may be needed to fully stem the tide of gentrification and displacement.
Sources
· http://www.cnt.org/tn w/20/204toc.htm (The Neighborhood Works July/Aug 1997)
· http://www.unrisd.org/engindex/publ/list/dp/dp90/ toc.htm#TopOfPage (UNRISD Discussion Paper No. 90, November 1997)
· Interview, John Donahue, Executive Director, Chicago Coalition for the Homeless
According to 1996 article in Shelterforce Online, "more
than one-third
of Bloomington residents live in poverty, and the city has one
of the highest
housing costs in the state. More than one-fourth of the city's
residents
pay more than 50% of their income for housing. Throughout the
1980s and
early 90s, low-rent downtown apartments disappeared, one
building at a
time, as developers speculated on the future value of housing
in the city.
Gentrification moved forward unabated with the helping hand of
city government,
which allocated HOME and CDBG dollars to developers who in turn
displaced
hundreds of low-income people. In one particularly terrible
incident, 60
families living in a low-rent trailer park were evicted to make
way for
a student condominium development." In 1995 the City Council
ignored citizen
objections and voted to transfer $750,000 from a fund providing
social
services and low- income housing to a project to expand
convention center
parking.
The Campaign
The Coalition of Low Income and Homeless Citizens decided to attack the problem of affordable housing in a systematic manner. They scheduled a series of weekend community organizing training sessions and began planning a direct-action organizing campaign aimed at forcing the City to dedicate $1.2 million of a county tax windfall to an Affordable Housing Trust Fund. As the authors of the article write, "Over the next two months, the Coalition organized a series of actions at City Hall, knocked on doors of low-income residents to solicit their active involvement, and showed up in large numbers regularly at City Council meetings. When candidates were electioneering at the farmers market, Coalition activists would stand nearby distributing trust fund literature." The Mayor and City Council eventually agreed to allocate $500,000 as seed money for the fund.
The newly established fund had no requirements for permanent affordability. The Coalition continued to organize. They orchestrated phone call campaigns to swing Council voters, set up meetings with individual Council members, and recruited allies from around the state to testify before the council. On the night of the vote they surrounded the City Hall and packed the chambers with supporters. The Council approved a permanent affordability amendment by a vote of 5-4.
"This trust fund is ground-breaking in many ways. It is the first time local Bloomington moneys have been dedicated for affordable housing. It is the first community housing trust fund in Indiana (there is a state Housing Trust Fund). It has the tightest restrictions on permanent affordability in the country. And, it was the first trust fund created almost exclusively by poor people; poor and homeless people designed and led the campaign."
Analysis
· The organizing campaign had clear goals: establish the fund, allocate $1.2 million, and assure permanent affordability.
· The campaign had clear targets: the Mayor, swing votes on the Council.
· The Coalition had breadth and focused on recruiting new members and developing new leaders.
· The Coalition took advantage of election year politics. The Democratic Council members had the increased incentive to support the Coalition's position because they knew the Coalition was willing and able to embarrass them in the upcoming elections.
· The Coalition had a clear message, which they distilled into concise slogans (e.g. "Homeless again in 20 years!"). They also discussed the Trust Fund internally and practiced presenting the issue to others, which helped clarify the message.
· The campaign was very low- tech. It was run out of a soup kitchen on $500 by volunteer staff.
When the Coalition won the campaign some of the key organizers moved away from Bloomington. They city subsequently took advantage of the absence by back-pedaling on permanent affordability issues and finding a dedicated source of revenue for the fund. This shows that what is won today can be taken away tomorrow without strong, permanent, attentive community organizations.
Sources
· http://w ww.nhi.org/online/issues/85/organize.html Shelterforce Online. Not Another Parking Lot: Fight City Hall--and WIN! By Mike Evans, George Goehl, and Kim Bobo Jan/Feb 1996
· Interview, Adam Krugel and
George Goehl,
Coalition Organizers
According to recent conference material prepared by the
Jewish Council
on Urban Affairs in Chicago, the Humboldt Park community had a
large population
of Mexican and Puerto Rican immigrants who were displaced from
other parts
of Chicago in the sixties and seventies. Manufacturing was once
a constant
in the community, but more than 30,000 people lost their jobs
in the seventies
and eighties and many left the neighborhood. Today the
neighborhood has
a population that is almost half Latino (mostly Puerto Rican)
and half
African-American. Fifty percent of households are below the
poverty level
and 19% are unemployed. Renters make up 75% of the residents.
They pay
as much as 50-75% of their incomes toward rent. The median area
rent is
$432.
The housing stock is mostly frame and brick single family houses. There are numerous vacant lots and a significant amount of scattered site public housing. The neighborhood is built around a well-landscaped 207- acre park. The nearby neighborhood of Wicker Park has been almost completely gentrified in recent years. The residents recognize that because of their housing stock, proximity to other gentrified neighborhoods, and the appeal of the open space of Humboldt Park, their neighborhood is a prime target for gentrification.
The Campaign
In 1994 the Near Northwest Neighborhood Network (NNNN) organized a community planning process for the city's federal Empowerment Zone application. Although they didn't get selected as an empowerment zone they decided to continue to organize around the issues they identified in the planning process. Over 80 organizations came together to form the independent Humboldt Park Empowerment Partnership (HPEP).
HPEP worked to get small businesses into the neighborhood and developed a job- training program in collaboration with local manufacturers. They initiated a youth mentoring program that works with dropouts to get a degree, a job and then provides 5 years of follow-up services. HPEP also assisted 60 people become new homeowners. To date, HPEP has garnered over $22 million dollars from CDBG, foundations, and local businesses for the community projects.
Earlier this year HPEP applied to the city's Community Development Commission for redevelopment area status for Humboldt Park and specifically for eminent domain authority over vacant lots and properties for HPEP. At the first meeting they attended, they met opposition to their proposal from local landowners and developers. They were able to put off what likely would have been a ruling against their application in order to give them time to garner community support for their proposal.
Over the next several weeks HPEP held town meetings and promoted the ideas of the community plan. 150 to 200 people attended two town meetings. When the Community Development Commission held their next meeting to decide on HPEP's proposal, the organization brought over 600 supporters to city hall. They had 200 people testify for the application and the general community plan. The overwhelming community support moved the Commission to vote in favor of HPEP. They won redevelopment area status for Humboldt Park and, most importantly eminent domain authority over 159 parcels of land for HPEP. Ground breaking on 29 of the parcels will begin next spring in order to build new city subsidized homes for first time home buyers.
Analysis
HPEP organized a broad and diverse constituency around many community improvement issues. Their motto often was "agree to disagree" and move forward.
· They had a comprehensive vision for the neighborhood that was developed through a participatory community planning process.
· When they needed to, HPEP could turn out large numbers of concerned citizens to win concessions from the city.
· In general, they employed a strategy of making local politicians their allies and sharing in the success of the neighborhoods projects.
Sources
Jewish Council on Urban Affairs anti- gentrification conference materials.
· Interview, Mr. Medina,
Executive Director,
Near Northwest Neighborhood Network
Harlem was originally a mixed income and working class
neighborhood,
which was predominantly White. After WWI, White residents moved
to the
suburbs and Blacks moved into the area. The migration of
African-Americans
to the region from 1919 to 1926 helped to develop the Harlem
Renaissance
era. As a result, Harlem experienced a period of cultural
growth particularly
in the fields of music and the arts.
However, as the jobs disappeared, so did the economic sustainability of Harlem. After years of disinvestment and economic disenfranchisement, it resulted in decline and dilapidation characterized by low rents and land values. The population has been decreasing steadily and nearly a quarter of all houses were abandoned. Harlem was predominantly low income, uneducated, and African-American. Estimates indicate that 18.1% of the residents are unemployed compared to 9.0% for the New York City area. Furthermore, 43% of residents live below the poverty line, compared to 19.3% for the New York City area. These indicators demonstrate the disparity which currently exists.
Beginning in the 1980's, the forces of gentrification began to usurp the outlining area, first Manhattan, then the periphery of Harlem. Due to its ideal location and proximity to one of the highest rent districts in the world, Harlem was very vulnerable to the forces of gentrification. The restructuring of NYC's economy into a financial control center in the wider global economy increased its susceptibility to being gentrified. Housing costs were rapidly rising as well as rent levels and there were extremely low vacancy rates. After 1983, the sale prices for private residential sales soared. As a result of the 1987 stock market crash, gentrification slowed down considerably. Local government wanted to revitalize the area in order to reap in the economic benefits that potentially existed in the area.
Central Harlem residents were more likely to be spared from displacement because the city owns such a vast stock of abandoned buildings (many of them vacant) and undeveloped land that it is possible for substantial rehabilitation and redevelopment to occur before low income residents become displaced.
The extent of displacement will be determined by the level of opposition and organization within the community. Strategies to prevent gentrification/displacement in Harlem included the following:
Homeownership is promoted by the fact that local nonprofits provide residents with counseling and advocacy. Also effective is the use of purchase money mortgages and low interest rehab loans. There is recognition that development of mixed income housing units are advantageous means of ensuring affordable housing. Finally, it was important to have development be contracted to local minority contractors in order to create jobs for residents with a livable wage.
Other job creation mechanisms included fostering more entrepreneurial opportunities for local residents and new commercial developments such as Harlem USA. Job training in emerging health careers such as home health aides and a childcare initiative to meet the increasing demand of the welfare to work population was implemented. Lastly, investment in Harlem included a new primary healthcare facility as well as the renovation of Minton's Playhouse (restaurant and club), a remnant of Harlem's jazz era. Community ownership and pride was also enhanced with the development of the East Harlem Chamber of Commerce and a Latino Cultural Center.
Suffolk County sits northeast of NYC on Long Island. The
county
has been a model in comprehensive community development. It
strives to
reach a balance between economic revitalization/development
while reducing
the likelihood of displacement of residents. With median home
sale prices
exceeding $140,000 and high closing costs, it was becoming
increasingly
more difficult for low-and moderate-income families to become
homeowners
in the region.
The County worked with various agencies and groups to provide affordable housing and employment training and to improve public facilities in a targeted area, North Bellport. Low-and moderate-income homebuyers in this area, which is part of the Town of Brookhaven, will soon occupy newly constructed, single-family homes. The County will also make units available to low- and moderate-income renters there. All of the units benefited low- and moderate-income people, and all of the homes were built according to a scattered-site plan.
Local non-profit organizations provide housing counseling and rental housing as well as the construction and rehabilitation of affordable housing. The County is also working with participating nonprofit organizations to provide employment training in retail and manufacturing sales. Partnerships were established between local municipalities, nonprofit organizations, and banks. CDBG, ESG and HOME funding were used. The HOME funds have leveraged an additional $28 million in private funds.
The Suffolk County Down Payment Assistance Program was established in 1993 which assisted 22 households in purchasing homes. In 1997, 137 households were assisted, representing an increase of 600 percent. Down payment assistance is provided in the form of a non-interest bearing deferred payment loan.
From both an economic and social perspective, it was
important that
lower income households be provided with assistance to become
homeowners.
Ownership
of homes becomes a strong stabilizing force to counteract
gentrification/displacement.
Local nonprofits provided advocacy and counseling services to
residents
to assist them with their goal of buying their own homes.
Furthermore,
partnership
between the public and private sectors
was an essential component in
revitalization of the community while mitigating the forces of
displacement.
Finally, another unique aspect of the model used in Suffolk
County entailed
employment
training for local residents. The job training provided
residents with
more economic opportunities to obtain jobs with livable wages
while enabling
them to afford rising housing costs.
The Tenderloin District in San Francisco, one of the
city's last
affordable downtown neighborhoods, lies directly adjacent to
the upscale
tourist and commercial area of Union Square. In the face of
great gentrification
pressures from expanding hotel and retail interests on its
borders, Tenderloin
neighborhood activists succeeded in mobilizing an effective
response to
outside development pressures, built on a few tangible
victories, and created
a proactive affordable housing and community development
movement.
San Francisco's well-established post-war "growth machine" of private developers working in concert with city government fueled major changes to the urban form and structure of the city's downtown region in the decades following WWII. Some of these projects supported the development of the hotel and theatre districts on and west of Union Square. This area lies directly east of the Tenderloin. As hotels and tourist-oriented businesses moved closer to the Tenderloin in the 70s, increased conversion rates of SRO units, dramatic rent increases, and higher eviction rates contributed to the critical numbers of displaced individuals and families from the area.
The North of Market Planning Coalition (NOMPC) was created out of a series of neighborhood political advocacy planning meetings in 1979, a process partially funded by the San Francisco Foundation and involved numerous local residents and social workers. The new group organized around a strategic plan, which they soon adopted, stating conditions, goals, and strategies for improving and preserving qualities in the Tenderloin. Rallying local political bodies and presenting numerous compelling studies on the Tenderloin to city government, NOMPC gained three quick victories in the face of intense gentrification pressures: a ban on the conversion of SROs to tourist uses (or in lieu of significant replacement funds), the granting of a conditional use permit on an application for three new hotels on the Tenderloin's border that required significant mitigation funds from the private developers to community programs, and the downzoning of the Tenderloin to limit height allowances and the commercial use of buildings.
NOMPC was able to build upon these victories and develop a subsequent proactive approach to fighting gentrification in the Tenderloin. Engaging nonprofit developers and foundation contributors, NOMPC helped to establish a productive and strong coalition for affordable housing development in their neighborhood. By establishing ties with housing developers, local residents, city government, and commercial developers, NOMPC's efforts improved the social production capacity of the Tenderloin and helped create a more stable neighborhood infrastructure. In a three-year period in the late 80s, funding was given to the construction of over 3500 affordable housing units.
The development of an organized neighborhood political
structure
that could mobilize to protect low-income residents in the face
of intense
gentrification pressures and enhance local housing conditions
was critical
to the community development efforts in the Tenderloin. NOMPC's
ability
to maintain pressure on and eventually win favor with the
city's planning
officials proved essential. The broadened application and
flexible use
of the California Environmental Quality Act's Environmental
Impact Report
process, which considered the socio-economic impacts of
proposed
hotel development on the Tenderloin's environment in addition
to the potential
physical impacts, was possible only because of the city's
eventual support
of NOMPC's campaign. A key component to the group's responses
to gentrification
pressures was the early development of a strategic plan
and the
strong value placed on public participation throughout
the process.
The building of a strong coalition behind said plan was then
important
in sending a clear message to developers and government
officials
alike that sincere dialogue with neighborhood groups would be
necessary
when considering redevelopment projects in the Tenderloin.
Developing and maintaining a healthy supply of
affordable housing
in a given neighborhood is a critical part of any
gentrification responses.
Displacement itself is seen partially as a function of an
affordable housing
crisis by some communities that choose to focus improvement
projects primarily
on enhancing and improving their stock of affordable housing.
Through the late 80s and early 90s, the influx of new wealth fueled gentrification pressures in the Santa Fe area. The city of Santa Fe, and indeed much of the Rocky Mountain West region, saw a great influx of population in a relatively short period of time, witnessing over a 20% growth rate in the 80s. The migration of part-time residents and retirees brought significant levels of new private wealth to the area. Average housing prices in Santa Fe rose dramatically in the face of such pressures, and registered at 40% above the national average level in 1996. Many of the city's jobs are low paying tourist-related positions, and wages failed to keep pace with the local cost increases. Average wages in the area fell to over 30% below the national average. Such conditions priced out numerous families from the city entirely; many of which came from Latino backgrounds with several generations of roots in Santa Fe.
In response to the severe affordability problem, the city of Santa Fe, in partnership with nonprofits such as The Enterprise Foundation, led a participatory process resulting in the adoption of a comprehensive, strategic housing plan. A Housing Roundtable group was created to ensure implementation of the plan and consists of numerous affordable and for-profit developers. In a three year period from 1993- 1996, various programs under the Roundtable assisted 1300 households in acquiring or maintaining affordable housing (through subsidies, construction, and rehabilitation programs), established two housing trust funds and one predevelopment loan fund in the area, and created a CDC that operates a Community Land Trust aimed at acquiring land in the region and retaining it for future affordable housing development.
Development of a strategic plan was critical to the success of the Roundtable's programs, as was the commitment by the city to spend significant funds on its implementation. Also noteworthy was the city's decision to relinquish certain funding decisions to the Roundtable body, of which it is a member, but not the sole decision-maker. The coalition approach in which nonprofits, the city, and private developers have all taken significant parts in goal setting, planning, and implementation has fueled the Roundtable's success. The city has also been commended for its acknowledgement of unique cultural and economic conditions fueling the housing crisis in its region. The Roundtable has been extremely creative in funding its work and has managed to leverage $43 for every city dollar invested in its affordable housing programs. The Roundtable has been the recipient of numerous private and public awards for its collaborative process, its ability to generate significant outside funding, and its noticeable results.
The Lower East Side of Manhattan is the neighborhood
located between
Wall Street and Chinatown to the south, the Village and SoHo to
the west,
Gramercy Park to the north and the East River to the east.
Historically
it has been a pocket of poverty that is home to immigrant
communities and
bounded by wealthier neighborhoods. Cycles of investment and
disinvestment
in the Lower East Side have resulted in declining property
values and populations
from 1910 to the late 1970s. In the early 1980s the
neighborhood experienced
an intense process of gentrification due to a combination of
forces including
an economic boom in New York's financial markets, an active re-
packaging
of the neighborhood by the real estate industry, an influx of
artists and
galleries, and a city policy that promoted real estate interests.
Neil Smith in The New Urban Frontier: Gentrification and the Revanchist City, catalogs the process by which the real estate and the "culture" industry transformed the Lower East Side from a marginalized neighborhood for low-income and minority communities into one considered fashionable and avant-garde, drawing young middle-class professionals to the neighborhood. The real estate industry re-named the northern part of the Lower East Side the "East Village" in order to capitalize on its geographic proximity to Greenwich Village. Artists and art dealers moved into the community during the early 1980s; with Lower East Side galleries playing a pivotal role in the gentrification process by drawing in tourists, consumers, art patrons, etc. It should be noted that by 1987 dramatic rent increases in the neighborhood led to gallery closures, with many artists becoming the victims of the gentrification process they helped to precipitate.
While the real estate and the art industries were central to the gentrification of the Lower East Side, city government was a key partner in the "cleaning up" of the neighborhood. City policies promoted gentrification through two key policies: one, a cycle of drug crackdowns and harassment of the homeless population in Tompkins Square Park and environs; two, the development of policies that supported and subsidized real estate interests. One strategy was to use their "in rem" properties, obtained through foreclosures and nonpayment of property taxes, to support the development of higher income housing. For example, in August 1981 the Department of Housing, Preservation and Development (HPD) solicited proposals for an Artist Homeownership Program (AHOP) that would renovate 16 abandoned buildings and create 120 new housing units for artists.
This galvanized the community to form the Joint Planning Council (JPC), a coalition of more than 20 housing and community organizations who argued that these abandoned buildings should be made available to create housing for existing residents in the Lower East Side. An artist's opposition also emerged - Artists for Social Responsibility (AHOP). The AHOP proposal was ultimately defeated by the City Board of Estimates, but the AHOP proposal sparked the Joint Planning Council to propose its own community-based plan for vacant land. The Joint Planning Council proposed that all city-owned vacant lands be used for low and moderate-income housing. The City then proposed a cross-subsidy program whereby they would sell land to developers with an agreement that developers would make 20% of units available at below market rates for existing residents. In exchange for the affordable housing units, developers would receive a tax break.
Initially some of the community groups approved the proposal, though the program was ultimately weakened due to the vagueness of the cross-subsidy program. While the successes of the program were not all that the community had hoped for, it is worthwhile to note that the process of gentrification in the Lower East Side sparked the creation of a neighborhood wide coalition that was organized and could advocate for the interests and needs of community residents.
· There are no guaranteed formulas for successfully fighting gentrification and displacement of residents.
· As each of these communities have demonstrated, it is best to use a variety of strategies to deter gentrification, depending on the unique strengths and circumstances of each neighborhood.
· As common sense would have it, community partnerships are fundamental in promoting development while preventing gentrification.
The strategies that we uncovered in the course of our research might be grouped into the following five categories:
1. Community Planning
In many of the neighborhoods and cities that we looked at, the threat of gentrification sparked those who might be displaced to mobilize and develop a plan or vision for their community. The characteristics of these strategies of community visioning included the development of a strategic plan, an inclusive process with broad-based participation and support, and a unified vision.
2. Affordable Housing
Strategies in this category include: home ownership subsidies, non-profit ownership and management, first-time buyer counseling, community land trusts, affordable housing trust funds, tax increment financing (TIF), redevelopment districts, rent control, eviction restrictions, and SRO (Single Room Occupancy hotels) retention.
3. Jobs
This involves working with local businesses and other non- profits to train residents in marketable job skills, advocating to retain of the manufacturing and light industry base in the neighborhood, and requirements for hiring local contractors to do redevelopment work.
4. Local Ordinances
The communities that we looked at adopted a variety of local ordinances or legislative approaches to stave the process of gentrification:
Zoning & Land Use ControlsExamples of this include inclusionary zoning, downzoning, mitigation fees (balanced growth, one-to-one replacement)
Balanced Growth OrdinancesThis requires legislation, which would link downtown development to the support of neighborhood economic development.
Eminent DomainThis gives community organizations eminent domain power to acquire vacant land and buildings in their neighborhood, which may be renovated or redeveloped later. Examples include the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative.
5. Direct Action/Grassroots Organizing
This core strategy, we found, was utilized by every successful campaign. Often it was the key to winning. Some fundamental principles: clear message, plan, goal, targets that can easily be articulated by residents, whether or not they play a major part in the campaign, broad- based participation.
· Reframe the issue of gentrification as an effect of broader regional inequity; establish regional partnerships.
· Permanent Affordability: Strategies to increase the stock of affordable housing; nonprofit ownership of property; Community land trusts.
· Development of neighborhood plans to guide development - push for requirement that plan be followed as a city ordinance.
· Job linkage: Retaining manufacturing jobs; ensure neighborhood residents are capturing jobs that are emerging from economic development projects. Project/labor agreements - ensure that agreements include jobs for community residents. Development of more jobs which pay livable wages as well as affordable childcare for residents.
· Education and Services: Renters education--educate renters about their legal rights; Creating new coalitions among homeowners and renters; increase home ownership through support services such as counseling and advocacy.
· Data collection - to
enable the
community to measure the extent/impact of gentrification over
time.