Date: Fri, 6 Sep 1996 08:51:55 CDT Sender: H-Net/H-Urban Seminar on History of Community Organizing & Community-Based DevelopmentSubject: Alinsky/TWO: 1960s Organizing in an African-American Community Posted by Wendy Plotkin I'd like to respond to Randy Stoecker and describe Alinsky's major organizing initiatives in an African-American neighborhood of Chicago in the 1960s so that we can move on to post-Alinsky organizing. Randy asks whether Alinsky's failure to achieve his goal of gradual racial integration in a white working class Chicago neighborhood in the early 1960s was due to an absence of theory, a failure to identify the structural forces that made segregation so appealing to the working classes. According to Sanford Horwitt, Alinsky's biographer, Alinsky did have a theory. The theory was *not* a critique of capitalism, but of the distribution of power within capitalism. Essentially, Alinsky was a pluralist, arguing that a thriving democracy depends on competing interests, and that power is the prime ingredient for success of any organization in the democracy. Community organizing was the means of "empowering" a community -- something that was achievable within capitalism, although it required a vigilant citizenry to maintain it. In the Back of the Yards and the Southwest neighborhood, Alinsky was pushing for an equalization of economic and political power against the "Goliaths" of government and business. [1] Increasingly, Alinsky also saw the need for a redistribution of power among the races at the local level. According to Horwitt, this became especially apparent to Alinsky as he viewed those whom he had empowered in these neighborhoods exerting their power against African-Americans seeking expansion out of the Black Belt of Chicago. Thus, Alinsky turned to organizing an African-American community, Woodlawn, in Chicago in the 1960s. Aided by funding from several churches, both Catholic and Protestant, Alinsky accepted the program in part because it fit his racial agenda. As Horwitt writes, "...what was needed in Chicago--and as a model for other Northern cities--was a powerful black community organization that could 'bargain collectively' with other organized groups and agencies, private and public. Alinsky told von Hoffman, 'There is no substitute for organized power.... We know all of the opposition which would come, including many of the Negro leaders and agencies who actually depend upon segregation for their very existence. Also, We also know that there is no Negro organization in the field equipped or able to do the kind of job that has to be done." (368) It is in this last statement that one sees the rationale for a white-led organization, the IAF, taking on the challenge of organizing an African-American community. There was some indigenous organizing within the neighborhood, including the United Woodlawn Conference, which according to Horwitt was only marginally effective. Its "Communist" leanings were seen as offensive by some inside Alinsky's team, but Alinsky intended to include the Conference in his own organization, the Temporary Woodlawn Organization (TWO), that was created in January, 1961. An intensive organizing effort followed, led by Alinsky's second-in-command Nicholas von Hoffman, and aided by the hiring of Robert Squires, a Woodlawn resident. They made their way through the middle class sections of Woodlawn that already contained block clubs, and through the East Woodlawn area, which was considered a disorganized disaster (von Hoffman: "Anyone who claims to have anything remotely resembling a representative organization in East Woodlawn is either a liar or a fool. I have absolutely no faith in any of the organization maneuvers which have been pulled in the past, and that includes my own. None of them will work, no matter how much energy and vigor is put into them.") (397) Robert Squires asserted that he became acquainted with "every bookie, every whore, every policy runner, every cop, every bartender, waitress, store owner, restaurant owner." (398) With von Hoffman taking the lead in overseeing Squires and the entire effort, the targets of attack were identified: the University of Chicago and its urban renewal program, the city School Board and its inferior facilities for African-American students, slum landlords, and local businessmen with bad business practices -- targets that provoked the citizens into participation. Horwitt describes the increasing involvement of local African American leaders such as the Reverend Arthur Brazier in the organizing, and the application of the painstaking techniques that had been used in earlier organizing, interviewing and identifying individuals and organizations. The organizing took on a different direction when the national civil rights movement hit Chicago, however. While the micro-organizing was proving effective in small measure, the appeal to support the Freedom Riders who'd been beaten in the South in 1961 mobilized the community in a manner not dreamed of by Alinsky. Always the opportunist, Alinsky immediately adapted to this new stimulus, and incorporated the civil rights movement into a local voter registration drive. By March, 1962, TWO was on sound enough footing to become a permanent organization, re-christened The Woodlawn Organization. The founding convention was attended by the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, a major organizer within the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and Mayor Richard J. Daley. Were Alinsky and those he trained inside the neighborhood successful in organizing Woodlawn? If one uses the past as the threshhold of comparison, Horwitt argues that major successes occurred, such as the agreement of the city to include Woodlawn residents in significant numbers in the neighborhood's planning process (resulting in the disruption of the University of Chicago's plans, and the eventual alliance between the University and TWO in later battles); the decision of Marshall Field's, an exclusive department store, to hire African-Americans as salespersons; successes in getting slum landlords to clean up their properties or businessmen to cease cheating the residents. In the long run, larger forces proved too tough for Alinsky, according to Horwitt, and his ambition and/or zealousness defeated him. In spite of the occasional local successes, von Hoffman asserts that Alinsky was aware that it wasn't enough to organize the residents -- that obtaining political power in larger arenas was necessary. At the local level "TWO was a political island without enough of a power base--control of enough precincts, wards, and people--to grow and prosper." (513) An attempt to defeat the Daley machine in the 1966 Congressional race (with Abner Mikva the reform candidate) went sour when (according to Alinsky), the Woodlawn leaders were unable to rise to the level of vote-stealing necessary to win the election (515). Beyond the political defeat were the immense forces facing the neighborhood, forces reqiring "vast amounts of energy and perseverance--like TWO's job-training program and, perhaps, most of all, the subsidized housing TWO fought for on a strip of land on Cottage Grove Avenue. Although the 502-unit project--a scaled-down version of the original--was still a pround achievement, one of the first housing developments in a black ghetto planned, owned, and managed by an indigenous community organization, some important goals had been sacrificed because fo the delays and other factors." (515) Thus, in this passage, there is a hint of some of the issues Randy has been raising about community organizations taking on more they can handle -- and draining their enthusiasm and standards. Horwitt also asserts that the national civil rights movement was a mixed blessing to the organizing in Woodlawn -- although it provided a boost in participation, it allowed the organization to prosper without the fundamental grass-roots organizing that was required for a firm foundation, that would withstand the waning of the civil rights movement or the intense pressures put on the neighborhood when it attempted to address local issues. Alinsky also hurt his own cause by taking organizers out of Woodlawn to establish projects elsewhere -- abiding literally by his assertion that after 2-3 years, a neighborhood should have developed adequate resources to carry on on their own. Horwitt asserts that Alinsky should have known better -- his own experience in Back of the Yards had demonstrated that ongoing outside support was necessary for far longer. At the same time, the black power movement made it difficult for Alinsky to stay in Woodlawn. Although initially applauding it, and being applauded by it (Stokely Carmichael cited an Alinsky project as an example of what "black power" meant), Alinsky became critical of the "black power" ideology as it evolved. In turn, he was attacked as being an "exploiting liberal" for his work in African-American neighborhoods. (506-510) Horwitt deals with Woodlawn in a more superficial way, and with much more attention to the Alinsky/von Hoffman/Chambers role than does John Hall Fish in BLACK POWER: WHITE CONTROL: THE STRUGGLE OF THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION IN CHICAGO (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1973). Fish, who spent six years observing TWO prior to authoring this book, shows the initial importance of Alinsky to the organization, after which, by about 1966, the organization was basically on its own without active participation of the IAF. Fish indicates that Alinsky was invited in to deal with the "powerlessness" of the many organizations in the neighborhood. Alinsky instilled his principles of organization-building, small successes, and conflict into the organization, which was led by Reverend Arthur Brazier, who himself authored BLACK SELF-DETERMINATION: THE STORY OF THE WOODLAWN ORGANIZATION (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1966) and staff director Leon Finney. Fish goes into detail about TWO's early organizing, emphasizing the organization's agenda of establishing itself as the community "voice" through advocacy activities. In TWO's early phases of establishing itself, Fish sees the Alinsky influence, as it set its sights on achievable and visible victories. At the same time, he sees the pitfalls of such an agenda -- achievable victories exist in power vacuums, in areas in which the powerful forces in the city are not especially interested, or in which the stakes are low. Thus, victories over slum landlords or local sleazy businessmen are only marginal in affecting the distribution of power that affects the neighborhood, while visible voter registration drives are useful but not adequate to fight the corrupt tactics of the machine. Thus, Fish sees TWO's turn to "community control" of governmental functions such as education, economic development, and social welfare as an attempt to raise the stakes and have an impact on the major forces shaping the neighborhood. In each of its major initiatives -- experimenting with educational reform at the neighborhood level, offering a community-controlled and -operated job training program, and presenting a Model Cities plan that (unlike the city's plan) was developed by and for the Woodlawn community -- TWO tried to take over planning and resources for its own neighborhood, targeting them to its own needs rather than to those of politicians, office holders, and service providers, none of whom (according to TWO, Fish or Alinsky) had the community's best interests at heart. In each of these initiatives, Fish describes the enormous resistance of the establishment to the community initiatives, and essentially credits the establishment with undermining all of the creativity and awareness of their own issues that TWO brought to these initiatives. As Horwitt relied on BLACK POWER/WHITE CONTROL in his 1986 biography of Alinsky, it's not surprising that the two books should share similar assessments about the successes and failures of TWO. As described in Harvey Molotch's review of BLACK POWER/WHITE CONTROL, Fish displays some "ambivalence" about TWO [2], although he is essentially positive about its past and future importance to the neighborhood. In earlier chapters, after describing the need of the organization to attain community control over its institutions, he describes the drawbacks of community control. Community control, if achieved, might have backfired in putting the community organization in the position of raising expectations that it would deliver where the city had failed, minus sufficient resources to do so. This would lead to community dissension and division, rather than focusing the energies of the community on the external forces that Fish argued were central to its problems. Failing to achieve control, and not content to return to advocacy as its only role, TWO took on community development, developing housing and commercial projects in Woodlawn. Fish defends the change from advocacy to development as an appropriate adaptation. He asserts that any diminution of TWO's advocacy role resulting from its development activities was *not* responsible for the decline of the neighborhood, which worsened in the 1960s and 1970s due to a rash of arson and continuing disinvestment. Instead, external forces were so overwhelmingly against the organization, nothing would have prevented the decline of the neighborhood. Furthemore, Fish asserts that TWO, both as advocate/gadfly and developer, *tempered* these effects. TWO prevented the elimination of the neighborhood via urban renewal, developed affordable housing, offered an experiment in involving gangs in job training and stimulated an intangible sense of self-esteem and community spirit through its successes. [3] Furthermore, Fish argues that although the neighborhood organization could not successfully compete with the city and social welfare officialdom that were threatened by it and did their best to defeat it, future failure of these centralized efforts to deal with the neighborhood problems might result in the neighborhood organization's being handed the control it had sought as the only remaining remedy. Fish acknowledges that his interpretation of TWO was not (in 1973) the only one, nor necessary the most popular. He presents alternate interpretations -- that TWO's confrontative activities alienated it in the eyes of those actors with whom it would have been better to have cooperated, or that TWO "sold out" to the capitalist ethos in taking on community development. He also describes the prevailing theories about neighborhoods in the early 1970s, from Theodore Lowi's THE END OF LIBERALISM that called for an end to local attachments and commitment to a more rational planning over larger areas to Milton Kotler's call for NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT. Obviously, this literature is "old" and much has been written since on organizing, the IAF, and religious and racial organizing. In the abstract of his 1995 dissertation from the University of California at Berkeley, "Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and the Future of Democracy," Richard Wood describes some of the newer issues being discussed. This will be posted separately, and I welcome any discussion of the issues raised to date on Alinsky's organizing in working class white and African-American communities -- as well as suggestions of more recent literature on these topics. Wendy Plotkin COMM-ORG NOTES ----- [1] A more thorough account of the Organization of the Southwest Community is available in an older collection on which Horwitt drew in LET THEM CALL ME REBEL, by John Fish, Gordon Nelson, Walter Stuhr, and Lawrence Witmer entitled THE EDGE OF THE GHETTO: A STUDY OF CHURCH INVOLVEMENT IN COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION (Chicago: Urban Planning Commission, Church Federation of Greater Chicago, 1966). The preface for this book begins "This research documents reports on the involvement of several local Protestant and Roman Catholic churches with a mass community organization in a racially changing area of Chicago. The corporate participation of churches in this social and political experiment and others of its kind has been the subject of much controversy. The research is an inquiry into the interaction between churches and the community organizations, and into the meaning of this interaction for the participants." (xi) The Table of Contents for the book is: Chapter 1: The Story of the Organization for the Southwest Community Chapter 2: The Stories of the Churches Chapter 3: The Churches in Comparative Profiles Chapter 4: What Shapes Attitudes Toward Church Involvement in Community Organization Chapter 5: Summary and Interpretation [2]Harvey Molotch, Review of _Black Power/White Control_ in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, v. 80, May, 1975, pp. 1481-82. [3] The assessment of the TWO jobs training program, in which Woodlawn's gangs were a major part, is one area in which Horwitt and Fish appear to disagree. The job training program appears to have occurred after Alinsky's involvement in TWO, and to the extent that he discusses it, Horwitt tends to dismiss the gangs as a negative influence in the neighborhood. Fish spends some time in defending the inclusion of the Blackstone Rangers in the program, and asserts that there were signs of progress that were ignored by those who eventually contributed to the demise of the program. ========================================================================= Date: Mon, 9 Sep 1996 12:28:34 CDT Posted by Amanda Seligman Wendy's as-always able summary of Alinsky's work in Woodlawn includes the following comment on the job training program that TWO ran for two Woodlawn area gangs, the Blackstone Rangers and the East Side Disciples. > >[3] The assessment of the TWO jobs training program, in which >Woodlawn's gangs were a major part, is one area in which Horwitt >and Fish appear to disagree. The job training program appears to have >occurred after Alinsky's involvement in TWO, and to the extent that he >discusses it, Horwitt tends to dismiss the gangs as a negative >influence in the neighborhood. Fish spends some time in defending the >inclusion of the Blackstone Rangers in the program, and asserts that >there were signs of progress that were ignored by those who eventually >contributed to the demise of the program. I am currently away from all of my sources, but can offer the following observations about this program, based on the research I did for my first year paper in Northwestern's history PhD program several years ago. TWO was already offering a job-training program for adults in Woodlawn before pursuing the teen-oriented program. As I recall, the adult program included specific training for jobs in health services, as well as more general work readiness efforts such as workshops about what employers expected of employees. In 1967, the federal Office of Economic Opportunity approved a grant of $927,341 to TWO to provide a job training program for members to the rival gangs in their neighborhood. In the spirit of "maximum feasible participation" one of the important qualifications of the program was that the gang members themselves would administer the job training program. This program caught the attention of conservative Arkansas Senator McClellan, who held hearings about the use of the grant money and put TWO and the Blackstone Rangers into a hostile national spotlight. Shortly after, the grant was terminated. In his book _The Promised Land_, journalist Nicholas Lemann wrote, "In the history of the OEO, there was no grant that was as complete a failure." I've learned much since I first wrote my paper on this project, so at the present time I offer only some comments on why Horwitt and Fish viewed this project and the Blackstone Rangers so differently. Fish was (and is) a resident of Chicago's Hyde Park (directly north of Woodlawn), and at the time was a seminary student (BLACK POWER/WHITE CONTROL is a published version of his dissertation). Like many others involved in TWO in the early 1960s, it was not at all clear to Fish that the Blackstone Rangers and other gangs were irredeemably bad. As Frederic Thrasher began documenting earlier in the century, there were many, many groups organized as "gangs" in Chicago (1,313, I think). Some were merely loose social clubs, others were "athletic clubs," and others organized criminal activities. The word "gang" had not yet acquired its present pejorative connotation and applied to all these groups; for example, the Boy Scouts in Chicago held an annual "Gang Show" (which I gather was a sort of variety show put on by the Scouts). In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Americans began to worry about "youth" in a new way. They simultaneously worried about (witness REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE) and romanticized (witness WEST SIDE STORY) the experiences and anxieties of young people. Poor black people living in Woodlawn were no less susceptible to fears about the future of their neighborhood's children than other Chicagoans and other Americans. Thus, it seemed reasonable to members of TWO and to participant John Fish to take advantage of the opportunities represented by the War on Poverty to reach out to the young people in Woodlawn by offering them a share of the pie, and a share of the pie whose terms the young people would have a chance to define. Horwitt, on the other hand, wrote his book 20 years later, when the word gang had taken on a much narrower and more negative meaning. Aside from having the perspective that told him that the Blackstone Rangers became the yet more notorious El-Rukns, it makes sense that Horwitt shares the judgment of Senator McClellan and others that TWO's job-training program was a mistake. My point here is not to judge whether TWO *should* have attempted to reach out to the Rangers (I thought that I had worked that out when I first wrote my paper, and now I am less certain). Rather, I would like to stress that from a historical perspective, TWO's attempt makes sense. Amanda Seligman Department of History Northwestern University [Full citation is Nicholas Lemann, _The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America_, Alfred A. Knopf, 1991 Frederick Thrasher was the author of _The Gang; A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago_, first published in 1927 by the University of Chicago Press, re-released in 1936 and 1947 by the Press, and then re-issued in an abridged version in 1963 with an introduction by sociologist James Short. For a copy of the overview of Woodlawn and TWO, send e-mail to listserv@uicvm.uic.edu with the message: GET WOODLAWN OVERVIEW -- W. Plotkin, COMM-ORG]